By withholding de jure recognition of Russia’s battlefield gains, Ukraine can continue to claim, and demand return of, Russia’s battlefield gains. In other words, the agreement evades the central issue.

According to the agreement, Ukraine must renounce all NATO aspirations.  But Putin’s other demands, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine are apparently not included in the agreement.

Washington will lift the sanctions against Russia, and there will be US-Russia economic cooperation, which seems to mean that Russia will open aspects of its economy to foreigners for exploitation, a disastrous Russian decision.

This is what the Russian oligarchs and Atlanticist Integrationists, who have never supported the war, want.  How the Russia’s military feels about victory being shoved aside by a negotiated settlement is unknown.

But is it a settlement?  Zelensky’s latest statement at this time of writing is that he will not concede a square inch of territory to Russia.  If Zelensky has to be coerced, and as he is not legally or constitutionally the current president of Ukraine as his term of office has expired, successive Ukrainian governments can legitimately claim that the agreement is not valid.

Moreover,  Ukraine and Europe have placed themselves behind an alternative agreement.  In their proposed agreement, Ukraine will consent to begin talks with Russia, Europe, and the US about the territorial issues. Moreover, Ukraine will be granted US security guarantees similar to Article 5 in the NATO treaty.  In other words, Ukraine becomes essentially a de facto member of NATO.  Additionally, there will be no restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces or on the operations of foreign forces on Ukrainian territory, and Russia will compensate Ukraine for war damage.

Clearly, the two proposals have nothing in common.  Unless Europe gives in to Trump, a split is implied between the US and NATO, a split that could leave the US and Russia in an alliance that excludes Europe.  I have no explanation why Europe is taking this risk.

As we can see from the facts, only two of the four parties agree to the deal. Moreover, even if there is a deal, in the absence of de jure recognition of Russia’s territorial claims, the deal amounts to little more than kicking the can down the road.

In fact, John Helmer says that the deal is just a mechanism, a cover, for moving Russia aside so that Washington can get on with its war with China. 

Here is how Helmer describes the situation:

“The politico-military strategy driving the US negotiators and prompting Trump’s tweets, is not a peace deal with Russia, nor even US withdrawal from the war in Europe. It is a strategy of sequencing one war at a time – the war in Europe to continue in the Ukraine with rearmed Germany, Poland and France in the lead, supported by Trump; and the US war against China in Asia.

“Sequencing these wars so as not to fight both enemies simultaneously – that’s the formula devised for Trump by Wess Mitchell, a former State Department appointee in the first Trump Administration,  and his business partner Elbridge Colby, now the third-ranking Pentagon official as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.   ‘The essence of diplomacy in strategy,’ Mitchell has just declaimed in Foreign Affairs, ‘is to rearrange power in space and time so that countries avoid tests of strength beyond their ability.’ . .  

“Mitchell and Colby have convinced Trump and his negotiators that Russia has been badly damaged by the Ukrainian war which the Obama and Biden Administration have fought. Russian weakness, especially the perception that President Putin is both politically vulnerable and personally susceptible to US business inducements, is Trump’s strong card, and he should play it now.”

The goal is not peace, but to make money off of two wars: Europe and Ukraine’s war with Russia, and Washington’s war with China.  And perhaps a war with Iran for Israel thrown in. 

Readers can listen to Helmer’s presentation of what he says is actually occurring in his discussion with Ray McGovern on Nima Alkhorshid’s program ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgG4ZmTZQww ), and they can read it in several of Helmer’s recent articles in Dancing with Bears ( https://johnhelmer.net/one-war-at-a-time-and-plenty-of-money-to-be-made-in-the-meantime-this-is-trumps-game-as-the-russian-and-chinese-general-staffs-understand/ ).

Helmer’s source for his explanation of what is really happening is an article in Foreign Affairs by West Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia in the first Trump term.  Mitchell is currently working with Trump’s current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to sequence America’s wars with Russia and China as the US lacks the power to take on both simultaneously. Mitchell’s article was published on April 22, 2025, in the May/June 2025 issue of Foreign Affairs.  

Mitchell writes that the process of sequencing the wars with Russia and China should  begin “by bringing the war in Ukraine to an end in a way that is favorable to the United States. That means that when all is said and done, Kyiv must be strong enough to impede Russia’s westward advances” [for which no evidence exists, showing Mitchell’s mind to be controlled by the false narrative]. Washington should use the Korean War formula: “prioritize an armistice and push questions about a wider settlement into a separate process that could take years to bear fruit, it it ever does.”  This, of course, is what Washington’s de facto recognition of Russia’s territorial claims ensures.

Mitchell carelessly then reveals the intended deception of Babe-in-the-Woods Putin: “The United States should pursue a defense relationship with Ukraine akin to the one it maintains with Israel: not a formal alliance, but an agreement to sell, lend, or give Kyiv what it needs to defend itself. But it should not grant Ukraine [ de jure ] NATO membership. Instead, the United States should push European states to take responsibility for Ukraine—and for the security of their continent more generally.” This strategy capitalizes “on Putin’s special relationship with the Russian oligarchs” and dupes Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s negotiator, ” into pressing the Kremlin to accept a short-term military armistice which stops well short of the demilitarization and denazification goals of the Special Military Operation.”

So, as Mitchell describes it, the “peace agreement” is a Washington deception to set up, yet again,  “Babe-in-the Woods Putin” for the eventual destruction of Russia.

Can I believe this?  Yes, I can.  Helmer has  been watching things for a long time and reporting on them.  This scenario is not a product of Helmer’s imagination.  It is spelled out in an article in Foreign Affairs, long the arbiter of American foreign policy. The author, West Mitchell, a former Trump high official, clearly holds to the neoconservative policy stated by Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfwitz that the purpose of American foreign policy is hegemony over the world. If American hegemony requires war, war it is.

The Russians, with a large part of the mindless Russian establishment so desirous of being part of the West, have never paid any attention to the implication for Russian sovereignty of the neoconservative doctrine of US hegemony. This doctrine has not been denounced by President Trump. Consequently, Russia will be destroyed as the Russian government stupidly walks into deception after deception. Under Putin and Lavrov it will be one Minsk Agreement after another.

The question I have is:  Is Trump a part of the deception not only of Putin but also of the American people, or is this a deal he has accepted without realizing its consequences because he is desperate to end the conflict as he promised?  If Trump himself is part of the deception, then we have the explanation why the American Establishment did not prevent his reappearance in the Oval Office.

Trump met Zelensky in Rome on Saturday before Pope Francis’s funeral for what the White House described as “very productive” talks. The US president believes that the Ukrainian leader “really has no choice” but to sign up to the proposal, according to a source close to his special envoy Steve Witkoff. Trump is threatening to pull out of the peace process next week unless a deal is agreed.

The US proposal, presented by Witkoff to Moscow and Kyiv, was reported to include formal US recognition of Russia’s control over Crimea, the peninsula that was annexed in 2014, and de facto recognition of Russia’s control over areas of southern and eastern Ukraine that its forces have seized since the full-scale invasion of 2022.

A rival European and Ukrainian proposal makes discussion about control of territory dependent upon talks that would follow a ceasefire.

“Trump’s view is that this land has been seized and it is not going back,” said a source close to Witkoff.

“The deal on the table is that the Russian-occupied territory is going to remain occupied. Russia’s not pulling it out of it. That part is set in stone.”

The US believes that, if Ukraine rejects the deal, the war would go on for months and possibly years, with Kyiv reliant on Europe for funding and munitions, the source said. “The [US] funding cut-off actually is going to have as much of an impact as the weapons cut-off [this year], because Ukraine uses that money to buy more weapons from other allies,” the source added.

Asked if this was a “take it or leave it” moment for Zelensky, the source said the US saw it as “take it or take it”.

The Americans also believe European public opinion will turn against the huge expenditure required to keep Ukraine in the war as the continent heads towards recession — partly caused by Trump’s tariffs.

Witkoff held three hours of talks with President Putin in Moscow on Friday. Yuri Ushakov, a Kremlin foreign policy aide who took part in the talks, described the meeting as constructive and useful. “This conversation allowed Russia and the United States to further bring their positions closer together, not only on Ukraine but also on a number of other international issues,” he said. “As for the Ukrainian crisis itself, the discussion focused in particular on the possibility of resuming direct negotiations between representatives of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.”

Zelensky has argued that Ukraine’s constitution forbids him from formally recognising Crimea as part of Russia, and has ruled out signing any peace deal that hands over control of Ukrainian territory.

Trump showed his uncompromising line on Russian-occupied Ukraine when he told Time magazine on Friday that “Crimea will stay with Russia” and again blamed Kyiv for provoking Moscow’s invasion.

However, The Times understands that he is flexible on formal US recognition of Crimea at this stage, and is not trying to force Zelensky to sign away Ukrainian sovereignty, but to accept the Russian occupation.

Mariana Betsa, the Ukrainian deputy foreign minister, countered that Ukraine would do “whatever it takes” to take back Crimea.

“Our position is very clear and our president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is very clear on that. Crimea is Ukraine,” Betsa told Times Radio. “We’ll never recognise the attempted annexation by Russia. We will never recognise it as a Russian territory and we will take whatever it takes … to occupy our land, our country.”

She spoke hours after Yaroslav Moskalik, a senior Russian general, was killed in a car bomb attack in Moscow. The Kremlin blamed Ukrainian special forces for the attack.

Vitali Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv, said that Ukraine may have to concede land to halt the war with Russia. He said it could be a “temporary” solution to end the three-year-long conflict. “One of the scenarios is … to give up territory. It’s not fair. But for the peace, temporary peace, maybe it can be a solution,” Klitschko told the BBC.

In London, the former commander of the Ukrainian armed forces said that Russia would continue to wage war against his country until it suffers a massive defeat.

“As long as the enemy has the resources, forces, and means to strike at our territory and attempt offensive actions, he will do so. This is a war of attrition,” Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to Britain, said at the UK-Ukraine Defence Tech Forum. “Only the complete destruction of [Russia’s] ability to wage war, that is the military-economic potential, can put an end to this.”

While the gap between the two combatants remains wide, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking to CBS on Thursday, sounded optimistic that a deal might be reached soon.

“There are several signs that we are moving in the right direction,” he said. “Still there are elements of this deal which need to be fine-tuned.”

Russia’s plans for Ukraine

In previous meetings, Mr. Putin insisted that he was ready to stop fighting, but only if he was shown a road map to a permanent settlement that achieved Russia’s main war objectives.

After those talks, Mr. Trump publicized a plan that Russian analysts say was basically acceptable to the Kremlin. In it, a full ceasefire would take effect along the existing battlefront, the United States would grant legal recognition to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and Ukraine would forgo NATO membership. In addition, the U.S. would begin easing the blizzard of sanctions that have been leveled against Russia for over a decade.

Ukraine would receive “robust security guarantees” provided by European powers – but not the U.S. – and some small territorial swaps might take place. Major issues that Mr. Putin has explicitly listed as Russian war goals would be left to further negotiations. Those issues include substantial Ukrainian demilitarization, the exclusion of Ukrainian ultranationalists from government, language and religious rights for Ukrainian Russian-speakers, and the final territorial settlement.

The U.S. had intended to present that Moscow-Washington agreement to Ukrainian and European leaders in London this past week. But that fell through when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy balked, especially at recognizing Russian ownership of Crimea, and top U.S. diplomats canceled plans to attend the meeting.

Mr. Trump blamed Mr. Zelenskyy for derailing the peace process. But he also chided Mr. Putin for launching a massive aerial attack Wednesday night on Kyiv, claiming “We’re putting a lot of pressure on Russia, and Russia knows that.”

(Although Russian media reports have blamed Ukraine for the apparent assassination of Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik when a car exploded in Moscow today, there is no indication that the general’s death has had an effect on the peace talks.)

A big gap between the adversaries

In the absence of consensus, Ukrainian and European officials have drawn up an alternative list of steps toward peace that differs very sharply from the outline earlier agreed between Mr. Putin and Mr. Witkoff.

The pro-Ukrainian draft rejects any form of recognition of Russian occupation of any Ukrainian land, rules out limits on Kyiv’s military, calls for strong security guarantees for Ukraine backed by the U.S., urges against rapid sanctions relief for Russia, and suggests that Ukrainian reconstruction be funded by Russian assets that were seized in the West at the war’s outset.

Experts in Russia say the subject of the present U.S.-Russia talks is to find ways, if any, to reconcile these two very different approaches and arrive at a common position before any ceasefire can be arranged.

“Right now, Russia is willing to discuss and move forward on the basis of the Trump plan. But what to do if this proves absolutely unacceptable to Ukraine, Britain, and European powers?” says Alexei Mukhin, director of the Center for Political Information, an independent consultancy in Moscow. “Russian leaders want assurances that the U.S. will work to bring them all onto a common path.”

Mr. Putin has spelled out Russia’s key war objectives many times, and analysts say that after over three years of hard fighting and reported massive casualties, he probably doesn’t have much room for compromise.

“It’s wartime, and Russia is awash with patriotic rhetoric,” says Sergei Strokan, an international affairs columnist for the Moscow business daily Kommersant. “If Putin should backtrack on his basic demands, which he himself has expressed, that would be a very hard sell for Russian public opinion.”

An escape hatch for Mr. Putin?

Many Russian analysts express frustration with Mr. Trump’s “superficial” approach, which emphasizes haste and broad strokes at the expense of comprehensive negotiations that consider every detail and contingency.

“Russia has said many times that it wants a reliable, long-term peace settlement, not a quick memorandum that fails to resolve any of the basic issues,” says Mr. Strokan.

Moscow might request the Trump administration to split the negotiation process, separating the process of normalizing U.S.-Russia relations – a key Russian goal – from the thorny, and likely impossible, efforts to achieve a generally acceptable peace in Ukraine, says Mr. Mukhin.

“The stream of talks on restoring bilateral ties is proving very successful. Both sides want it and it promises a lot of long-term benefits,” he says. “Why should the broader relationship be held hostage to Ukraine? Let those negotiations continue on a different track.”

Many experts say that in the absence of a clear and generally-agreed blueprint for a peace settlement, no ceasefire is likely to last. Some Russian analysts even suggest that Mr. Trump’s frequently repeated threat to walk away from peace talks if they don’t bear quick fruit might be the outcome best for Russia.

“Trump is looking for a pretext to continue the process of normalizing relations with Russia, while getting out of Ukraine,” says Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser. “By agreeing to his ceasefire plan, Putin is giving him that pretext.”

His clear implication: When the ceasefire expires without what Moscow regards as a satisfactory settlement, Russia will return to the battlefield to reach its goals.

The process of making Ukraine a de facto member of NATO started in 1992, one year after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 1994 marked the first year that Ukrainian forces participated in NATO exercises, although these were held in Poland and the Netherlands. The following year, 1995, witnessed the creation of Ukraine’s Yavoriv military base as the NATO training center, although this was not formalized until 1999.

1999 was no coincidence… it was the year that NATO expanded to the East by accepting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members on March 12, 1999. This provoked alarm in Russia because it obliterated the promise of former US Secretary of State James Baker, that NATO would not move one inch to the East. President Bill Clinton broke that promise.

Part 2 will cover the period, 2000 – 2010. Part 3 will cover 2011 – 2021. The plan to use Ukraine as a proxy to weaken Russia was born in the 1990s and matured into war in 2022. I hope you find this informative.

I did a podcast today with Garland Nixon. That is posted at the end of this article.

1992

NATO-Ukraine Relations in 1992 — In 1992, Ukraine formally established relations with NATO by joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in March 1992. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established by NATO in December 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation between NATO member states and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

The NACC ostensibly was created to foster political consultation and build confidence between former adversaries, reflecting NATO’s “hand of friendship” to the newly independent and transitioning states of Central and Eastern Europe, which also included Russia. The NACC’s activities paved the way for deeper cooperation, notably leading to the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, which allowed for more practical and individualized cooperation between NATO and partner countries.

In 1997, the NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which expanded the partnership framework to include more countries and provided a more sophisticated forum for dialogue and cooperation, reflecting the evolving security environment and the deepening relationships between NATO and its partners. Russia also joined EAPC, but was suspended from the organization in 2014 after the people of Crimea voted to reunite with Russia.

• Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO began in March 1992 when it joined the newly established NACC, marking the start of formal relations and opening the door for future military cooperation .
• The first concrete participation of Ukraine in a NATO-linked military exercise did not occur until September 1994, when Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and participated in joint training exercises such as “Cooperation Bridge” in Poland .

1993

In 1993, Ukraine began its military cooperation with the United States and NATO, although it had not yet joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (which happened in 1994). The most significant development in 1993 was the initiation of the U.S.-Ukraine State Partnership Program (SPP), established between the California National Guard and Ukraine. This program laid the groundwork for ongoing joint training, military exchanges, and exercises.

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) advocated for establishing a Military Liaison Team (MLT) in Kyiv as early as 1993, but the deployment was delayed due to diplomatic considerations. Nonetheless, military cooperation and engagement activities were ongoing under the Defense Attaché Office. The cooperation in 1993 set the stage for more formal and larger-scale military exercises such as “Peace Shield” and “Sea Breeze,” which began after Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994.

1994

Cooperative Bridge 94

• In September 1994, Ukraine participated in its first NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint training exercise,
  “Cooperative Bridge 94,” held at the Biedrusko military training area near Poznan, Poland, from 12 to 16 September 1994 .
• This exercise involved approximately 600 soldiers from 13 NATO and Partner nations, including Ukraine, and focused on basic unit and individual peacekeeping tasks and skills.
• The aim was to share peacekeeping experience, develop a common understanding of operational procedures, and improve interoperability among NATO and Partner military forces .
• The exercise was conducted under the supervision of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and was jointly planned with Polish military authorities.

Spirit of Partnership

Later in 1994, a Ukrainian air-mobile unit participated in another PfP training exercise called “Spirit of Partnership,” held in the Netherlands.

1995

Peace Shield 1995:

The primary NATO/USEUCOM military exercise conducted with Ukraine in 1995 was “Peace Shield,” a joint US-Ukrainian exercise held at the Yavoriv training area near Lviv from May 23 to May 27, 1995. This exercise was part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which aimed to increase interoperability and cooperation between NATO and partner countries, including Ukraine.

Autumn Allies 95:

Another notable exercise was “Autumn Allies 95,” which involved approximately 400 U.S. Marines and 200 Ukrainian soldiers. The exercise focused on promoting interoperability in peacekeeping operations and was conducted later in 1995.

The Partnership for Peace program was central to these activities, providing a framework for joint exercises, training, and defense planning between Ukraine, NATO, and USEUCOM.

1996

Cossack Step-96:

In 1996, Ukraine hosted a military exercise called “Cossack Step-96” in cooperation with Great Britain. This exercise was conducted “in the spirit of Partnership for Peace (PfP),” NATO’s program for building trust and
interoperability with non-member countries, including Ukraine at the time. The exercise involved approximately 140 participants from Ukraine and Great Britain.

During this period, Ukraine was actively increasing its military cooperation with NATO through the PfP framework, which included joint training and exercises aimed at enhancing Ukraine’s ability to participate in multinational operations with NATO forces. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) was involved in
developing security cooperation with Ukraine, focusing on familiarization activities, military professionalism, and closer ties to NATO.

1997

Cooperative Neighbor-97:

In July 1997, Ukraine hosted the Cooperative Neighbor-97 joint exercise at the Yavoriv training grounds in western Ukraine. The exercise involved approximately 1,200 soldiers from the United States, Greece, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Macedonia. Cooperative Neighbor-97 was conducted under NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which aimed to build
trust and interoperability between NATO members and partner countries. The exercise focused on joint training and cooperation, and was observed by U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk.

Sea Breeze 1997:

Sea Breeze 1997 was a multinational maritime exercise cohosted by the United States and Ukraine in the Black Sea region. The exercise included U.S. Marines and Ukrainian forces and was initially planned to simulate an intervention in a fictional ethnic conflict, but the scenario was changed due to Russian
sensitivities. The revised scenario focused on providing humanitarian aid after an earthquake. The land-based segments were moved from Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland to avoid local protests and Russian
opposition. While conducted “in the spirit of NATO’s Partnership for Peace,” NATO itself maintained a hands-off approach, with only Turkey among NATO members sending ships to participate directly.

Significance:

Both exercises were part of the broader NATO-Ukraine cooperation established by the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, signed in July 1997, which set the framework for ongoing military and political collaboration. These exercises marked early steps in Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and were designed to enhance interoperability, readiness, and mutual understanding between Ukraine, NATO, and U.S. European Command forces.

1998

Cossack Express 1998 (May 1998)

• Location: Ukraine (multiple sites).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other PfP nations.
• Focus: Disaster response, humanitarian aid, and crisis management.
• Significance: Aimed at improving civil-military coordination in emergencies.

Peace Shield 1998 (June 1998)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) focused on peacekeeping operations, crisis response, and interoperability with NATO standards.
• Significance: Part of the “Peace Shield” series, which began in 1995 to prepare Ukrainian forces for potential NATO-led peacekeeping missions.

Sea Breeze 1998 (July 1998)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odesa, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, the U.S., and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Maritime security, search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Part of the annual “Sea Breeze” series (started in 1997), enhancing Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO in Black Sea operations.

Cooperative Nugget 1998 (September 1998)

• Location: Hohenfels Training Area, Germany (part of the Cooperative Partner series).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other NATO/PfP countries.
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations, joint command structures, and multinational coordination.
• Significance: Helped Ukrainian forces train alongside NATO troops in a simulated UN/NATO-style peacekeeping mission.

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and other U.S. military entities were actively engaged in planning and executing military-to-military contacts and exercises with Ukraine in 1998, focusing on familiarization, confidence building, and demonstrating U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty . The annual planners’ conference for military contacts was held in April 1998 in Stuttgart, Germany, to develop the 1999 plan, indicating ongoing and planned engagement. The transition of responsibility for U.S. military engagement in Ukraine from the Joint Staff to USEUCOM was underway in 1998, further institutionalizing these activities. The establishment of a Regional Training Centre at the Yavoriv training area in Ukraine was discussed as a future initiative for multinational training and exercises.

1999

Peace Shield 99 (May 1999)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members (including the U.S.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) focused on peacekeeping operations, interoperability, and crisis response.
• Significance: One of Ukraine’s major annual multinational exercises under the PfP framework.

Cooperative Partner 99 (June–July 1999)

• Location: Ukraine (Odesa and Myrhorod regions)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), and other NATO/PfP nations.
• Focus: Maritime and air operations, including search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Part of the Cooperative Partner series, enhancing Black Sea security cooperation.

Sea Breeze 99 (July–August 1999)

• Location: Black Sea (Odesa and Crimea)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. Navy (6th Fleet), NATO allies (including Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria), and PfP countries.
• Focus: Maritime security, amphibious operations, and crisis response.
• Significance: Part of the annual Sea Breeze series, which began in 1997 and continues today.

Cossack Express-99 (September 1999):

Held at the Yavoriv training grounds in Ukraine starting September 18, 1999, this NATO-sponsored exercise involved British and Ukrainian motorized infantry units of battalionsize. The exercise focused on rehearsing joint actions in UN authorized peacekeeping operations under NATO command, modeled after operations in the Balkans.

Cossack Steppe-99:

Conducted at the Nowa Deba training range in Poland beginning September 20, 1999, this exercise included company-sized motorized infantry units from Ukraine, Poland (a new NATO member at the time), and Britain. It also rehearsed joint peacekeeping operations under NATO command, with participation from the Ukrainian-Polish joint battalion.

Black Sea Partnership-99:

From September 20–25, 1999, the Ukrainian navy’s flagship Hetman Sahaydachny participated alongside NATO and partner country warships in this exercise, which was held mostly in Turkish waters. The aim was to practice joint naval operations and naval support for NATO-led peacekeeping operations on land.

CONCLUSION:

I spent 23 years scripting military exercises for US Special Forces. While I was not involved in the scripting of any of these NATO/US military exercises, I understand the purpose and process of them. These were not harmless games. They were designed to train and equip the Ukrainian military to fight Russia, potentially with NATO’s direct involvement. We have seen that come to fruition since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. It is no coincidence that Russia hit the Yavoriv NATO military facility on March 13, 2022.

Troops, engineers and construction workers from Ukraine — which is engaged in a disastrous war with Russia since February 2022 and unsure of continued U.S. assistance under President Donald Trump — entered Moldova without informing its poorer, landlocked neighbour which also shares its border on the west with Romania.

Known for its exquisite wines, Moldova, a country of 2.4 million, has been buffeted by an energy crisis following the discontinuation [by Ukraine on Jan. 1] of Russian gas supplies through Ukraine. The country — whose ethnic majority Moldovans are peeved at being dominated by Ukraine on one side and Romania on the other — is also plagued by huge unemployment among the youth.

“The Kyiv regime began constructing a second barrier line at the Lower Dniester Hydroelectric Power Plant from the Moldovan side without prior notice to Chisinau (Moldova’s capital). This (has) created an imbalance of 470 MW between the Moldovan and Ukrainian power systems, with Chisinau’s energy losses rising to 7.1 percent. For the average Moldovan consumer, this meant electricity costs instantly more than tripled,” a Moldovan energy official told Open, asking not to be named because he is not authorised to speak to the media.

The construction is on the Moldovan side of the Dniester River, which flows from Ukraine to Moldova, the breakaway region of Transnistria, then to Ukraine and finally to the Black Sea, a person in the know explained.

“They also occupied a section of the Odesa-Reni highway near the Moldovan village of Palanca [the site of a border crossing] as well as a hydroelectric power plant in the north near the Ukrainian city of Novodnistrovsk (specifically in the Ocnita district),” the first official noted, adding that the Ukrainian encroachment, steered by its special forces and a U.K.-based security services provider, started by the autumn of last year.

Palanca is Moldova’s lowest easternmost point. 

According to another source, “There are fears, real fears, that the Ukrainians aim to draw a line across from their border to Palanca to secure the passage of the river fully, meaning they could lop off a chunk and occupy a part (of Moldova) that juts into Ukraine and claim it as their own. Right now, the river is the border.” Neither Ukrainian nor Moldovan government officials responded immediately to emails from Open.

These developments have stirred anguish and a sense of helplessness among Moldovans, the first official added. The locals, according to the World Bank, are reeling from “the spillover effects” of the Russia-Ukraine war. The Bank noted in a report that in Moldova, “poverty remains pervasive, particularly in rural regions where access to services and viable economic opportunities is limited.”

The report said that “traditional means of poverty alleviation, such as remittances and social assistance, are slowing, while low labour force participation and employment rates impede a shift to employment-based poverty reduction, underscoring the urgency for structural reforms.”

In addition, close to a quarter of Moldova’s young people aged 15-34 are neither employed nor pursuing education.

Ethnic Moldovans account for close to 78 percent of the nation, which is predominantly Christian; Romanians make up 8 percent and Ukrainians less than 5 percent. Several officials in the government of President Maia Sandu are Romanian nationals, adding to disaffection among a majority of locals.

Analysts argue that the news of this apparent violation of Moldova’s sovereignty by Ukraine is bound to embarrass President Volodymyr Zelensky at a time when the Trump administration has distanced itself from the war. Calling it his predecessor “Biden’s war,” the U.S. president has taken the credit for sealing a limited ceasefire between the warring sides, vowing to work towards a complete truce.

Ullekh N.P. is a writer, journalist, and political commentator based in New Delhi. He is the executive editor of the newsweekly Open and author of three nonfiction books: War Room: The People, Tactics and Technology Behind Narendra Modi’s 2014 Win, The Untold Vajpayee: Politician and Paradox and Kannur: Inside India’s Bloodiest Revenge Politics. His book on Cuba, Mad About Cuba: A Malayali Revisits the Revolution, part travelogue and part political commentary, was released in November 2024.

Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that its army has no chance in the foreseeable future of reconquering the territories now occupied by Russia. Vice President J.D. Vance’s statement that the U.S. plan would “freeze the territorial lines…close to where they are today” simply acknowledges an obvious fact.

On the other hand, by reportedly agreeing to a ceasefire along the present front line, Putin has indicated his readiness to abandon Russia’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from the parts of the provinces claimed by Russia that Ukraine still holds. This too is common sense. The Ukrainians will never agree to give those up, and, judging by the slowness of Russia’s advance to date, conquering these territories in the face of Ukrainian resistance backed by the U.S. would be a long and horribly bloody process from which Russia would gain only devastated wastelands.

Even without a U.S. veto, NATO membership for Ukraine is not realistic, both because all existing NATO members have made clear that they will not fight to defend Ukraine, and because several European countries will also veto Kyiv’s membership. Indeed, during the peace talks at the war’s outset, President Volodymyr Zelensky himself said that since all the leading NATO governments (including the Biden administration) had refused to promise NATO membership within five years, a treaty of neutrality with security guarantees was the best way for Ukraine to go.

At the same time, the Trump plan contains one big surprise: the offer to recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea. Unlike neutrality and de facto (not de jure) acceptance of Russian control over the other territories, this really constitutes a major concession to Russia. It is not, however, as big as the Western media is suggesting, since it does not cover the other four provinces in eastern Ukraine that Russia claims to have annexed.

Nor is it clear yet whether the Trump administration is simply offering formal recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea itself, or whether it — and Moscow — will also insist on Ukraine doing so, which is almost certainly politically impossible for the Zelensky government. White House press spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt has said that Trump’s offer of recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea applies only to the U.S., and that he is not demanding that Ukraine follow suit.

Given this ambiguity, it was unwise and thoughtless of Zelensky to declare immediately that “there is nothing to talk about here.” Maybe he doesn’t need to talk about it — and this kind of public rebuff is no way to retain the Trump administration’s sympathy.

There is a certain legal, moral, and historical basis for the U.S. at least to treat Crimea differently, since Crimea was only transferred from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet decree in 1954, and without any pretense of consultation with the local population. The Crimean majority vote to join Russia in 2014 also appears to have been generally credible, while the “referenda” held by Russia in the other four provinces in the middle of the war are rightly seen as wholly unreliable.

Will this plan bring peace? Russia appears close to accepting it — though at least as revealed so far, the plan does not appear to address other Russian demands, including the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine, limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces, and, above all, a bar on a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine, something on which the British, French, and other governments have been working intensively.

It is possible that the Kremlin will try to load additional and genuinely unacceptable conditions onto the peace plan (for example, radical reductions in the Ukrainian armed forces). In that case, Trump should blame Moscow for the failure of the peace process, and, while walking away from it, should also continue U.S. aid to Ukraine.

A key motive for Moscow’s acceptance is that the Putin administration is indeed extremely anxious that Trump should blame Ukraine and the Europeans, not Russia, for a failure of the talks, and therefore that if, as threatened, he “walks away” from the peace process, he will also cut off military and intelligence aid to Kyiv.

For that same reason, the Ukrainians and Europeans would be insane to reject this plan outright, as initial statements suggest they may. As already noted, the formal goals set by Ukraine, for NATO membership and the recovery of its lost territories, are practically impossible to achieve. In concrete terms therefore, Ukraine loses nothing by agreeing to Trump’s plan.

Assuming that the British government sticks to Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s statement that a European “reassurance force” can enter Ukraine only if the U.S. acts as a “backstop,” then this force is also not going to happen. Trump has no intention of providing such a guarantee, which would amount to Ukrainian NATO membership by another name. Key European governments including Poland’s have also said that they would not participate in any such force.

At present and for a considerable time to come, the British and French armies simply do not seem to have the troops for such a deployment in a context of possible war with Russia. A former British army chief, General Lord Dannatt, has said that (given the need for rotation and training of troops) up to 40,000 British soldiers would need to be designated for such a force, and “we just haven’t got that number available.” Creating such a force for Ukraine would also mean ending British commitments to defend existing NATO members, notably the Baltic states and Poland.

At present, the likely response of Kyiv and most European governments to the Trump plan appears to be “no, but.” In other words, they will reject the plan as it stands, but declare their readiness to negotiate on aspects of it. This, however, would be deeply unwise, if indeed Russia is ready to accept it. Trump is waiting on them and he is not a patient man. His administration’s threat to leave Ukraine and Europe to their own devices could hardly have been clearer. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated:

“The Ukrainians have to go back home, they have to run it by their president, they have to take into account their views on all of this. But we need to figure out here now, within a matter of days, whether this is doable in the short term. Because if it’s not, then I think we’re just going to move on.”

If the U.S. does indeed “move on,” Ukraine will have placed itself in a terribly precarious situation, and West European countries may face a choice between deep humiliation and immense danger. For if U.S. aid is withdrawn, Ukraine’s ability to hold its present line would be greatly reduced, and the chances of a Russian breakthrough greatly increased.

If that happened, Europeans would either have to admit that their “ironclad” promises to Ukraine were made of paper, or send their troops into Ukraine. They could of course stay in Kyiv and Odessa, far away from the actual fighting, but how would that help Ukraine? And unless this intervention were worked out as part of a deal with Moscow that ceded much additional territory to Russia, how could European air forces avoid being drawn into direct combat?

Given these acute dangers, and given that details of the Trump plan still have to be worked out, the appropriate Ukrainian and European response should be “yes, but” — certainly if they wish to have any hope of retaining Washington’s support for Ukraine.

The Trump plan would leave 80% of Ukraine independent and free to try to move towards membership in the European Union, and, in historical terms, that would be a great (albeit qualified) victory for Ukraine. A rejection of that plan can only promise Ukraine greater defeat — possibly catastrophically greater.

Anatol Lieven is Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and in the War Studies Department of King’s College London.

The operatives assembled their war plans immediately in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and delivered them directly to the highest-ranking relevant U.S. National Security Council official in the Biden administration.

Proposed operations ranged from covert military options to jihadist-style psychological operations against Russian civilians, with the authors insisting, “we need to take a page from ISIS’ playbook.” 

ISIS was not the only militant outfit upheld as a model for Ukraine’s military. The intelligence cabal also proposed modernizing improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, like those staged by Iraqi insurgents against occupying U.S. troops, for a potential stay-behind guerrilla army in Russia, which would attack rail lines, power plants and other civilian targets.

Many of the cabal’s recommendations were subsequently enacted by the Biden administration, dangerously escalating the conflict and repeatedly crossing Russia’s clearly-stated red lines.

Included among the proposals were providing extensive training to “Ukrainian expatriates” in using Javelin and Stinger missiles, enabling “cyberattacks on Russia by ‘patriotic hackers’ with deniability,” and flooding Kiev with “unmanned combat air vehicles.”

It was also foreseen that “replacement fighter aircraft” would be provided by “many sources,” and that “non-Ukrainian volunteer pilots and ground crews” would be recruited to fight air battles in the manner of the Flying Tigers, a World War II-era force composed of American Air Force pilots, which was formed in April 1941 to help the Chinese oppose Japan’s invasion before Washington’s formal entry into the conflict.

The document was written and cosigned by a quartet of academic armchair warriors with colorful pasts. They included historian Andrew Orr, the director of the Kansas State Institute for Military History.

His recent academic contributions include a chapter in an obscure academic volume entitled, “Who is a Soldier? Using Trans Theory to Rethink French Women’s Military Identity in World War II.”

Joining him was Ash Rossiter, assistant professor of international security at the United Arab Emirates’ Khalifa University, and described as “ex-British Army Intelligence Corps.” Also participating was Marcel Plichta, then a doctoral candidate at St. Andrews.

He’s described as a veteran of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, and his LinkedIn profile indicates he interned at NATO before working in roles with Pentagon contractors, then joined the DIA as an intelligence analyst. Along the way, Plichta claims to have “[nominated] known or suspected terrorists to the national watchlisting and screening community.”

Also involved in the academic cabal was Zachary Kallenborn, a self-styled U.S. Army “mad scientist” currently pursuing his PhD in War Studies at King’s College London, with a focus on drones, WMD and other edgy forms of modern warfare.

Kallenborn, who has moonlighted at the D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, contributed to the Ukraine war planning by offering proposals for Iraqi insurgent-style “smart” IED attacks on Russian targets, and planting bombs on Russian trains and railways. 

The cabal appears to have been led by Marc R. DeVore, a senior lecturer at Britain’s St. Andrews University. Little about his personal or professional background can be ascertained online, although his most recent academic publications discuss military strategy.

Around the time the secret proposal document was being drafted, he published an article with Orr for the Pentagon’s in-house Military Review journal entitled “Winning by Outlasting: The United States and Ukrainian Resistance to Russia.” Moreover, he is a fellow at the elite Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, a Ministry of Defence-run “think tank.”

Emails show DeVore passed the group’s handiwork directly to Col. Tim Wright, who was the director for Russia in the Biden administration’s National Security Council (NSC) at the time the emails were sent, according to his LinkedIn profile. Since July 2022, Wright has been the assistant head for research and experimentation in the Futures Directorate of the British Army.

The Grayzone attempted to contact Orr, Rossiter and Devore by phone and email in order to solicit comment about their role in proxy war scheme, and about whether St. Andrews University was aware it was being used as a base for planning terror attacks against Russia. None have responded to our requests.

Surging Ukrainian Diaspora to the Front

Once the Ukraine proxy war erupted with full force in February 2022, the cabal of military academics quickly laid out what they described as “ideas of varying practicality that may not have been considered that Western states can collectively take to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to resist and hopefully preserve its independence.”

Dedicated sections spelled out five suggestions, along with “background for such action and possible avenues for implementing them.” They boasted that the “fastest proposals” in the document were “executable in little over a week.” 

First on the list was arming Ukrainian emigres with anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, due to Kiev’s lack of “trained crews to operate the large numbers of missiles” being shipped to them by the West.

They cited the little-known October 1973 Operation Nickel Grass as a means of “providing trained crews along with the hardware.” Under that mission’s auspices, Tel Aviv’s embassy in Washington “mobilized Israeli students studying at American universities,” who were then “rushed… through a rapid training program” by the U.S. military.

This included teaching the conscripts how to use weapons similar to Javelin and Stinger missiles. The Israelis were then airdropped onto the frontlines of the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Syria and Egypt, where they “achieved ample tank kills before the two-week war had concluded.”

The academics proposed doing “the same for Ukraine,” due to “large numbers of Ukrainian young men” living in the West, some of whom would have completed compulsory military training before emigrating.

This diaspora, it was believed, could easily be identified and recruited due to their registration with Ukrainian “consulates or embassies” in the West, then given “intensive classes” in using “shoulder-launched missiles” before being dispatched to Kiev. 

‘Volunteer Cyber Warriors’ Conceal State Hacking

The quartet’s plans extended into the realm of cyberware, calling for “Western intelligence agencies” to “provide cyber tools and suggestions” to “volunteer hackers who want to strike their blow for Ukrainian independence, while also warning them what targets we do not want attacked.”

A “major task for these volunteer cyber warriors,” the four wrote, “could be to make certain that videos of Russian indiscriminate attacks, the use of objectionable weapons such as thermobarics, Ukrainian civilian casualties, Russian casualties and poor befuddled captured Russian conscripts” were made available to Russian audiences.

Simultaneously, “patriotic hackers” could seek to bombard Russians with propaganda “about domestic opposition to the war.” 

The intelligence cabal made clear they aimed to achieve the same psychological impact as the world’s most notorious terrorist organization, declaring, “we need to take a page from ISIS’ playbook in agilely communicating our message to Russians.”

The activities of these “volunteer cyber warriors” were designed to provide cover for more formal, state-level hack attacks on Russian cyber infrastructure.

“The greater the volume of freelance cyber-attacks on Russia, the greater also will be the opportunities for Western intelligence agencies to launch surgical cyber-attacks to disrupt key systems at key moments … because these will be more plausibly attributable to the truly amateur component,” the four academics evangelized.

The description offered strongly resembles the “IT Army of Ukraine,” a volunteer cyber militia propped up in the days after Russia’s invasion.

Since then, it’s been overseen by Mikhailo Federov, the Ukrainian digital czar credited by the BBC with pressuring Samsung and Nvidia to cease operations in Moscow, and getting PayPal to de-bank all its Russian clients. 

Ukraine’s cyber army collaborates closely with Anonymous, the once-countercultural online hacker collective whose work now tracks closely with the objectives of the C.I.A.

The authors of the proposal to the NSC hinted at the relationship, writing, “Hacking groups such as Anonymous have already begun targeting Russia. This effort could be enlarged and enhanced.” 

The Ukrainian cyber army has taken credit for various acts of online vandalism. However, it also appears to have been involved in hacks targeting Russia’s power grids and railways. An attack on Russian taxi service Yandex that caused a large September 2022 traffic jam in Moscow was jointly attributed to both Ukraine’s ‘IT Army’ and Anonymous.

‘Modern’ IEDs for Blowing up Russian Infrastructure

The academic cabal’s plans for attacking Russia through unconventional means extended explicitly into the realm of terrorism.

A series of detailed recommendations for attacking Russian railway systems and roads with improvised explosive devices was put forward by Zachary Kallenborn, a self-described “PhD Student in War Studies at King’s College London researching risk analysis, perception, management, and theories with topical focuses in global catastrophe, drone warfare, WMD, extreme terrorism, and critical infrastructure.” 

“Fuel tanks for diesel locomotives are typically on the bottom, underneath the engine,” Kallenborn wrote. “It wouldn’t be very difficult to plant and disguise small explosives between the wooden slats of the railway then detonate when the locomotive is above it… Ideally, guerrillas operating behind Russian lines would place the anti-locomotive lines.”

Throughout 2023, a group of self-described Russian and Belarussian anarchists conducted a series of attacks on railways, cell towers and infrastructure inside Russia.

Calling themselves BOAK, or the Combat Organization of Anarcho-Communists, the group of radical saboteurs earned glowing promotion in Western media. It is unclear if it received any outside assistance, however. 

Kallenborn’s proposal, drafted in conjunction with the U.S. War Department’s Joint IED Defeat Organization, suggested the U.S. and its allies could “draw upon the lessons they painfully learned in Iraq and Afghanistan to help Ukraine orchestrate an IED campaign behind Russia’s lines.” 

With the Taliban and Iraqi insurgents as models, Kallenborn proposed two technologies, “public-private key ring cryptography and ‘smart’ IEDs… to greatly increase the effectiveness of such a campaign.”

To wreak havoc inside Russia, Kallenborn envisioned a modern “stay behind” force similar to those unleashed onto Europe during Cold War era Operation Gladio, when the C.I.A. and NATO organized fascist gangs and mafiosi to conduct anti-communist terrorist attacks. 

Meanwhile, “smart” IEDs with “modern components” such as “microcontrollers,” which are now “abundant and cheap,” would allow Ukrainian attackers to “exercise additional discretion, reducing potential for collateral damage,” and “detonate the IED regardless of what the targets do.”

“The circuitry of microcontrollers can internalize most of the circuitry that would originally have been hard-wired into IED initiation switches,” Kallenborn wrote. He added:

“All microcontrollers have multiple inputs and outputs allowing multiple inputs, all while controlling multiple devices. Because microcontrollers are programmable, attackers can automate complicated algorithms to maximize an IEDs effects, and reduce collateral damage. Microcontrollers can even, relatively easily, circumvent many common countermeasures.”

Secretly Employing Contractors to Pilot Drones

While taking inspiration from non-state actors like ISIS and the Taliban, the Western academics plotting on the Ukrainian government’s behalf had elaborate plans for conventional warfare as well. 

They assessed that drones had already “proven effective thus far” in the proxy war, so they urged greater deliveries of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, which they said were “virtually the only airborne platform with which Ukraine is successfully striking Russian ground forces.”

They proposed flooding Kiev with “additional TB2s,” pointing out that since Ukraine was already openly using them, and “had more on order before the conflict began,” Turkey’s role in supplying yet further drones could be concealed, leaving its neutrality publicly intact.

Ankara “could potentially transfer significant numbers of TB2s rapidly” from a variety of sources, the academics assumed, and fly them using local “private sector contractors.” If Turkey was unwilling or unable to go along with this plan, alternatives could be sought.

“Given how commonly UCAVs are operated by private sector contractors, these could all be remotely piloted by private sector personnel employed by Ukraine, rather than uniformed members of NATO armed forces,” they noted.

Since drones can be operated “from considerable distances away from the frontline (potentially with pilots operating from neighboring countries),” they offered the further “advantage” over contract pilots, in that they would “be comparatively safe and certainly unlikely to be captured and paraded in front of Russian cameras.”

While U.S.-produced unmanned systems such as Predators and Reapers were an option, and could be provided “in large numbers,” they “would appear the most provocative” from Russia’s perspective, and make active U.S. involvement too obvious.

Prophetically, the paper noted Ukraine could be provided instead with “commercial-off-the-shelf drones such as the DJI Mavic and Phantom,” which not only had recording equipment capable of producing “tactically useful intelligence,” but could “be modified to carry explosives.” Moreover, “their wide-spread availability” made “attribution of these platforms to a supplying nation difficult.”

It is surely no coincidence that ever since, both drones have been deployed extensively by Kiev to slow Russian advances and swarm military and civilian infrastructure.

By contrast, despite alleged initial successes, Bayraktar TB2s quickly vanished from the skies of Donbass. As several Ukrainian officials have admitted, Russian innovation in air defense and electronic warfare rendered the drones effectively useless.

Conversely, the paper noted that while Ukraine’s Air Force was still conducting missions, Kiev would soon “run out of aircraft.” The prescribed remedy was to re-equip the country with Soviet-produced MiG-29 fighters, which “Ukrainian pilots know how to operate” already.

This plan, however, required a number of countries to hand over their ancient fleets of MiG-29s. The academics expressed concern that Central and Eastern European states might be “reticent” due to the risk of “Russian retaliation,” which could be circumvented by “promising gifts” to them, such as weapon upgrades.

A year later, in March 2023, Slovakia granted Kiev its entire squadron of 13 MiG-29s in exchange for a U.S. promise of 12 Bell AH-1Z attack choppers equipped with Hellfire missiles.

Poland initially promised to match Slovakia’s splurge, but only wound up delivering a token amount. The deal has remained on hold since Krakow’s August 2024 announcement that it wouldn’t provide any further MiG-29s until it received a fleet of F-35s, which aren’t expected to arrive until 2026.

Peru, likewise tapped by the academics as a potential source for the aircraft, reportedly initially greenlit supply of its MiG-29s to Ukraine, but then reneged. Latin American governments more widely have refused to dispatch any arms whatsoever to Ukraine, despite U.S. pressure. 

Air Wars Waged Against Russia by ‘Non-Ukrainian’ Pilots

Perhaps the most disquieting passage of the document is its last, in which its authors survey historical examples of air forces employing foreign pilots in major conflicts.

The paper notes that the aforementioned Flying Tigers “were discharged from the U.S. armed forces” to fight Japan in China, “with the clear understanding that they would be welcomed back thereafter.”

Also cited was Finland’s employment of an “entirely” foreign squadron in its 1940 war with Moscow, as well as Zionist settlers’ reliance on an air force “comprised almost entirely of foreign volunteers” during their military campaign against indigenous Palestinian and Arab forces in 1948.

The academics wished to apply these precedents to the Ukraine proxy conflict, creating “volunteer fighter groups today to bolster Ukraine’s air defense” composed of “a reasonable number of Western pilots.”

They wrote that these airmen “might volunteer if their national armed forces offered leaves of absence” — as might their civilian counterparts, if U.S. commercial airlines could be “pressured into allowing their pilots, who are fighter-qualified Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard pilots, to take such leaves of absence.”

The document boasted that “volunteer fighter groups could substantially disjoint Russia’s air campaign.”

F-16s were considered “the most logical option” due to “the number of NATO members that use F-16s,” including Poland. Accordingly, “Polish spare parts could be trucked into Ukraine comparatively quickly,” with the U.S. “airlifting replacements” to Warsaw.

From almost the first day of the proxy war, its most hawkish supporters have demanded that Kiev be provided with these fighter jets, referring to the planes as a “game changer” which would tip the conflict’s scales decisively in favor of Ukraine.

Despite much initial fanfare, when F-16s finally arrived in Kiev in late July of 2024, President Volodomyr Zelensky almost immediately complained the country had only received a handful of jets, and did not have enough pilots trained to fly them.

The panic spread to Washington, where Sen. Lindsey Graham publicly urged any “retired F-16 pilot… looking to fight for freedom” to sign up. By the month’s end, the first of the F-16s had crashed in uncertain circumstances.

While references to Ukraine’s “game changing” use of F-16s have all but disappeared from the media in the months since, the leaked proposal’s contents raise serious questions how many supposedly Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia were actually perpetrated by Western military operatives, acting at the behest of, and with the material assistance from, NATO and the U.S.

“Western European and American fighter pilots tend to fly substantially more hours and train more realistically than their Russian or Ukrainian counterparts,” the academics claimed, meaning they were ideal candidates for conducting “combat missions” against Moscow’s positions, forces and territory.

However, the academics cautioned against Western pilots flying close to the frontline, for fear that “foreign volunteers fall into Russian custody, where an example could be made of them, or they could be paraded in front of the camera.”

This was perhaps a nod to C.I.A. pilots Gary Powers and Eugene Hassenfus, whose capture by the Soviet Union and Nicaragua, respectively, humiliated U.S. intelligence.

It’s still unclear how much these proposals determined the course of operations by Ukrainian forces against their Russian foes. But the leaks reviewed by The Grayzone reveal for the first time how, in just a matter of weeks, a small cabal of academics secretly furnished some fairly unconventional war plans on a platter for the C.I.A. and MI6. 

Just as Britain did with its Project Alchemy, the Biden administration appears to have outsourced responsibility for crafting its battlefield strategy in Ukraine to a nexus of pinheads with dubious backgrounds, situated thousands of miles from the frontline and its gruesome realities.

Almost three years later, with a generation of Ukrainians lost to the proxy war’s meat grinder, the authors of these battle plans are likely still pecking away at their laptops somewhere in the musty halls of academia.

Kit Klarenberg is an investigative journalist exploring the role of intelligence services in shaping politics and perceptions.

This glaring oversight is all the more inexcusable given the contents of a publicly-accessible FBI affidavit. It contains numerous excerpts of private conversations conducted over prior months via Telegram between Casap and pseudonymous individuals with Ukrainian telephone numbers in Cyrillic, discussing the killing of Trump in some detail. In one such chat, Casap posed a variety of questions to an anonymous Ukrainian user, amply indicating he expected to be extracted to Kiev once he took Trump out.

“How long will I need to hide before I will be moved to Ukraine?” he enquired, adding, “I probably should brush up on my Russian.” He further asked, “So while in Ukraine, I’ll be able to get a normal job and have a normal life? Even if when [sic] it’s found out I did it?” In an even more revealing exchange in January, Casap asked an “unknown” confederate “what country do you think will get the blame for this?” They stated plainly:

“Russia will be blamed for it, this is the goal.”

In this context, one passage of the affidavit takes on a particularly sinister character. On March 10th, a classmate of Casap informed law enforcement Casap regularly circulated “gore edit” videos, which “included flashing gory and war images put to Russian music” via Snapchat. Casap also openly informed his classmate he intended to kill his parents, and “was in contact with a male in Russia via Telegram,” with whom he was “planning to overthrow the government” by assassinating Trump. Casap reportedly boasted:

“When they saw 10 consecutive attacks in the news, it would have been him.” 

There are ominous reverberations in Casap’s overt advertisement of his murderous intent and purported Russian connections of the extensive ‘legend building’ of Lee Harvey Oswald, in advance of John F. Kennedy’s November 1963 assassination. Numerous low- and high-profile incidents involving Oswald – or impersonators – prior to that fateful day appeared custom-built to frame him as an unhinged Communist and crack marksman, with a homicidal axe to grind against the President. Even federal investigators privately lamented “the facts on Oswald seem…too obvious” in the aftermath.

‘Attack Drone’

It is evident from the affidavit that Casap firmly believed wiping out Trump would be part of a wider wave of terror strikes in the US. On top of the teenager’s references to “10 consecutive attacks” in discussions with his classmate, in one Telegram chat with a co-conspirator using a Ukrainian phone number, he asked “do the other 10 people also have similar beliefs to I? Or are they different?” In a three-page “manifesto” titled “accelerate the collapse”, provided to his Ukrainian contacts, he wrote:

“The other attacks that may occur, I have no idea what they are/who they target. I have no idea even if they are same ideology [sic] as I. Point being, this manifesto is specifically for the attack that targets Trump.”

It is uncertain whether any other mayhem was indeed planned, or Casap was manipulated by his Ukrainian contacts, as a means of motivating him to action. He was evidently taking detailed orders from his foreign associates, to the extent one might call them “handlers”. For example, a Telegram user named “forest” with whom Casap communicated in Cyrillic provided instructions on how to obtain a fake license plate for his parents’ stolen car, along with coordinates and driving directions from his home to Eureka, California.

Casap received explicit orders related to the murder of his parents in addition. At the direction of a Russian-speaking Telegram user, he responded to texts from his stepfather’s employer, enquiring about his welfare as he failed to show up to work for two weeks, saying he “got sick”. Casap was also told to “take [drag]” his parents’ bodies to the basement, although failed to do so, leaving their corpses where he killed them in their home, covered with blankets.

Markedly, the FBI identified extensive information on Casap’s phone on “how to utilize a drone as an attack drone,” including “directions on how to extend the range of an attack drone by using repeater drones and ways to avoid detection, such as making a drone from a kit rather than a commercial off-the-shelf brand.” Moreover, methods to affix “a small dropper” to the drone “to drop an explosive, Molotov cocktail, or very strong topical poison,” and avoid detection by law enforcement were outlined.

Coincidentally, drones bearing explosives or poison are Ukraine’s “weapon of choice” against Russia. Kiev, and in turn Moscow, have innovated in the field to such an extent that modern warfare has been permanently transformed. Casap had arranged via Telegram to purchase a drone that would drop a bomb “with nuts, bolts, needles”, and “headphones” to protect his hearing from gunshots produced by “a .357 magnum”, using bitcoin. Trump was to be assassinated using the drone.

It may also be relevant to consider that in recent years, Ukraine’s SBU has perfected the dark art of recruiting individuals in Russia to commit crimes, via messaging apps such as Telegram. This often takes the form of attacking government buildings, in return for small sums of money. During the March 2024 Presidential election, several people who vandalised ballot boxes – which generated significant media attention – were confirmed to have been blackmailed by Ukrainian scammers into perpetrating the acts. 

‘Ethnically Motivated’

Another striking linkage between the Trump assassination plot and Ukraine is Casap avowedly following the “teachings” of the Order of Nine Angles. A Satanic Neo-Nazi fraternity, it advocates extremist violence to destroy modern civilisation, on the grounds the Western world has become infected and corrupted by “Judeo-Christian” influence. Casap specifically sought to connect with fellow adherents via Telegram and TikTok. His manifesto strongly echoes the group’s messaging and ideology, declaring “it is clear Jews control all White countries” and “promote White genocide and degeneracy”:

“For the White race to survive, it is necessary to accelerate the collapse of the countries [sic]. Jewish occupied governments must fall. The White race cannot survive unless America collapses…As to why, specifically Trump, I think it’s obvious. By getting rid of the president and perhaps the vice president, that is guaranteed to bring in some chaos…[and] bring into the public the idea that assassinations and accelerating the collapse are possible things to do.”

Elsewhere, in providing guidance on how others could assist his “White revolution” globally, Casap directed manifesto readers to The American Futurist, an online platform promoting publishing guides to carrying out violent acts. Casap said the resource had “a lot of really good articles”, noting it was founded by members of now-defunct Neo-Nazi terror group Atomwaffen. “There is sure much to learn from the success and mistakes of Atomwaffen,” he stated.

One “mistake” made by Atomwaffen was to closely align with the Order of Nine Angles, causing many White supremacists to disavow the group, due to the latter’s perverse advocacy of sexual violence and paedophilia. Atomwaffen founder John Cameron Denton was also alleged by federal prosecutors to be personally involved in the distribution of child pornography. He has spent much of his adult life in and out of prison. Most recently, Denton was indicted in February 2023, along with his girlfriend Sarah Beth Clendaniel.

The pair planned to destroy electrical substations serving the majority Black city of Baltimore, Maryland, in a bid to deprive residents of heat and light during Winter. Oddly, despite the Biden administration at that time routinely warning of the grave threat of “racially or ethnically motivated” domestic terrorist attacks by US citizens, and publishing a dedicated national security strategy to address the “challenge”, their indictment went largely unremarked upon by US officials or the mainstream media.

This omertà may be attributable to Atomwaffen’s intimate relationship with Ukraine’s openly Neo-Nazi, US-funded and armed Azov Regiment, which routinely hosted members of Atomwaffen in Kiev. One Atomwaffen figure, Caleb Kole, was sentenced in January 2022 for plotting with accomplices to intimidate Jews and journalists. He had previously visited Ukraine to attend the country’s annual Neo-Nazi black metal festival Asgardsrei, which is held in a state-owned venue and features influential Azov activists on-stage.

By contrast, the media did take some interest in would-be Trump assassin Ryan Routh’s Ukrainian ties, after his arrest in September 2024. He reportedly sought to join the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and recruit foreign fighters. News outlets nonetheless keenly downplayed these links, framing Routh as a mere “delusional” wannabe. This time round though, intimate connections between yet another aspiring Trump assassin and Ukraine are writ so large, the mildest scrutiny raises deeply uncomfortable questions mainstream ‘journalists’ are evidently prohibited from asking.

The war in Ukraine has a direct impact on Americans. It’s time to prioritize America’s core national interests and bolster robust diplomacy that articulates the advantages of a free and open society.  However, negotiating an end to the conflict presents a formidable challenge, requiring diplomatic finesse, political will, and solutions that address the core causes of the war.  

With the geopolitical stakes high and U.S. foreign policy on the line, how should the new Trump administration approach this conflict? What role should Europe play? And if peace talks stall, what comes next for Ukraine and the broader international community? 

We asked Emma Ashford, senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center — a think-tank that promotes international security and shared prosperity through applied research and independent analysis, global engagement, and policy innovation — for her analysis on a path forward that embraces a realist and restrained approach to U.S. involvement in the conflict. 

Trump promised to seek a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia to end the war. What challenges will he face in striking that deal?  

It is increasingly clear that all parties to the war in Ukraine would benefit from either a pause in hostilities or a resolution to the conflict under some conditions. However, achieving even a temporary peace will not be easy. Retired Gen. Keith Kellogg has been tasked by the administration with attempting to find a settlement to the conflict; he will need not only to persuade both Kyiv and Moscow to come to the negotiating table, but also to address some of the underlying issues that caused the conflict in the first place if it is not to reoccur. 

These are not, however, insurmountable obstacles. Ukraine is in a weak position as Russian forces continue to make consistent, gradual gains on the battlefield. Ukraine’s primary constraint is not the supply of Western arms or money, but rather the constraints of manpower: Ukraine has lost significant numbers of troops, is smaller than Russia, and continues to struggle to mobilize manpower. 

Russia, though in a stronger position, also has incentives to want this war ended. It is costly for Russia in lives, and further mobilization would impose some political costs on the Kremlin. Russia’s economy is adequate, but the impact of sanctions, inflation caused by the large quantity of funds funneled into Russia’s military-industrial complex, and even the labor market hit of mobilization — are all costly. In short, both sides can likely be brought to the negotiating table by a committed effort. 

Achieving a deal will be harder. Territory is, ironically, probably the easiest issue to resolve, as there is widespread consensus that the status quo — leaving Russia in control of the Ukrainian areas it holds — is the most likely outcome. Political issues, however, will be more challenging. How will a peace deal or simply a ceasefire be enforced? Will it require peacekeepers from Europe or the United Nations? Might restrictions upon armaments make it more difficult for Ukraine to defend itself in the future? And if Russia seeks sanctions relief, is that something the Trump administration can actually provide? 

Congress has historically been strongly opposed to sanctions relief. Though there are no easy answers, the best approach for Kellogg’s team may be some kind of ceasefire that halts the fighting while longer-term issues are worked out.

Ukraine insists that any peace deal must include guarantees for its security from countries like the United States. What are some of the options on the table, and what sort of guarantees might make sense from America’s perspective (if any)? 

One of the core political issues underlying this war is the question of Ukraine’s alignment and Western security guarantees. The question of NATO membership and expansion to Ukraine was key in the run-up to the Russian invasion in February 2022, but the problem goes back at least as far as 2008, when the George W. Bush administration suggested that a path to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was inevitable. 

Given the course of the war — and political developments in Europe and America — almost no one believes that NATO membership is a viable prospect for Ukraine anymore. The risks of doing so are simply too high. NATO membership would make the U.S. responsible for defending Ukraine and risk dragging us into a future war.  

Yet the Zelenskyy government in Kyiv has insisted that it requires Western security guarantees to prevent the war from restarting. As a result, many discussions in European capitals are focused on alternative guarantees, particularly whether non-NATO bilateral or multilateral security guarantees can be made to Ukraine that would offer them protection. European leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron clearly envision a European-led security force in Ukraine as part of the eventual peace. 

Yet such a guarantee would still be problematic from the U.S. point of view:  

• First, European states aren’t necessarily capable of accomplishing this mission. Even if European states can furnish the necessary troops, they’d still have to rely on U.S. military enablers such as intelligence and reconnaissance assets, or logistical support.  

• Second, it raises questions about what political scientists call “chain ganging.” If European allies found their troops under attack in Ukraine, would this then obligate an American response? Would NATO’s Article 5 commitment then apply? The prospect of being pulled into a conflict remains high. 

In short, the only form of security guarantee that would make sense from an American point of view is a commitment to send weapons or funds in the case of a future conflict. This is exactly what the United States has done over the last two years and would not obligate any actual involvement in a future war. Though potentially expensive for American taxpayers down the line, this could contribute to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and thereby prevent such conflicts from happening.  

It’s also worth noting, though, that there are other alternatives. A Western security guarantee is one way to deter future conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but it is not the only way. A well-armed Ukraine capable of defending itself  could deter Russia from future war. Or a more ambitious political settlement that seeks to address some of the core underlying causes of the conflict could do the same. In short, the Trump administration’s negotiators should not feel that they are limited only to security guarantees when considering this question — American interests might be better served by some other option. 

If Gen. Kellogg and the negotiating team don’t make any progress and the war continues, what happens next? How should the U.S. respond? 

This is a difficult question and is one of the reasons why the United States hasn’t moved towards resolving this conflict in the last few years. That experience, however, should offer a salutary lesson for policymakers. Many in the Biden administration were wary of seeking peace in Ukraine for fear that this would yield a bad deal. But since that time, Ukraine’s negotiating position has substantially weakened. The risk remains that if the war continues, the situation will deteriorate further.  

This speaks to the importance of finding a deal that can at least halt or freeze this conflict at a reasonable cost, rather than seeking a perfect, but implausible deal. I firmly believe that this is possible. If no deal can be reached, however, and the war were to continue, then the next priority of the Trump administration should be to follow through on their commitment to voters, and push European allies to pick up much of the burden for this war from the United States. 

This burden-shifting could take the form of money or arms sent directly to Ukraine; indeed, European states have stepped up their direct commitments substantially since the early days of the conflict. But it should also take the form of burden-shifting within NATO, decreasing the costs for U.S. forces in Europe of deterring Russia as the conflict continues.  

Ultimately, European states and the European Union are far closer to this conflict than the United States; they have a much stronger interest in seeing Ukraine continue to thrive. A peace deal is the best way — at this moment in time — to best secure the interests of Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. 

The Stimson Center is supported by Stand Together Trust, which provides funding and strategic capabilities to innovators, scholars, and social entrepreneurs to develop new and better ways to tackle America’s biggest problems. 

The ideas were outlined in a confidential document presented by senior Trump administration officials to their Ukrainian counterparts in Paris on Thursday, according to Western officials. They were also shared with senior European officials at the daylong meeting.

The U.S. is now waiting for Kyiv’s response, which is expected to come at a meeting of U.S., Ukrainian and European officials in London later this week. Then if there is a convergence among the American, European and Ukrainian positions, the proposals could be floated to Moscow.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. would pause its efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine if progress isn’t made in the coming days. Photo: Julien De Rosa/AFP/Getty Images

To put pressure on Ukraine and Russia, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Friday that the administration may pause its negotiating efforts if headway isn’t made on core issues in the next several weeks.

“The Ukrainians have to go back home, they have to run it by their president, they have to take into account their views on all of this,” Rubio said. “But we need to figure out here now, within a matter of days, whether this is doable in the short term. Because if it’s not, then I think we’re just going to move on.”

The U.S. diplomatic push is intended to set the stage for a cease-fire, which would be broadly along current battle lines, and an eventual settlement. Accepting some of the Trump administration’s ideas could prove difficult for Kyiv since Ukraine has rejected Russia’s legal claims to some of its territory.

A senior State Department official on Sunday cast the ideas presented to the Ukrainians as options for Kyiv to weigh and not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. The official said a “list of potential options” was shared “for discussion and feedback.” A spokesman for the National Security Council didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg, the retired Army lieutenant general who serves as an envoy to Ukraine, met on Thursday in Paris with senior Ukrainian officials, including Andriy Yermak, a top aide to President Volodymyr Zelensky, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha.

Rubio, Witkoff and Kellogg are planning to attend the coming London meeting, according to U.S. officials. After that, Witkoff might make another trip to Russia, though no travel has been announced.

Witkoff, a real-estate executive who is close to Trump, has met with Russian President Vladimir Putin three times and reported that he has made progress in his discussions with the Kremlin leader. Other U.S. officials have advised Trump to be more skeptical of Putin’s intentions.

A U.S. move to recognize the Russian seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 would reverse a more than decade of American policy from both Democratic and Republican administrations. In 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who served during the first Trump administration, denounced Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a threat to “a bedrock international principle shared by democratic states: that no country can change the borders of another by force.”

The U.S. Congress has passed legislation opposing U.S. recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

The ideas presented by the U.S. in Paris also include ruling out Ukraine’s membership in NATO. “NATO isn’t on the table,” Kellogg said in an appearance on Fox News Saturday.

Yet another U.S. idea, Western officials said, calls for designating the territory around the nuclear reactor in Zaporizhzhia as neutral territory that could be under American control.

In a March call with Zelensky, Trump raised the possibility that the U.S. would acquire Ukrainian power plants, including nuclear facilities, calling it the “best protection for that infrastructure.” The Zaporizhzhia plant, the largest in Europe, would then presumably feed power to both Ukrainian territory and regions that Moscow has conquered since its invasion of 2022 and that remain under its control.

The ideas put forth by the Trump administration fall short of some Russian demands, according to Western officials. They wouldn’t concede that Russia has a legal right to control four regions in the eastern part of Ukraine that it claims to have annexed, though they don’t require the Russian military to leave those areas. The idea that the U.S. consider recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea was earlier reported by Bloomberg.

The U.S., Western officials say, is also not proposing a cap on Ukrainian forces and isn’t precluding Western military support for Kyiv or the deployment of European troops there, a key sticking point with Moscow.

“Every sovereign nation on Earth has a right to defend itself,” Rubio said Friday. “Ukraine will have a right to defend itself and to enter into whatever agreements it wants to enter into on a bilateral basis with different countries and so forth.”

While the Trump administration temporarily withheld arms and intelligence from Ukraine to pressure it to seek a diplomatic compromise with Russia, it hasn’t imposed economic sanctions or taken any concrete steps to pressure Putin.

Ukraine has said it is willing to agree to a comprehensive 30-day cease-fire if the Kremlin follows suit. Several days ago, Putin declared a short cease-fire for the Easter holiday but Ukrainian officials said Moscow continued to carry out attacks during the religious holiday.

There is still no resolution regarding what types of security guarantees Ukraine might receive if it agrees to a peace settlement. The Trump administration hasn’t said if it is willing to provide any military support to European nations that send troops to Ukraine as part of a “reassurance force” to deter future Russian aggression.

The Kremlin has sought a lifting of U.S. sanctions and rekindling economic ties between Russia and the U.S. during talks in Moscow and Saudi Arabia that Putin’s special envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, has taken part in.