Uncertainties surround Moscow’s capacity to play an effective role as it contends with a war of its own in Ukraine, but the buy-in of a world power with ties to nearly every major stakeholder could provide crucial support to the initiative at a time when Washington’s leadership in the Middle East has been increasingly called into question.

“We always prefer the Americans,” Orna Mizrahi, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser now serving as senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, told Newsweek. “But we understand that, because of [the Russians’] really good relations nowadays with the Iranians, maybe they can provide something that will contribute to this for the stability of any arrangement in the future.

“Another point is the fact that they are part of the United Nations Security Council five and if we get to the point that we have some kind of a new resolution about the ceasefire in the United Nations Security Council, we would like that the Russians will approve it.”

Moreover, Mizrahi said the latest developments came at a time when Russia “wants to be involved, they want to be relevant to what’s going on in the region.”

A Dual Approach

Moscow has a long history of power plays in the Middle East dating back to the days of the Soviet Union, as the already ideologically fractured region emerging from its colonial era was thrust into the crosshairs of the Cold War. For decades, the USSR was a key supporter of a number of Arab states that clashed with U.S.-backed Israel in support of Palestinian statehood.

Just months before its ultimate collapse, however, the Soviet Union reestablished ties with Israel in 1991 and the newly formed Russian Federation doubled down on this path, particularly after President Vladimir Putin first came to power in 2000. Putin would go on to reassert Russia’s influence across the Middle East and take it a step further by conducting an unprecedented intervention on behalf of longtime partner Syria in the midst of its civil war in 2015.

The conflict set the stage for a substantial boost in Russia’s relationship with Iran, which also backed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against rebels and jihadis, including the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). Moscow and Tehran have since further bolstered their partnership, with Russian forces even utilizing Iranian drones in the ongoing war in Ukraine launched by Putin in February 2022.

The Russian leader has also forged a close, personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These bonds have been complicated by Moscow’s increasingly harsh criticism of Israeli wartime actions in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, yet Netanyahu has rarely responded in kind and the two sides have managed to keep their channels open.

Having dealt with Russian officials directly in her past roles in government, Mizrahi testified to an “astonishing” level of “their appreciation of Israeli military capabilities,” something she said has helped drive a pragmatic approach on issues such as Syria, where advanced Russian air defenses have been silent in the face of hundreds of Israeli strikes against positions tied to Iran and its militia allies.

She said: “I think that this plays a very significant role in their policy towards Israel and this is one of the reasons that they are not doing anything against the Israeli attacks in Syria, although they could do a lot, of course.”

The region’s focus has since shifted from Syria to Gaza, however, where war erupted in October of last year following an attack led by the Palestinian Hamas movement against Israel. Even more recently, the spotlight has been on Lebanon, where the Israeli military is now waging a combined air and land campaign against Hezbollah, a close ally of Iran, over its continuous cross-border strikes in solidarity with Hamas.

Hezbollah has been dealt severe blows as a result of the conflict, including the loss of large amounts of equipment and the deaths of senior commanders, including longtime Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. But as the powerful paramilitary organization regroups and Israel and Iran reel from their recent exchange of direct strikes, the latest ceasefire talks have emerged as a potential off-ramp.

Among the discussed components of the deal, an apparent U.S. draft of which was leaked earlier this week by Israeli broadcaster Kan and confirmed by two sources cited by Reuters, is a plan to hamper the flow of weapons to Hezbollah via the presence of foreign troops at the Syria-Lebanon border.

Yeghia Tashjian, regional and international affairs cluster coordinator at the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, pointed out that Russia was in the best position to aid in this effort given the presence of its forces in Syria.

“Here, we should ask, is it in Russia’s interest to see Hezbollah dismantled?” Tashjian, who recently participated in a conference held by the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies discussing Moscow’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean, asked.

“Russia does not want to see Hezbollah weakened to a degree that would increase the U.S. influence in Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah and Iran have been useful in containing the American influence,” he said. “However, instability is not in the interest of Russia if it extends to Syria.”

Allies and Competitors

Today, Tashjian said, Moscow’s attention has been diverted to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where Putin is overseeing a massive war effort against Kyiv, which is receiving increasingly advanced aid from Washington and its NATO allies.

Tashjian said this shift was most notably demonstrated by Russia’s lack of intervention in support of ally Armenia when Azerbaijan seized control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region last year. The large-scale offensive came just three years after the establishment of a ceasefire agreement meant to be enforced by Russian peacekeeping units.

Russia and Iran, which also borders the volatile South Caucasus region, have since diverged on their positions in the strategically located area as the former backs the opening of a corridor through Armenian territory to Azerbaijani lands and Iran opposes it.

In Syria, too, the two powers have differed in their long-term approaches, with Moscow looking to bring the war-torn nation back into the Arab fold while Tehran views it as a key component of the Axis of Resistance coalition that also includes Hezbollah and an array of other non-state actors in the region. Critical for both players is access to the Mediterranean.

“Within this context, there seems to be an agreement between Tel Aviv and Moscow that the former would not sell weapons to Kyiv and in return, Russia would close an eye for Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian and Hezbollah assets in Syria,” Tashjian said. “The weakening of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria would also provide additional flexibility for President Bashar al-Assad to open to the Gulf countries.”

The Syrian conflict has also had a profound impact in Lebanon because of refugee flows, security concerns and the often-polarizing history between the neighboring nations, among other factors. Since the end of the civil war in 1991 and the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, Lebanon’s sectarian politics have largely been divided into two blocs, one supportive of Assad and the other opposed to him.

Iran’s influence in the country has traditionally been rooted in its close ties to fellow Shiite Muslims, predominantly Hezbollah, the dominant military force in the country and also a powerful political entity.

Russia, too, has established a rapport with Hezbollah. Moscow has also fostered support among different segments of society, including the Orthodox Christian community and other key figures such as Maronite Christian Marada Movement leader Suleiman Frangieh, who has been considered a potential candidate to assume the vacant Lebanese presidency, thus breaking a two-year deadlock.

“Its soft power over the years has built bridges with many actors both in the Christian and Muslim communities, something that Iran lacks,” Tashjian said. “Hence, the Israeli media outlets hinting on the issue that Russia is being asked and has expressed willingness to play a role in a ceasefire in Lebanon means we may see greater Russian involvement in Lebanon, at the expense of Iran.”

“I am not sure if the U.S. will agree on such an idea,” he added. “This depends on the future administration in Washington and its willingness to compartmentalize its relations with Moscow.”

Reached for comment, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department told Newsweek that “we don’t have comment on Russian diplomatic efforts” and spoke instead to the U.S. approach to the ongoing talks.

“The United States is committed to regional stability,” the State Department spokesperson said. “We continue to support a diplomatic solution to current hostilities between Israel and Hizballah—one that restores lasting calm and allows residents in both countries to return safely to their homes.”

Newsweek has also reached out to the Lebanese Embassy to the U.S., the Israeli Consulate General in New York, the Iranian Mission to the United Nations and the Russian Foreign Ministry for comment.

A Precarious Pivot

Mona Yacoubian, a former U.S. State Department analyst now serving as vice president of the United States Institute of Peace’s Middle East and North Africa center, expressed doubts regarding Russia’s potential to play a major role in the outcome of the conflict in Lebanon.

“Russia’s strategy in Lebanon has largely been opportunistic, seeking to exploit opportunities wherever they arise without investing significant resources,” Yacoubian told Newsweek. “As such, Moscow’s influence in Lebanon is fairly limited and certainly pales in comparison to the role it plays in Syria.”

Unlike in Syria, where Russia capitalized on a Cold War-era relationship with the central government to great effect, Lebanon’s complex constellation of sectarian factions would demand a more comprehensive campaign of maneuvering.

“Under the current circumstances, it’s difficult to imagine Russia exploiting the current crisis to play a bigger role in Lebanon,” Yacoubian said. “It does not have the requisite influence across Lebanon’s political spectrum, leverage among key regional players or leading influence in the United Nations to take on ceasefire diplomacy in Lebanon.”

While Russia’s soft power moves have gained a degree of foothold in Lebanon, Moscow’s more ambitious projects have had mixed results.

In 2018, Russia offered a $5 billion military assistance deal to Lebanon only for the agreement to later be turned down amid U.S. and European pressure. That same year, Russian energy giants Novatek and Rosneft signed contracts for the exploration of Lebanese maritime gas fields but the former ultimately ceded the contract to QatarEnergy last year amid Western sanctions over the war in Ukraine.

Karim Emile Bitar, a professor of international relations at Saint Joseph University of Beirut, also felt the major players in Lebanon at this stage remained the U.S., Iran and Saudi Arabia, which continues to hold the greatest influence among the Sunni Muslim community in Lebanon amid competition with another regional player, Turkey.

He told Newsweek that Moscow and Ankara do exert degrees of influence in Lebanon “but they cannot be considered as key stakeholders, unless the solution to the Israeli-Lebanese war is part of a wider package deal that would involve a detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between the United States and Iran, and if it includes the Syrian dossier, if Bashar al-Assad can be forced to make certain concessions.”

“In that case, Putin could be a broker, a middleman between the Sunni Arab states and Bashar al-Assad,” he said.

Still, as Russian International Affairs Council expert Kirill Semenov told Newsweek: “Russia does not cease to conduct dialogue with Lebanese political forces.” He said the current discussions come as “Moscow is trying to understand Israel’s motives in order to find common ground between them in order to develop a formula for a possible ceasefire.”

Others, too, would need to be convinced of the final initiative.

“Moscow’s efforts alone on this track will not be enough and informal consultations with Western countries are necessary, as well as close coordination with Moscow’s Arab partners, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” Semenov said.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have called for a ceasefire since the regional crisis first erupted more than a year ago, but they have so far been hesitant to play a larger role. Moscow has had success in the past on this front, however, notably playing a significant part in mending their ties with Damascus, which returned to the Arab League last year after being shut out at the onset of the civil war in 2011.

Assad’s comeback on the battlefield and diplomatic arena with help from Moscow was widely viewed as a victory against Washington’s waning influence in the region. But replicating this win in Lebanon may prove an even bigger challenge for the Kremlin, even with the many inroads it has sought to foster.

“Moscow and Beirut maintain close relations and contacts, just as Russia maintains relations with various political forces in the country, both with Hezbollah’s allies and opponents, so Russia still has certain levers of influence in Lebanon,” Semenov said. “But they are limited.

“Nevertheless, many political forces in Lebanon are ready to listen to Moscow’s advice but this does not mean that they will follow this advice.”

In the greater Middle East, however, there is something seriously weird about this image of Russian behavior. In this region, over the past 20 years, it is in fact the United States that has acted as a disruptor of the existing status quo, and Russian opposition to U.S. policies on key issues has proved in retrospect to be objectively correct, from the point of view not only of Russia and of the region but also of the United States and the West.

Of course, Russian policies were designed to serve Russian interests. All the same, the fact that they turned out to correspond to Western interests as well was not purely accidental. These Russian policies were founded on an analysis by the Russian foreign-policy and security establishment of Middle Eastern states that has turned out to be correct in itself—and is also very close to those of many in the U.S. establishment.

Underlying Russian analysis is a perception that might be called anti-democratic but is more accurately characterized as a profound sense of the fragility of states and fear of chaos and civil war, coupled with deep skepticism about projects of rapid revolutionary change. This attitude has its roots in Russia’s own terrible experiences of the 20th century. As Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked to the New York Times in October 2003 concerning the results of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, “There is no surprise for us about the situation that has taken shape, because we foresaw the development of the situation there just exactly as it is developing now. … How could one imagine a different course of events in a case where the regime is dismantled? Of course, statehood is destroyed. How can it be otherwise?”

Putin linked this destruction of the Iraqi state—all too presciently, as it turned out—to a vast increase in Islamist extremism:

“Saddam Hussein’s regime was not a liberal one … but it struggled against the fundamentalists. … Now, there is no more Saddam, and we witness on Iraq’s territory the infiltration of a great number of members of different terrorist organizations.”

Given what happened in Iraq, can anyone say Putin was wrong in opposing the invasion there? Would the United States itself not be much better off today if in 2002-2003 it had accepted Russian advice?

The Soviet experience has made Russians deeply skeptical of revolutionary projects to transform other societies according to one universal ideological template—because this is what Soviet communism tried to do around the globe, thereby embroiling Russia in a series of horribly expensive disasters. Thus Russians (correctly) saw the U.S. project in Afghanistan as resembling in key respects the Soviet effort of the 1980s, and as doomed to similar failure.
And as Putin told the Financial Times in 2019 concerning the results of the Western overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s state in Libya:

“[Do] our Western partners want a region such as Libya to have the same democratic standards as Europe and the U.S.? The [Middle Eastern and North African] region has only monarchies or countries with a system similar to the one that existed in Libya. … It is impossible to impose current and viable French or Swiss democratic standards on North African residents who have never lived in conditions of French or Swiss democratic institutions. … All this led to conflict and intertribal discord. In fact, a war continues in Libya.”

Once again, have the results of Qaddafi’s overthrow proved Putin right or wrong? Civil war does indeed continue to this day, and the collapse of the Libyan state enabled a mass movement of migrants across the Mediterranean that has destabilized the European Union.

U.S.-Russian disagreements in the Middle East came to a head with the Arab Spring of 2011 and the uprisings in Egypt, Syria, and Libya. The Russian response to these events was shaped partly by a desire to defend old Soviet allies and (in the case of Syria) retain Russia’s last naval base in the Mediterranean.

Still more important, however, was Russia’s fear that these uprisings would lead to the triumph of Islamist extremist forces and the creation of bases for the revival of terrorism in Russia, which took so many Russian victims before and during the Second Chechen War. The fears of both Russia and European countries concerning the Islamic State in Syria were increased by the large number of Muslim European and Russian citizens who traveled to Syria to fight and then tried to return home.

As Putin said concerning the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war:

“I decided that the positive effect from our active involvement in Syrian affairs for Russia and the interests of the Russian Federation would far outweigh noninterference and passive observation of how an international terrorist organization grows ever stronger near our borders. … We have managed to preserve Syrian statehood, no matter what, and we have prevented Libya-style chaos there.”

Then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described Russian opposition to the overthrow of the Baath state in Syria as “despicable.” But now here is a curious thing. In his memoir A Promised Land former U.S. President Barack Obama describes how his cabinet met in January 2011 to discuss the unfolding revolution in Egypt and whether to call for the resignation of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, then engaged in a brutal crackdown against the protesters:

“The older and more senior members of my team—Joe, Hillary [my italics], Gates, and Panetta—counseled caution, all of them having known and worked with Mubarak for years. They emphasized the role his government had long played in keeping peace with Israel, fighting terrorism, and partnering with the United States on a host of other regional issues. While they acknowledged the need to press the Egyptian leader on reform, they warned that there was no way of knowing who or what might replace him.”

It might be argued that the tactics of the Baath regime in the Syrian civil war were more brutal than anything carried out by Mubarak. Then again, 20 years earlier the administration of Clinton’s husband had followed in the footsteps of the George H.W. Bush administration by backing the military regime in Algeria in the cancellation of democratic election results and in a savage campaign against the Islamist opposition. U.S. calculations concerning Algeria were virtually identical to those of Russia in Syria.

To say this is not to condemn the Clintons or those U.S. officials and analysts who expressed doubts about so-called democratic revolutions in the Middle East and fears that they could lead to chaos and Islamist victory. Their doubts and fears were well founded, as the miserable results of the Arab Spring demonstrated. The Middle East is a harsh political terrain, and any outside power operating there has to be prepared to work with some pretty foul regimes.

Those American officials who advised Obama against overthrowing the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, out of fear that the Islamic State would take over, were also almost certainly correct, as are those today who have persuaded the Biden administration to go on working with Saudi Arabia. It is hard, however, to see why Russia should be damned for following the same line as sensible American advisors.

Finally, Russian sanctions eventually (admittedly after long delays) played an important part in bringing Iran to sign the nuclear deal in 2015. Russia had long advocated a U.S. compromise with Iran on the nuclear issue, and if the United States had taken this advice in 2002-2003, it would have gotten a vastly better deal than the one it did in 2015, let alone anything that can possibly be achieved today.

Interestingly enough, Russia’s stand on the nuclear deal and partnership with Iran in Syria have not destroyed Russia’s close relationship with Israel, founded on strong bonds with Russia’s Jewish community, as well as on a strong common commitment to the fight against Sunni Islamist extremism. Israeli governments have greatly disliked the Iranian role in Syria, but they also deeply feared the consequences of a collapse of the Syrian state, and they recognized the very limited and conditional nature of Russian-Iranian cooperation.

The Biden administration has stated that while confronting Russia on certain issues, it wants to work with Russia where U.S. and Russian interests converge. The history of the Middle East over the past 20 years suggests that, in this area at least, a strong basis for cooperation does in fact exist. To develop such cooperation will, however, require U.S, policymakers to acknowledge—at least to themselves in private—the number of times that Russia has been proved right, and America wrong.

Artin DerSimonian of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft helped with the research for this essay.

Gadhafi, a dictator who surrounded himself with female bodyguards, used his country’s immense oil wealth to make it the country in Africa number one in literacy, education and income. Literacy, for example, went from 25% to 88%. Although Libya is 90% desert his great engineering projects brought water to nearly all its inhabitants.

He also used his wealth to fund a good number of anti-government movements in different parts of the world- the IRA in northern Ireland, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Black Panther party in the US.

He threatened Western interests by promoting a merger with Egypt and Syria. He also wanted to create a pan-African currency, making use of Libya’s gold reserves of 144 tons. This would allow Libya and Africa to wean themselves off the US dollar and the French franc used in 14 African countries. At the time when Hillary Clinton was secretary of state her purloined e-mails revealed the discussions on what to do about Libya’s financial plans. The emails reported on French president Nicolas Sarkozy, saying that “Gadhafi’s idea of an alternative to the African franc was one of the factors that influenced his decision to commit France to the attack on Libya”. He didn’t want to see France’s sizeable influence over its former colonies circumscribed.

Ten years ago Gadhafi faced an uprising. It flagged itself as being committed to democracy and human rights. It was a bloody affair. The rebels actively sought help from the UN. After a long debate the Security Council passed a resolution in March 2011 that approved “by all means necessary” an intervention “to protect civilians”. Western nations voted for it. Russia and China abstained. But when NATO revealed with its bombing on March 19^th that it was also bent on the destruction of Gadhafi, Russia felt betrayed. So did Germany, another abstainer. If Russia had known what was afoot it would have vetoed the resolution. Moscow never appreciates having the wool pulled over its eyes by Washington.

Immediately after the killing of Gadhafi, Mrs Clinton was reported as jumping with joy, saying, borrowing from Shakespeare, “We came, we saw, he died”.

All this happenednot long after Gadhafi reached out to the West in an attempt to reduce hostilities. He allowed the UK and the US to dismantle Libya’s efforts to move towards building a nuclear bomb. He sent for trial in Scotland two men suspected of blowing up an American airliner in Scottish skies. Diplomacy was beginning to work. The military intervention aborted this and, in its stead, created chaos.

Before long it became apparent there were two warring factions fighting for control of the government, one based in Tripoli, the capital and the other in Benghazi, the main port for exporting oil. (Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa.) In the wings lurk Al-Qaeda, ISIS and other jihadist fighters.

Eight years after the NATO invasion the factions were still fighting. The UN all along has sought to mediate. Finally, in October last year a ceasefire was brokered. Elections are scheduled for December.

It’s a difficult road ahead for Libya. Even today in liberal circles within the US’s Democratic Party there is a debate about the pros and cons of humanitarian military intervention. Perhaps a majority still argue that in some cases it’s necessary, although they are hard put to give an example where it has succeeded in implanting democracy and liberty.

The withdrawal from Afghanistan has resuscitated this important debate. It’s quite clear from Biden’s record while vice-president that he personally has renounced his earlier belief that large-scale military intervention can do good. He was a lone voice in Obama’s cabinet in not wanting to extend the US’s military presence in Afghanistan. He opposed the attack on Libya.

Biden has the support of ex-presidential candidate, Bernard Sanders in the senate and Alexander Ocasio-Cortez in the House, who between them can summon up a significant number of American senators, congressmen and voters. (They are also stalwart supporters of Biden as he attempts to push through Congress bills that will aid the poor, build up the subsidised health services and renew America’s infrastructure.)

One can safely say that on Biden’s watch there will not be another Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya. My worry is the mindset of who may come after, in three years’ time or seven. Don’t count on American liberals, much less its conservatives, to do the sensible thing- although, ironically, Donald Trump was a “non-intervener”.