By withholding de jure recognition of Russia’s battlefield gains, Ukraine can continue to claim, and demand return of, Russia’s battlefield gains. In other words, the agreement evades the central issue.

According to the agreement, Ukraine must renounce all NATO aspirations.  But Putin’s other demands, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine are apparently not included in the agreement.

Washington will lift the sanctions against Russia, and there will be US-Russia economic cooperation, which seems to mean that Russia will open aspects of its economy to foreigners for exploitation, a disastrous Russian decision.

This is what the Russian oligarchs and Atlanticist Integrationists, who have never supported the war, want.  How the Russia’s military feels about victory being shoved aside by a negotiated settlement is unknown.

But is it a settlement?  Zelensky’s latest statement at this time of writing is that he will not concede a square inch of territory to Russia.  If Zelensky has to be coerced, and as he is not legally or constitutionally the current president of Ukraine as his term of office has expired, successive Ukrainian governments can legitimately claim that the agreement is not valid.

Moreover,  Ukraine and Europe have placed themselves behind an alternative agreement.  In their proposed agreement, Ukraine will consent to begin talks with Russia, Europe, and the US about the territorial issues. Moreover, Ukraine will be granted US security guarantees similar to Article 5 in the NATO treaty.  In other words, Ukraine becomes essentially a de facto member of NATO.  Additionally, there will be no restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces or on the operations of foreign forces on Ukrainian territory, and Russia will compensate Ukraine for war damage.

Clearly, the two proposals have nothing in common.  Unless Europe gives in to Trump, a split is implied between the US and NATO, a split that could leave the US and Russia in an alliance that excludes Europe.  I have no explanation why Europe is taking this risk.

As we can see from the facts, only two of the four parties agree to the deal. Moreover, even if there is a deal, in the absence of de jure recognition of Russia’s territorial claims, the deal amounts to little more than kicking the can down the road.

In fact, John Helmer says that the deal is just a mechanism, a cover, for moving Russia aside so that Washington can get on with its war with China. 

Here is how Helmer describes the situation:

“The politico-military strategy driving the US negotiators and prompting Trump’s tweets, is not a peace deal with Russia, nor even US withdrawal from the war in Europe. It is a strategy of sequencing one war at a time – the war in Europe to continue in the Ukraine with rearmed Germany, Poland and France in the lead, supported by Trump; and the US war against China in Asia.

“Sequencing these wars so as not to fight both enemies simultaneously – that’s the formula devised for Trump by Wess Mitchell, a former State Department appointee in the first Trump Administration,  and his business partner Elbridge Colby, now the third-ranking Pentagon official as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.   ‘The essence of diplomacy in strategy,’ Mitchell has just declaimed in Foreign Affairs, ‘is to rearrange power in space and time so that countries avoid tests of strength beyond their ability.’ . .  

“Mitchell and Colby have convinced Trump and his negotiators that Russia has been badly damaged by the Ukrainian war which the Obama and Biden Administration have fought. Russian weakness, especially the perception that President Putin is both politically vulnerable and personally susceptible to US business inducements, is Trump’s strong card, and he should play it now.”

The goal is not peace, but to make money off of two wars: Europe and Ukraine’s war with Russia, and Washington’s war with China.  And perhaps a war with Iran for Israel thrown in. 

Readers can listen to Helmer’s presentation of what he says is actually occurring in his discussion with Ray McGovern on Nima Alkhorshid’s program ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgG4ZmTZQww ), and they can read it in several of Helmer’s recent articles in Dancing with Bears ( https://johnhelmer.net/one-war-at-a-time-and-plenty-of-money-to-be-made-in-the-meantime-this-is-trumps-game-as-the-russian-and-chinese-general-staffs-understand/ ).

Helmer’s source for his explanation of what is really happening is an article in Foreign Affairs by West Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia in the first Trump term.  Mitchell is currently working with Trump’s current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to sequence America’s wars with Russia and China as the US lacks the power to take on both simultaneously. Mitchell’s article was published on April 22, 2025, in the May/June 2025 issue of Foreign Affairs.  

Mitchell writes that the process of sequencing the wars with Russia and China should  begin “by bringing the war in Ukraine to an end in a way that is favorable to the United States. That means that when all is said and done, Kyiv must be strong enough to impede Russia’s westward advances” [for which no evidence exists, showing Mitchell’s mind to be controlled by the false narrative]. Washington should use the Korean War formula: “prioritize an armistice and push questions about a wider settlement into a separate process that could take years to bear fruit, it it ever does.”  This, of course, is what Washington’s de facto recognition of Russia’s territorial claims ensures.

Mitchell carelessly then reveals the intended deception of Babe-in-the-Woods Putin: “The United States should pursue a defense relationship with Ukraine akin to the one it maintains with Israel: not a formal alliance, but an agreement to sell, lend, or give Kyiv what it needs to defend itself. But it should not grant Ukraine [ de jure ] NATO membership. Instead, the United States should push European states to take responsibility for Ukraine—and for the security of their continent more generally.” This strategy capitalizes “on Putin’s special relationship with the Russian oligarchs” and dupes Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s negotiator, ” into pressing the Kremlin to accept a short-term military armistice which stops well short of the demilitarization and denazification goals of the Special Military Operation.”

So, as Mitchell describes it, the “peace agreement” is a Washington deception to set up, yet again,  “Babe-in-the Woods Putin” for the eventual destruction of Russia.

Can I believe this?  Yes, I can.  Helmer has  been watching things for a long time and reporting on them.  This scenario is not a product of Helmer’s imagination.  It is spelled out in an article in Foreign Affairs, long the arbiter of American foreign policy. The author, West Mitchell, a former Trump high official, clearly holds to the neoconservative policy stated by Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfwitz that the purpose of American foreign policy is hegemony over the world. If American hegemony requires war, war it is.

The Russians, with a large part of the mindless Russian establishment so desirous of being part of the West, have never paid any attention to the implication for Russian sovereignty of the neoconservative doctrine of US hegemony. This doctrine has not been denounced by President Trump. Consequently, Russia will be destroyed as the Russian government stupidly walks into deception after deception. Under Putin and Lavrov it will be one Minsk Agreement after another.

The question I have is:  Is Trump a part of the deception not only of Putin but also of the American people, or is this a deal he has accepted without realizing its consequences because he is desperate to end the conflict as he promised?  If Trump himself is part of the deception, then we have the explanation why the American Establishment did not prevent his reappearance in the Oval Office.

Trump met Zelensky in Rome on Saturday before Pope Francis’s funeral for what the White House described as “very productive” talks. The US president believes that the Ukrainian leader “really has no choice” but to sign up to the proposal, according to a source close to his special envoy Steve Witkoff. Trump is threatening to pull out of the peace process next week unless a deal is agreed.

The US proposal, presented by Witkoff to Moscow and Kyiv, was reported to include formal US recognition of Russia’s control over Crimea, the peninsula that was annexed in 2014, and de facto recognition of Russia’s control over areas of southern and eastern Ukraine that its forces have seized since the full-scale invasion of 2022.

A rival European and Ukrainian proposal makes discussion about control of territory dependent upon talks that would follow a ceasefire.

“Trump’s view is that this land has been seized and it is not going back,” said a source close to Witkoff.

“The deal on the table is that the Russian-occupied territory is going to remain occupied. Russia’s not pulling it out of it. That part is set in stone.”

The US believes that, if Ukraine rejects the deal, the war would go on for months and possibly years, with Kyiv reliant on Europe for funding and munitions, the source said. “The [US] funding cut-off actually is going to have as much of an impact as the weapons cut-off [this year], because Ukraine uses that money to buy more weapons from other allies,” the source added.

Asked if this was a “take it or leave it” moment for Zelensky, the source said the US saw it as “take it or take it”.

The Americans also believe European public opinion will turn against the huge expenditure required to keep Ukraine in the war as the continent heads towards recession — partly caused by Trump’s tariffs.

Witkoff held three hours of talks with President Putin in Moscow on Friday. Yuri Ushakov, a Kremlin foreign policy aide who took part in the talks, described the meeting as constructive and useful. “This conversation allowed Russia and the United States to further bring their positions closer together, not only on Ukraine but also on a number of other international issues,” he said. “As for the Ukrainian crisis itself, the discussion focused in particular on the possibility of resuming direct negotiations between representatives of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.”

Zelensky has argued that Ukraine’s constitution forbids him from formally recognising Crimea as part of Russia, and has ruled out signing any peace deal that hands over control of Ukrainian territory.

Trump showed his uncompromising line on Russian-occupied Ukraine when he told Time magazine on Friday that “Crimea will stay with Russia” and again blamed Kyiv for provoking Moscow’s invasion.

However, The Times understands that he is flexible on formal US recognition of Crimea at this stage, and is not trying to force Zelensky to sign away Ukrainian sovereignty, but to accept the Russian occupation.

Mariana Betsa, the Ukrainian deputy foreign minister, countered that Ukraine would do “whatever it takes” to take back Crimea.

“Our position is very clear and our president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is very clear on that. Crimea is Ukraine,” Betsa told Times Radio. “We’ll never recognise the attempted annexation by Russia. We will never recognise it as a Russian territory and we will take whatever it takes … to occupy our land, our country.”

She spoke hours after Yaroslav Moskalik, a senior Russian general, was killed in a car bomb attack in Moscow. The Kremlin blamed Ukrainian special forces for the attack.

Vitali Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv, said that Ukraine may have to concede land to halt the war with Russia. He said it could be a “temporary” solution to end the three-year-long conflict. “One of the scenarios is … to give up territory. It’s not fair. But for the peace, temporary peace, maybe it can be a solution,” Klitschko told the BBC.

In London, the former commander of the Ukrainian armed forces said that Russia would continue to wage war against his country until it suffers a massive defeat.

“As long as the enemy has the resources, forces, and means to strike at our territory and attempt offensive actions, he will do so. This is a war of attrition,” Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to Britain, said at the UK-Ukraine Defence Tech Forum. “Only the complete destruction of [Russia’s] ability to wage war, that is the military-economic potential, can put an end to this.”

While the gap between the two combatants remains wide, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking to CBS on Thursday, sounded optimistic that a deal might be reached soon.

“There are several signs that we are moving in the right direction,” he said. “Still there are elements of this deal which need to be fine-tuned.”

Russia’s plans for Ukraine

In previous meetings, Mr. Putin insisted that he was ready to stop fighting, but only if he was shown a road map to a permanent settlement that achieved Russia’s main war objectives.

After those talks, Mr. Trump publicized a plan that Russian analysts say was basically acceptable to the Kremlin. In it, a full ceasefire would take effect along the existing battlefront, the United States would grant legal recognition to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and Ukraine would forgo NATO membership. In addition, the U.S. would begin easing the blizzard of sanctions that have been leveled against Russia for over a decade.

Ukraine would receive “robust security guarantees” provided by European powers – but not the U.S. – and some small territorial swaps might take place. Major issues that Mr. Putin has explicitly listed as Russian war goals would be left to further negotiations. Those issues include substantial Ukrainian demilitarization, the exclusion of Ukrainian ultranationalists from government, language and religious rights for Ukrainian Russian-speakers, and the final territorial settlement.

The U.S. had intended to present that Moscow-Washington agreement to Ukrainian and European leaders in London this past week. But that fell through when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy balked, especially at recognizing Russian ownership of Crimea, and top U.S. diplomats canceled plans to attend the meeting.

Mr. Trump blamed Mr. Zelenskyy for derailing the peace process. But he also chided Mr. Putin for launching a massive aerial attack Wednesday night on Kyiv, claiming “We’re putting a lot of pressure on Russia, and Russia knows that.”

(Although Russian media reports have blamed Ukraine for the apparent assassination of Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik when a car exploded in Moscow today, there is no indication that the general’s death has had an effect on the peace talks.)

A big gap between the adversaries

In the absence of consensus, Ukrainian and European officials have drawn up an alternative list of steps toward peace that differs very sharply from the outline earlier agreed between Mr. Putin and Mr. Witkoff.

The pro-Ukrainian draft rejects any form of recognition of Russian occupation of any Ukrainian land, rules out limits on Kyiv’s military, calls for strong security guarantees for Ukraine backed by the U.S., urges against rapid sanctions relief for Russia, and suggests that Ukrainian reconstruction be funded by Russian assets that were seized in the West at the war’s outset.

Experts in Russia say the subject of the present U.S.-Russia talks is to find ways, if any, to reconcile these two very different approaches and arrive at a common position before any ceasefire can be arranged.

“Right now, Russia is willing to discuss and move forward on the basis of the Trump plan. But what to do if this proves absolutely unacceptable to Ukraine, Britain, and European powers?” says Alexei Mukhin, director of the Center for Political Information, an independent consultancy in Moscow. “Russian leaders want assurances that the U.S. will work to bring them all onto a common path.”

Mr. Putin has spelled out Russia’s key war objectives many times, and analysts say that after over three years of hard fighting and reported massive casualties, he probably doesn’t have much room for compromise.

“It’s wartime, and Russia is awash with patriotic rhetoric,” says Sergei Strokan, an international affairs columnist for the Moscow business daily Kommersant. “If Putin should backtrack on his basic demands, which he himself has expressed, that would be a very hard sell for Russian public opinion.”

An escape hatch for Mr. Putin?

Many Russian analysts express frustration with Mr. Trump’s “superficial” approach, which emphasizes haste and broad strokes at the expense of comprehensive negotiations that consider every detail and contingency.

“Russia has said many times that it wants a reliable, long-term peace settlement, not a quick memorandum that fails to resolve any of the basic issues,” says Mr. Strokan.

Moscow might request the Trump administration to split the negotiation process, separating the process of normalizing U.S.-Russia relations – a key Russian goal – from the thorny, and likely impossible, efforts to achieve a generally acceptable peace in Ukraine, says Mr. Mukhin.

“The stream of talks on restoring bilateral ties is proving very successful. Both sides want it and it promises a lot of long-term benefits,” he says. “Why should the broader relationship be held hostage to Ukraine? Let those negotiations continue on a different track.”

Many experts say that in the absence of a clear and generally-agreed blueprint for a peace settlement, no ceasefire is likely to last. Some Russian analysts even suggest that Mr. Trump’s frequently repeated threat to walk away from peace talks if they don’t bear quick fruit might be the outcome best for Russia.

“Trump is looking for a pretext to continue the process of normalizing relations with Russia, while getting out of Ukraine,” says Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser. “By agreeing to his ceasefire plan, Putin is giving him that pretext.”

His clear implication: When the ceasefire expires without what Moscow regards as a satisfactory settlement, Russia will return to the battlefield to reach its goals.

The process of making Ukraine a de facto member of NATO started in 1992, one year after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 1994 marked the first year that Ukrainian forces participated in NATO exercises, although these were held in Poland and the Netherlands. The following year, 1995, witnessed the creation of Ukraine’s Yavoriv military base as the NATO training center, although this was not formalized until 1999.

1999 was no coincidence… it was the year that NATO expanded to the East by accepting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members on March 12, 1999. This provoked alarm in Russia because it obliterated the promise of former US Secretary of State James Baker, that NATO would not move one inch to the East. President Bill Clinton broke that promise.

Part 2 will cover the period, 2000 – 2010. Part 3 will cover 2011 – 2021. The plan to use Ukraine as a proxy to weaken Russia was born in the 1990s and matured into war in 2022. I hope you find this informative.

I did a podcast today with Garland Nixon. That is posted at the end of this article.

1992

NATO-Ukraine Relations in 1992 — In 1992, Ukraine formally established relations with NATO by joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in March 1992. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established by NATO in December 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation between NATO member states and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

The NACC ostensibly was created to foster political consultation and build confidence between former adversaries, reflecting NATO’s “hand of friendship” to the newly independent and transitioning states of Central and Eastern Europe, which also included Russia. The NACC’s activities paved the way for deeper cooperation, notably leading to the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, which allowed for more practical and individualized cooperation between NATO and partner countries.

In 1997, the NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which expanded the partnership framework to include more countries and provided a more sophisticated forum for dialogue and cooperation, reflecting the evolving security environment and the deepening relationships between NATO and its partners. Russia also joined EAPC, but was suspended from the organization in 2014 after the people of Crimea voted to reunite with Russia.

• Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO began in March 1992 when it joined the newly established NACC, marking the start of formal relations and opening the door for future military cooperation .
• The first concrete participation of Ukraine in a NATO-linked military exercise did not occur until September 1994, when Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and participated in joint training exercises such as “Cooperation Bridge” in Poland .

1993

In 1993, Ukraine began its military cooperation with the United States and NATO, although it had not yet joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (which happened in 1994). The most significant development in 1993 was the initiation of the U.S.-Ukraine State Partnership Program (SPP), established between the California National Guard and Ukraine. This program laid the groundwork for ongoing joint training, military exchanges, and exercises.

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) advocated for establishing a Military Liaison Team (MLT) in Kyiv as early as 1993, but the deployment was delayed due to diplomatic considerations. Nonetheless, military cooperation and engagement activities were ongoing under the Defense Attaché Office. The cooperation in 1993 set the stage for more formal and larger-scale military exercises such as “Peace Shield” and “Sea Breeze,” which began after Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994.

1994

Cooperative Bridge 94

• In September 1994, Ukraine participated in its first NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint training exercise,
  “Cooperative Bridge 94,” held at the Biedrusko military training area near Poznan, Poland, from 12 to 16 September 1994 .
• This exercise involved approximately 600 soldiers from 13 NATO and Partner nations, including Ukraine, and focused on basic unit and individual peacekeeping tasks and skills.
• The aim was to share peacekeeping experience, develop a common understanding of operational procedures, and improve interoperability among NATO and Partner military forces .
• The exercise was conducted under the supervision of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and was jointly planned with Polish military authorities.

Spirit of Partnership

Later in 1994, a Ukrainian air-mobile unit participated in another PfP training exercise called “Spirit of Partnership,” held in the Netherlands.

1995

Peace Shield 1995:

The primary NATO/USEUCOM military exercise conducted with Ukraine in 1995 was “Peace Shield,” a joint US-Ukrainian exercise held at the Yavoriv training area near Lviv from May 23 to May 27, 1995. This exercise was part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which aimed to increase interoperability and cooperation between NATO and partner countries, including Ukraine.

Autumn Allies 95:

Another notable exercise was “Autumn Allies 95,” which involved approximately 400 U.S. Marines and 200 Ukrainian soldiers. The exercise focused on promoting interoperability in peacekeeping operations and was conducted later in 1995.

The Partnership for Peace program was central to these activities, providing a framework for joint exercises, training, and defense planning between Ukraine, NATO, and USEUCOM.

1996

Cossack Step-96:

In 1996, Ukraine hosted a military exercise called “Cossack Step-96” in cooperation with Great Britain. This exercise was conducted “in the spirit of Partnership for Peace (PfP),” NATO’s program for building trust and
interoperability with non-member countries, including Ukraine at the time. The exercise involved approximately 140 participants from Ukraine and Great Britain.

During this period, Ukraine was actively increasing its military cooperation with NATO through the PfP framework, which included joint training and exercises aimed at enhancing Ukraine’s ability to participate in multinational operations with NATO forces. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) was involved in
developing security cooperation with Ukraine, focusing on familiarization activities, military professionalism, and closer ties to NATO.

1997

Cooperative Neighbor-97:

In July 1997, Ukraine hosted the Cooperative Neighbor-97 joint exercise at the Yavoriv training grounds in western Ukraine. The exercise involved approximately 1,200 soldiers from the United States, Greece, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Macedonia. Cooperative Neighbor-97 was conducted under NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which aimed to build
trust and interoperability between NATO members and partner countries. The exercise focused on joint training and cooperation, and was observed by U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk.

Sea Breeze 1997:

Sea Breeze 1997 was a multinational maritime exercise cohosted by the United States and Ukraine in the Black Sea region. The exercise included U.S. Marines and Ukrainian forces and was initially planned to simulate an intervention in a fictional ethnic conflict, but the scenario was changed due to Russian
sensitivities. The revised scenario focused on providing humanitarian aid after an earthquake. The land-based segments were moved from Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland to avoid local protests and Russian
opposition. While conducted “in the spirit of NATO’s Partnership for Peace,” NATO itself maintained a hands-off approach, with only Turkey among NATO members sending ships to participate directly.

Significance:

Both exercises were part of the broader NATO-Ukraine cooperation established by the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, signed in July 1997, which set the framework for ongoing military and political collaboration. These exercises marked early steps in Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and were designed to enhance interoperability, readiness, and mutual understanding between Ukraine, NATO, and U.S. European Command forces.

1998

Cossack Express 1998 (May 1998)

• Location: Ukraine (multiple sites).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other PfP nations.
• Focus: Disaster response, humanitarian aid, and crisis management.
• Significance: Aimed at improving civil-military coordination in emergencies.

Peace Shield 1998 (June 1998)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) focused on peacekeeping operations, crisis response, and interoperability with NATO standards.
• Significance: Part of the “Peace Shield” series, which began in 1995 to prepare Ukrainian forces for potential NATO-led peacekeeping missions.

Sea Breeze 1998 (July 1998)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odesa, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, the U.S., and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Maritime security, search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Part of the annual “Sea Breeze” series (started in 1997), enhancing Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO in Black Sea operations.

Cooperative Nugget 1998 (September 1998)

• Location: Hohenfels Training Area, Germany (part of the Cooperative Partner series).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other NATO/PfP countries.
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations, joint command structures, and multinational coordination.
• Significance: Helped Ukrainian forces train alongside NATO troops in a simulated UN/NATO-style peacekeeping mission.

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and other U.S. military entities were actively engaged in planning and executing military-to-military contacts and exercises with Ukraine in 1998, focusing on familiarization, confidence building, and demonstrating U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty . The annual planners’ conference for military contacts was held in April 1998 in Stuttgart, Germany, to develop the 1999 plan, indicating ongoing and planned engagement. The transition of responsibility for U.S. military engagement in Ukraine from the Joint Staff to USEUCOM was underway in 1998, further institutionalizing these activities. The establishment of a Regional Training Centre at the Yavoriv training area in Ukraine was discussed as a future initiative for multinational training and exercises.

1999

Peace Shield 99 (May 1999)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members (including the U.S.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) focused on peacekeeping operations, interoperability, and crisis response.
• Significance: One of Ukraine’s major annual multinational exercises under the PfP framework.

Cooperative Partner 99 (June–July 1999)

• Location: Ukraine (Odesa and Myrhorod regions)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), and other NATO/PfP nations.
• Focus: Maritime and air operations, including search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Part of the Cooperative Partner series, enhancing Black Sea security cooperation.

Sea Breeze 99 (July–August 1999)

• Location: Black Sea (Odesa and Crimea)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. Navy (6th Fleet), NATO allies (including Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria), and PfP countries.
• Focus: Maritime security, amphibious operations, and crisis response.
• Significance: Part of the annual Sea Breeze series, which began in 1997 and continues today.

Cossack Express-99 (September 1999):

Held at the Yavoriv training grounds in Ukraine starting September 18, 1999, this NATO-sponsored exercise involved British and Ukrainian motorized infantry units of battalionsize. The exercise focused on rehearsing joint actions in UN authorized peacekeeping operations under NATO command, modeled after operations in the Balkans.

Cossack Steppe-99:

Conducted at the Nowa Deba training range in Poland beginning September 20, 1999, this exercise included company-sized motorized infantry units from Ukraine, Poland (a new NATO member at the time), and Britain. It also rehearsed joint peacekeeping operations under NATO command, with participation from the Ukrainian-Polish joint battalion.

Black Sea Partnership-99:

From September 20–25, 1999, the Ukrainian navy’s flagship Hetman Sahaydachny participated alongside NATO and partner country warships in this exercise, which was held mostly in Turkish waters. The aim was to practice joint naval operations and naval support for NATO-led peacekeeping operations on land.

CONCLUSION:

I spent 23 years scripting military exercises for US Special Forces. While I was not involved in the scripting of any of these NATO/US military exercises, I understand the purpose and process of them. These were not harmless games. They were designed to train and equip the Ukrainian military to fight Russia, potentially with NATO’s direct involvement. We have seen that come to fruition since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. It is no coincidence that Russia hit the Yavoriv NATO military facility on March 13, 2022.

The war in Ukraine has a direct impact on Americans. It’s time to prioritize America’s core national interests and bolster robust diplomacy that articulates the advantages of a free and open society.  However, negotiating an end to the conflict presents a formidable challenge, requiring diplomatic finesse, political will, and solutions that address the core causes of the war.  

With the geopolitical stakes high and U.S. foreign policy on the line, how should the new Trump administration approach this conflict? What role should Europe play? And if peace talks stall, what comes next for Ukraine and the broader international community? 

We asked Emma Ashford, senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center — a think-tank that promotes international security and shared prosperity through applied research and independent analysis, global engagement, and policy innovation — for her analysis on a path forward that embraces a realist and restrained approach to U.S. involvement in the conflict. 

Trump promised to seek a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia to end the war. What challenges will he face in striking that deal?  

It is increasingly clear that all parties to the war in Ukraine would benefit from either a pause in hostilities or a resolution to the conflict under some conditions. However, achieving even a temporary peace will not be easy. Retired Gen. Keith Kellogg has been tasked by the administration with attempting to find a settlement to the conflict; he will need not only to persuade both Kyiv and Moscow to come to the negotiating table, but also to address some of the underlying issues that caused the conflict in the first place if it is not to reoccur. 

These are not, however, insurmountable obstacles. Ukraine is in a weak position as Russian forces continue to make consistent, gradual gains on the battlefield. Ukraine’s primary constraint is not the supply of Western arms or money, but rather the constraints of manpower: Ukraine has lost significant numbers of troops, is smaller than Russia, and continues to struggle to mobilize manpower. 

Russia, though in a stronger position, also has incentives to want this war ended. It is costly for Russia in lives, and further mobilization would impose some political costs on the Kremlin. Russia’s economy is adequate, but the impact of sanctions, inflation caused by the large quantity of funds funneled into Russia’s military-industrial complex, and even the labor market hit of mobilization — are all costly. In short, both sides can likely be brought to the negotiating table by a committed effort. 

Achieving a deal will be harder. Territory is, ironically, probably the easiest issue to resolve, as there is widespread consensus that the status quo — leaving Russia in control of the Ukrainian areas it holds — is the most likely outcome. Political issues, however, will be more challenging. How will a peace deal or simply a ceasefire be enforced? Will it require peacekeepers from Europe or the United Nations? Might restrictions upon armaments make it more difficult for Ukraine to defend itself in the future? And if Russia seeks sanctions relief, is that something the Trump administration can actually provide? 

Congress has historically been strongly opposed to sanctions relief. Though there are no easy answers, the best approach for Kellogg’s team may be some kind of ceasefire that halts the fighting while longer-term issues are worked out.

Ukraine insists that any peace deal must include guarantees for its security from countries like the United States. What are some of the options on the table, and what sort of guarantees might make sense from America’s perspective (if any)? 

One of the core political issues underlying this war is the question of Ukraine’s alignment and Western security guarantees. The question of NATO membership and expansion to Ukraine was key in the run-up to the Russian invasion in February 2022, but the problem goes back at least as far as 2008, when the George W. Bush administration suggested that a path to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was inevitable. 

Given the course of the war — and political developments in Europe and America — almost no one believes that NATO membership is a viable prospect for Ukraine anymore. The risks of doing so are simply too high. NATO membership would make the U.S. responsible for defending Ukraine and risk dragging us into a future war.  

Yet the Zelenskyy government in Kyiv has insisted that it requires Western security guarantees to prevent the war from restarting. As a result, many discussions in European capitals are focused on alternative guarantees, particularly whether non-NATO bilateral or multilateral security guarantees can be made to Ukraine that would offer them protection. European leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron clearly envision a European-led security force in Ukraine as part of the eventual peace. 

Yet such a guarantee would still be problematic from the U.S. point of view:  

• First, European states aren’t necessarily capable of accomplishing this mission. Even if European states can furnish the necessary troops, they’d still have to rely on U.S. military enablers such as intelligence and reconnaissance assets, or logistical support.  

• Second, it raises questions about what political scientists call “chain ganging.” If European allies found their troops under attack in Ukraine, would this then obligate an American response? Would NATO’s Article 5 commitment then apply? The prospect of being pulled into a conflict remains high. 

In short, the only form of security guarantee that would make sense from an American point of view is a commitment to send weapons or funds in the case of a future conflict. This is exactly what the United States has done over the last two years and would not obligate any actual involvement in a future war. Though potentially expensive for American taxpayers down the line, this could contribute to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and thereby prevent such conflicts from happening.  

It’s also worth noting, though, that there are other alternatives. A Western security guarantee is one way to deter future conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but it is not the only way. A well-armed Ukraine capable of defending itself  could deter Russia from future war. Or a more ambitious political settlement that seeks to address some of the core underlying causes of the conflict could do the same. In short, the Trump administration’s negotiators should not feel that they are limited only to security guarantees when considering this question — American interests might be better served by some other option. 

If Gen. Kellogg and the negotiating team don’t make any progress and the war continues, what happens next? How should the U.S. respond? 

This is a difficult question and is one of the reasons why the United States hasn’t moved towards resolving this conflict in the last few years. That experience, however, should offer a salutary lesson for policymakers. Many in the Biden administration were wary of seeking peace in Ukraine for fear that this would yield a bad deal. But since that time, Ukraine’s negotiating position has substantially weakened. The risk remains that if the war continues, the situation will deteriorate further.  

This speaks to the importance of finding a deal that can at least halt or freeze this conflict at a reasonable cost, rather than seeking a perfect, but implausible deal. I firmly believe that this is possible. If no deal can be reached, however, and the war were to continue, then the next priority of the Trump administration should be to follow through on their commitment to voters, and push European allies to pick up much of the burden for this war from the United States. 

This burden-shifting could take the form of money or arms sent directly to Ukraine; indeed, European states have stepped up their direct commitments substantially since the early days of the conflict. But it should also take the form of burden-shifting within NATO, decreasing the costs for U.S. forces in Europe of deterring Russia as the conflict continues.  

Ultimately, European states and the European Union are far closer to this conflict than the United States; they have a much stronger interest in seeing Ukraine continue to thrive. A peace deal is the best way — at this moment in time — to best secure the interests of Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. 

The Stimson Center is supported by Stand Together Trust, which provides funding and strategic capabilities to innovators, scholars, and social entrepreneurs to develop new and better ways to tackle America’s biggest problems. 

The ideas were outlined in a confidential document presented by senior Trump administration officials to their Ukrainian counterparts in Paris on Thursday, according to Western officials. They were also shared with senior European officials at the daylong meeting.

The U.S. is now waiting for Kyiv’s response, which is expected to come at a meeting of U.S., Ukrainian and European officials in London later this week. Then if there is a convergence among the American, European and Ukrainian positions, the proposals could be floated to Moscow.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. would pause its efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine if progress isn’t made in the coming days. Photo: Julien De Rosa/AFP/Getty Images

To put pressure on Ukraine and Russia, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Friday that the administration may pause its negotiating efforts if headway isn’t made on core issues in the next several weeks.

“The Ukrainians have to go back home, they have to run it by their president, they have to take into account their views on all of this,” Rubio said. “But we need to figure out here now, within a matter of days, whether this is doable in the short term. Because if it’s not, then I think we’re just going to move on.”

The U.S. diplomatic push is intended to set the stage for a cease-fire, which would be broadly along current battle lines, and an eventual settlement. Accepting some of the Trump administration’s ideas could prove difficult for Kyiv since Ukraine has rejected Russia’s legal claims to some of its territory.

A senior State Department official on Sunday cast the ideas presented to the Ukrainians as options for Kyiv to weigh and not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. The official said a “list of potential options” was shared “for discussion and feedback.” A spokesman for the National Security Council didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg, the retired Army lieutenant general who serves as an envoy to Ukraine, met on Thursday in Paris with senior Ukrainian officials, including Andriy Yermak, a top aide to President Volodymyr Zelensky, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha.

Rubio, Witkoff and Kellogg are planning to attend the coming London meeting, according to U.S. officials. After that, Witkoff might make another trip to Russia, though no travel has been announced.

Witkoff, a real-estate executive who is close to Trump, has met with Russian President Vladimir Putin three times and reported that he has made progress in his discussions with the Kremlin leader. Other U.S. officials have advised Trump to be more skeptical of Putin’s intentions.

A U.S. move to recognize the Russian seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 would reverse a more than decade of American policy from both Democratic and Republican administrations. In 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who served during the first Trump administration, denounced Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a threat to “a bedrock international principle shared by democratic states: that no country can change the borders of another by force.”

The U.S. Congress has passed legislation opposing U.S. recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

The ideas presented by the U.S. in Paris also include ruling out Ukraine’s membership in NATO. “NATO isn’t on the table,” Kellogg said in an appearance on Fox News Saturday.

Yet another U.S. idea, Western officials said, calls for designating the territory around the nuclear reactor in Zaporizhzhia as neutral territory that could be under American control.

In a March call with Zelensky, Trump raised the possibility that the U.S. would acquire Ukrainian power plants, including nuclear facilities, calling it the “best protection for that infrastructure.” The Zaporizhzhia plant, the largest in Europe, would then presumably feed power to both Ukrainian territory and regions that Moscow has conquered since its invasion of 2022 and that remain under its control.

The ideas put forth by the Trump administration fall short of some Russian demands, according to Western officials. They wouldn’t concede that Russia has a legal right to control four regions in the eastern part of Ukraine that it claims to have annexed, though they don’t require the Russian military to leave those areas. The idea that the U.S. consider recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea was earlier reported by Bloomberg.

The U.S., Western officials say, is also not proposing a cap on Ukrainian forces and isn’t precluding Western military support for Kyiv or the deployment of European troops there, a key sticking point with Moscow.

“Every sovereign nation on Earth has a right to defend itself,” Rubio said Friday. “Ukraine will have a right to defend itself and to enter into whatever agreements it wants to enter into on a bilateral basis with different countries and so forth.”

While the Trump administration temporarily withheld arms and intelligence from Ukraine to pressure it to seek a diplomatic compromise with Russia, it hasn’t imposed economic sanctions or taken any concrete steps to pressure Putin.

Ukraine has said it is willing to agree to a comprehensive 30-day cease-fire if the Kremlin follows suit. Several days ago, Putin declared a short cease-fire for the Easter holiday but Ukrainian officials said Moscow continued to carry out attacks during the religious holiday.

There is still no resolution regarding what types of security guarantees Ukraine might receive if it agrees to a peace settlement. The Trump administration hasn’t said if it is willing to provide any military support to European nations that send troops to Ukraine as part of a “reassurance force” to deter future Russian aggression.

The Kremlin has sought a lifting of U.S. sanctions and rekindling economic ties between Russia and the U.S. during talks in Moscow and Saudi Arabia that Putin’s special envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, has taken part in.

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents have become less likely over the past year to say Russia is an enemy of the United States – and more likely to call it a partner or competitor.

Republicans have also become less likely to say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself and to express concern about Russia defeating Ukraine or invading other countries in the region. As a result of this change in opinion, the partisan gap on many of these issues has grown.

For example, when asked whether Russia is an enemy, competitor or partner of the U.S., 40% of Republicans say Russia is an enemy, down from 58% last year. The share of Democrats and Democratic leaners who see Russia as an enemy is down 5 percentage points over the same period. Overall, half of Americans now call Russia an enemy, down from 61% in 2024.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted March 24-30, 2025, among 3,605 U.S. adults.

Views of NATO

Americans continue to see NATO in a mostly favorable light, and views among Republicans, Democrats and the public overall have changed little over the past year. As has long been the case, Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to have a positive opinion of the military alliance.

About two-thirds of Americans (66%) say the U.S. benefits from NATO membership, though this share has decreased slightly from 71% in 2021. This drop is reflected among Republicans (down 6 points) while opinion among Democrats has held steady.

Views of Russia and Putin

Few in the U.S. see Russia favorably (13%) or have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs (12%).

Both Democrats and Republicans have generally negative views of Russia and Putin, but these attitudes are more intense among Democrats – who are more likely than Republicans to express very unfavorable views of Russia (62% vs. 41%) and say they have no confidence at all in Putin (72% vs. 43%).

Over the past year, Republicans have become somewhat more likely to see Russia favorably and to express confidence in Putin, while Democratic views are largely unchanged.

Views of the Russia-Ukraine war

Nearly half of Americans (47%) are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading other countries, and 43% are concerned about Russia defeating and taking over Ukraine. Republicans have become less concerned about both possibilities in recent months, while Democrats have become more so.

Majorities of Republicans and Democrats alike see the war between Russia and Ukraine as important to U.S. interests, though Democrats are more likely to hold this view. Most Americans say the war is important to them personally, too, including 47% of Republicans and 66% of Democrats.

When it comes to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 49% have confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Democrats are much more likely to express confidence in Zelenskyy than Republicans (70% vs. 30%).

The Russian Defense Ministry insisted that it targeted “a meeting of the command staff of the Seversk operational-tactical group”, which Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later claimed was attended by NATO servicemen.

A debate is now raging over whether the attack was a war crime, as Ukraine claimed, a terrible mistake like Trump said, or a legitimate strike, as Russia insists.

Ukraine’s claim is aimed at further rallying the West to apply more pressure on Trump to pull the US out of its talks with Russia. Claiming that Russia deliberately targeted churchgoers on Palm Sunday is meant to make it more difficult for the talks to continue and for Trump to meet Putin.

As for Trump’s explanation of events, he wasn’t going to discredit himself by denying that it took place, but he also didn’t want to fall into Ukraine’s trap of lending credence to its war crime claim.

That’s why he instead opted for the middle ground of acknowledging what happened but attributing it to some vague “mistake” by Russia, such as a wayward missile or faulty intelligence. Trump can’t approve of any Russian strike that causes civilian casualties, but he also won’t let such attacks ruin their ongoing talks either.

Russia’s explanation maintains the country’s integrity by insisting that the targets were legitimate, though it also accounts for the reported civilian casualties by claiming Ukraine employs de facto human shields by illegally deploying military assets in civilian areas.

While critics might scoff at this version of the attack, it has been lent credence by the mayor of nearby Konotop, who declared on video that the regional military governor “organized an award ceremony for the soldiers of the 117th brigade” that day.

He also said that civilians were invited to attend the event, which he claimed that the regional military governor was earlier warned not to hold, presumably due to the risk of a Russian strike.

This additional information, which is omitted from many of the mainstream media reports about Palm Sunday’s missile strike, contextualizes Russia’s decision-making process and the reported civilian casualties.

Accordingly, from Russia’s perspective, it was neither a war crime nor a terrible mistake but a legitimate strike.

To elaborate, the regional military governor likely thought that inviting civilians to attend an award ceremony for the soldiers that he decided to host inside the city would deter Russia. Yet Russia’s cost-benefit analysis was different than what he expected.

From Russia’s perspective, taking out those VIP military targets at the possible cost of some civilian casualties could hasten the end of the conflict, thus ultimately saving more civilians in the long run than if the conflict continued.

Moreover, observers should remember that Russia has the international legal right to strike military targets anywhere in Ukraine, while Ukraine has the international legal responsibility not to deploy military assets in civilian areas.

For whatever one might think about the morality of Russia’s decision-making process, it was the regional military governor who irresponsibly assembled this legitimate target in Sumy, which he then surrounded with de facto human shields in a failed attempt to deter Russia.

The attack was also undertaken to help push Ukraine out of the rest of the neighboring Kursk Region since the targets that had assembled in Sumy were reportedly directly responsible for the invasion of Russian territory. Fully removing Ukraine’s forces from Kursk is a Russian prerequisite to any cessation of hostilities.

From Ukraine’s perspective, the civilian casualties caused by the collateral damage from the strike serve as the perfect pretext for rallying the West against the Russia-US talks, which takes on an even greater urgency considering the consequences that this strike had on Ukraine’s operations in Kursk.

If Ukraine is soon pushed out of this entire region as a result, then Russia might expand its counteroffensive into Sumy in order to pressure Kyiv into complying with Moscow’s peace demands.

Ukraine obviously wants to prevent this, to which end it believes that rallying the West could help, especially if the media optics of the strike complicate the Russia-US talks. The timing also couldn’t have been more opportune for Kyiv since Putin will have to decide by Friday (April 18) whether or not to extend the lopsided “energy ceasefire” with Ukraine. If he opts against right after the Palm Sunday missile strike, then Ukraine might more easily rally the West against Russia.

Nevertheless, Trump might not be pressured to pull the US out of talks with Russia nor pass along more arms to Ukraine, at least judging by what he said on Monday. 

According to Trump, “[Zelensky is] always looking to purchase missiles. When you start a war, you got to know that you can win the war. You don’t start a war against somebody that’s 20 times your size and then hope that people give you some missiles.”

These aren’t the words of a leader interested in further perpetuating the Ukraine conflict. With that in mind, Ukraine is unlikely to get what it wants from exploiting the incident.

That’s seen in Trump choosing the middle ground of attributing what happened to some vague “mistake” instead of taking either Ukraine or Russia’s side on the issue. For the time being, the peace process will, therefore, probably remain on track. But it will still likely take some time before any major agreement is reached.

President Donald Trump’s administration told allies it couldn’t sign the statement denouncing the attack as it is “working to preserve the space to negotiate peace,” according to people familiar with diplomatic correspondence, as meetings continue between the White House and the Kremlin.

Canada, which holds the G-7 presidency this year, told allies that without US endorsement it would be impossible to go ahead with the statement, according to the same people.

The US Embassy in London declined to comment. The White House, US National Security Council and Canadian government did not immediately respond to Bloomberg News requests for comment.

The Russian Defense Ministry acknowledged it carried out the attack on Sumy in a Telegram post on Monday, while claiming it had struck a gathering of Ukrainian military command staff in the city and killed more than 60 servicemen.

The G-7’s statement planned to say that the attack on Sumy was proof that Russia was determined to continue the war, according to drafts seen by Bloomberg News.

Trump struck a different tone, describing the attack as “terrible” in comments to reporters on Sunday night, but saying without elaboration that he was told Russia had “made a mistake.”

Trump, who continues his rapid drive to strike a deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, quickly shifted to blaming the fighting on his predecessor Joe Biden and Zelenskiy.

Russia’s strike on Sumy came two days after President Vladimir Putin met Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff for nearly five hours in St. Petersburg to discuss a ceasefire in Ukraine.

The talks with Putin opened up the possibility to “reshape” the Russia-US relationship and stabilize the region through some “very compelling commercial opportunities,” Witkoff told Fox News on Monday evening, without elaborating.

Following the Sumy attack, nearly 50 countries and international organizations spoke in support of Ukraine, Zelenskiy said Monday in his daily address to the nation.

Zelenskiy said that Kyiv had responded positively to Trump’s proposal for a full and unconditional ceasefire and an end to attacks like those in Sumy and Kryvyi Rih, referring to a strike on a children’s playground in the southern city which killed 20 earlier this month.

But 34 days had passed since Trump’s proposal, during which Russia continued to attack Ukraine, Zelenskiy said. Putin remains committed to waging war and will continue to do so in the absence of serious pressure, said the Ukrainian leader.

Dizzying talk of Trump simply calling Putin and Zelensky on the phone, and the three presidents agreeing to end the war has yielded to the sober reality that there are substantial issues that led to the war and that need to be resolved. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov explained in an early April interview that Russia takes Washington’s diplomatic efforts seriously, but that they cannot accept them “as they are” because they have not yet addressed “Russia’s core demand, that is, the need to resolve the issues stemming from the root causes of this conflict.”

Western commentators and advisers are quick to point out that Washington needs to exert leverage on Moscow or to complain that Washington has less leverage against Moskow than against Kiev, but both miss the point. There is little that leverage can accomplish in the Kremlin. Russia went to war, in large part, to make NATO keep its promise not to expand to Ukraine and to make Ukraine keep its founding promise not to join NATO. Both NATO and Ukraine have said as much. The Russian armed forces are decidedly winning on the battlefield. Russia is not going to agree to withdraw from Ukraine until NATO guarantees that it will not expand into Ukraine. Putin will not surrender Russia’s core demand at the negotiating table when he can impose it on the battlefield.

Russia will continue its war to push NATO out of Ukraine and away from its borders until that core requirement is promised it in writing at the negotiating table.

Negotiations have slowed against the tide of incompatible demands. Zelensky insists on a European and American security force in Ukraine that is NATO by another name, and Putin insists that there be no NATO in Ukraine. There are ways to resolve the paradox. The security force that monitors the peace need not be American or European. There are other nations in the world. The peacekeepers could be provided by Global South countries who are not a threat to Russia but who, at the same time, have an interest in Russia not breaking a peace. More creatively, and more promisingly if the peace is to be real and the peace is to be permanent, would be, not negotiating a peace along the Russia-Ukraine border, but, negotiating the broader European security structure that should have been built at the end of the Cold War.

Russia will not surrender its battlefield advantage until it is convinced that its core demands, no NATO membership for Ukraine and protection of ethnic Russians in Ukraine, are assured and the security paradox is resolved. These core demands will be achieved at the negotiating table, or they will continue to be pursued on the battlefield.

And though the West may rail at Russia, rightly or wrongly, for dragging its feet or for resisting, Russia seems to retain the support of powerful countries in the multipolar world, not for its invasion, but for its demand for a serious and lasting solution to the security problem in Ukraine, in Russia and in Europe.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will go to Moscow on an official visit in May. “China-Russia relations will not stand still,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “but will only become broader and broader.”

Wang echoed Ryabkov’s remarks, affirming that diplomatic efforts to end the war are “worth taking” but that a diplomatic solution was still “far away” because “the causes of the crisis are extremely complex.” Crucially, he then said that China “advocate[s] eradicating the causes of the crisis through dialogue and negotiations” as the means to “achieving a fair, long-term, binding peace agreement acceptable to all parties involved.”

Though not directly expressing support for Moscow’s insistence on permanently resolving the “core” issues and “root causes of this conflict,” India, too, has suggest support for Russia. After a pause in the protocol of annual visits, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Russia in 2024, but he has not invited Putin to India since Russia invaded Ukraine. That has now changed. On March 28, Moscow announced that Putin has accepted an invitation to visit India.

In announcing that preparations are underway for the visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov thanked Modi for taking “a balanced position on the Ukrainian crisis and advocat[ing] its resolution through dialogue and the elimination of the root causes of this conflict.”

The war in Ukraine was not ended within 24 hours of Trump taking office, and it will not be ended in one hundred days. But there is still hope that the Trump administration will facilitate its ending at the negotiating table. For that to happen, there has to be the will to deal with reality, including the reality that a diplomatic settlement is “far away” unless “root causes of this conflict,” including Ukrainian neutrality and an authentic security architecture are finally on the table.

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.