Strategy or stupidity? The dangers of escalation against Russia

Concurrently, the Biden administration agreed to permit Kyiv to strike Russian territory as well, but only near Kharkiv, where Moscow is mounting a major offensive that appears intended to achieve a buffer zone to prevent Ukrainian raids into Russian territory. Prior to that, it was the United Kingdom that had first publicly stated it would permit Kyiv strike Russian territory with Britain’s Storm Shadow missiles in early May. 

Ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Paris and Berlin have accused each other of opting for self-serving policies that undermine European policy coordination. On the one hand, Berlin followed the U.S. lead in supporting Kyiv against Russia. On the other, Paris claimed it wanted to strengthen “European sovereignty,” which opposes too much dependence on Washington, while engaging in “dialogue” with Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

In addition to disputes over the European Sky Shield, the French were upset with Germany’s decision to procure the problematic 5th Generation F-35 from the United States instead of investing more resources into French and European defense programs, such the more operational 4th Generation Rafale fighter jet and the next-generation Future Combat Air System. 

The French position then shifted quite radically away from “dialogue” with Moscow (at the time Macron did not want to “humiliate” Putin) to demands that Europe better defend itself against Moscow, as symbolized by the French test-firing an updated nuclear-capable missile in response to Putin’s tactical nuclear weapons threats. 

Warning that “Europe is mortal,” Macron has significantly upgraded arms exports to Ukraine for 2024 and agreed to permit Kyiv to deploy long-range missiles to “neutralize” Russian missile sites. In keeping “all options open,” Macron has publicly proposed the possible deployment of greater numbers of French/European military forces, advisers and trainers in Ukraine. 

For his part, Scholz has not wanted to provoke Putin by placing German forces in Ukraine. Nevertheless, he has toughened Berlin’s policy by agreeing to permit shorter-range German tanks to be used by Kyiv to strike Russian territory, while Germany has become the second-largest arms supplier to Ukraine after the U.S. 

At the same time, however, Berlin has thus far refused to deliver its long-range Taurus missiles to Kyiv that could strike the Kerch bridge that links Russia to Crimea, in large part because the Taurus missile would require deploying German personnel in Ukraine. The U.S. has likewise refused to permit Ukrainians to deploy ATACMS that can hit targets 200 miles away. 

On the one hand, now that the Biden administration has agreed to permit Kyiv to strike Russian territory, the U.S. and Europeans need to support Kyiv to prevent Russian forces from expanding beyond Kharkiv and Odessa. 

On the other hand, in implementing a defensive strategy, the Allies should not permit Kyiv to once again go onto the offensive, as could be the case if all restrictions are lifted on the use of weaponry that could strike deeper into Russian territory, which Ukrainian President Zelensky has urged. Using its own drones, Kyiv has already struck energy infrastructure, radar systems and airbases deep inside Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea.   

Concurrently, as they boost Ukrainian defenses in an effort to pressure Moscow from a position of greater strength, Washington, Paris and Berlin should also seek a cease-fire — while working with Beijing, New Delhi and Ankara, among others, to find a more permanent peace settlement based on current borders and the April 2022 Istanbul talks — as Putin has indicated might be possible. 

If no steps are soon taken toward a cease-fire, Putin has warned that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, coupled with a more significant deployment of European forces to Ukraine, would represent an escalation toward major-power war. 

Putin could begin to expand conflicts to new fronts by supporting Russophile movements throughout eastern Europe. He could likewise boost efforts to provide military assistance to China, Iran and its Axis of Resistance, and a nuclear North Korea, while sparking conflicts in Africa. Even within NATO countries, Moscow has purportedly begun to engage in covert acts of sabotage and cyber warfare. 

Putin has not ruled out the use of tactical nuclear weapons. One option is to “demonstrate” the explosion of such weaponry to stop the Ukraine conflict. While many believe Putin is bluffing, the dilemma is that if Putin bluffs too often, he will lose all credibility — thus pressing him to stick by his words. 

Berlin’s more cautious view is based on Germany’s disastrous history with Russia. Observations attributed to 19th century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck still appear relevant: The Russians are never as strong or as weak as they appear to be, and if you try to fight them, Moscow will meet “your every stratagem with unpredictable stupidity.” Bismarck had likewise counselled: “The secret of politics? Make a good treaty with Russia.”  

At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Europeans had failed to reach a “good treaty” with Russia that would establish a new architecture for Euro-Atlantic security. Now, in the present crisis, the refusal to accept Bismarck’s realistic counsel could lead Homo Geopoliticus down the path to yet another major-power war — that is, if Putin does raise the ante “with unpredictable stupidity.” 

Hall Gardner is professor emeritus of the History and Politics Department of the American University of Paris. He is the author of “Toward an Alternative Transatlantic Strategy,” “IR Theory, Global Rivalry and Major Power War,” “World War Trump,” “Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History,” American Global Strategy and the ‘War on Terrorism’” and “Averting Global War.”