ACURA ViewPoint: Nicolai N. Petro: The Fundamental Choice Before Us

To understand what is really going on, therefore, we probably need to look as much to domestic as to international politics. President Biden would very much like to show critics that he is a “Putin tamer” not a “Putinversteher.” The least costly way to do this is to concoct a manageable danger that he can then take credit for resolving. The eminent American political scientist Murray Edelman referred to this as “constructing the political spectacle.” 

But while this is all well and good for American domestic politics, it invariably leads to brinkmanship in our dealing with other nations, since it makes us blind to the “red lines” they regard as vital to their own survival. Moreover, just as they did during the Cold War, government officials like to pretend that they are in total control of the situation, when in fact it can spiral out of control at any moment.

The danger of accidental escalation is especially acute in Ukraine, where “volunteer battalions” of armed nationalists regard the conquest of Donbass as the only honorable solution, and barely tolerate government supervision as it is. We should not forget that it was the attack by the head of the Right Sector, Dmytro Yarosh, on April 20th, 2014 that led to all out war. Foremost in his mind, Yarosh recalls, was torpedoing the Geneva peace talks, which would have forced Ukraine to pursue negotiations, rather than the military liberation of Donbass.

Should the situation again spiral out of control, international actors try to pull back from all-out war, but what incentives would these local independent players have to join them? After all, they have long argued that only a Ukrainian victory parade on Red Square will suffice; recently, some former top Ukrainian officials have also called on the West to “go all the way” and attack Crimea.

Lots of political spectacle here, to be sure, only this time with unforeseeable consequences for the audience.

The solution that suggests itself is to stop playing games, and to engage in sweeping and comprehensive negotiations. Our objective, as I have recently argued elsewhere, should be to reach a true post-Cold war settlement. The first post-Cold War generation failed at this because it could not imagine an international order in which Russia might play a central role.

This is still the fundamental choice before us—either Russia will be on the inside, defending European security, or on the outside, undermining it.