China-Russia relations in 2022: an alliance by any other name?

Both Moscow and Beijing have already lauded the past year as the most outstanding period in their bilateral partnership.

During the recent video conference between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in mid-December, the leaders referred to each other as “friend”. Putin hailed bilateral relations as “a shining example of interstate cooperation” while Xi said the ties had demonstrated “major political advantages”.

On December 23, during his annual end-of-year press conference, Putin reiterated the praise lavished on Russia-China relations during his conversation with Xi. He said cross-state ties represent “an absolutely comprehensive partnership of a strategic nature, which has no precedent in history”.

In 2021, Russia and China marked several important milestones in their collaboration, which hint that their relations are taking on a more alliance-like structure, albeit still deprived of official obligations to avoid cold-war-style polarisation.

Economically, Moscow and Beijing have seen tangible progress, with trade turnover surpassing pre-pandemic levels and hitting a record high of US$123 billion.

The Russia-China partnership is often criticised as being unbalanced and based mainly on hard power elements, with economics being of secondary importance. That is why trade and flagship cross-border infrastructure projects act as important indicators of both presidents’ contribution to the growing entente.

In 2018, bilateral trade reached a historic US$100 billion, prompting both sides the following year to set a target of US$200 billion by 2024.

Moreover, Russia-China economic cooperation is gradually taking on a strategic nature as Beijing is now relying more on Moscow for crucial economic supplies.

In May, after the launch ceremony for the construction of four new reactors, which use Russian technology, at two nuclear plants in China, the two countries pledged to boost cooperation on nuclear energy.

China has increased electricity imports from Russia and initial discussions on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which is seen as a hedge against Western pressure, are making rapid progress. The fact that Xi and Putin discussed the pipeline during their virtual meeting in December speaks to the significance they assign to the project.

Yet, the most outstanding area of expanding cooperation is on the military front in all domains. In August, the two countries’ armies held a military drill in China during which they used a joint command and control system for the first time, echoing Nato’s approach. In addition, joint military manoeuvres were held in the air and at sea this year.

On December 23, China’s Defence Ministry issued a statement saying 2021 has seen “a new breakthrough in strategic cooperation” between the two countries. At his press conference, Putin said China and Russia are jointly developing hi-tech weapons for space and aviation.

Those areas are likely to extend to other dimensions. Both states have already made significant headway in the development of disruptive military technology, revolutionising the very model of great power competition.

Putin is confident that Russia’s hypersonic missile technology leads the pack. It was reported that China had tested a hypersonic weapon in the summer, reports that China denies. While the US expressed concerns over the development, Russia said conducting such tests was within international law and mirrored similar US moves.

Given close Russia-China interaction in most sensitive security domains, such as missile attack early warning systems, mutual incorporation of space flight components and joint development of hi-tech weapons, collaboration on hypersonic systems does not seem far-fetched.

As a result of this dynamism in bilateral cooperation at the political and strategic levels, Russia-China relations have come to resemble an alliance but lack its official structure.

Though the partnership was promoted in 2021 as a “tandem” to fend off any reference to formation of a military bloc, Russian officials have referred to the two countries as “allies”. When this happens twice in two weeks, it doesn’t seem like a slip of the tongue.

China and Russia are now openly expressing mutual support in the areas that they did not specifically stress earlier to avoid attracting criticism from the West.

China reassured Russia of its “full political support to [Russian] defence of legitimate rights” in June. In his video call with Putin, Xi pledged to support Russia in protecting its long-term security and backed Putin’s demand for security guarantees from Nato.

Moscow has sided with Beijing on the Taiwan issue, lambasted the West for politicising sports with the Winter Olympics boycott, joined China in condemning the West’s use of sanctions against their two countries, criticised US attempts to contain China and restated its impartiality towards disputes in the South China Sea, where Beijing has the upper hand.

Russia and the US will hold presidential elections in 2024, while China is entering a new political cycle with a personnel reshuffle on the cards after October’s National Party Congress at a time when Xi has consolidated his position as the country’s president.

The people of all three countries expect their leaders to defend national pride and dignity, which will be translated into heightened rhetoric and more bravado directed outside. Ukraine and Taiwan are likely to remain major flashpoints as both issues are impossible to resolve any time soon.

The US, Nato and the European Union will continue to exert pressure on China and Russia, both of which have been incorporated into the official policy-planning documents of Washington and its Nato allies either as a “challenge” or “threat”.

Recognising the long-term rivalry with the West, which has begun to resemble Cold War-era confrontation, Moscow and Beijing could enhance their cooperation by exploring deeper collaboration in military technologies, intensified military exchanges, advanced technology sharing and expanded joint military manoeuvres in more parts of the world.

Next year should bring no fewer breakthroughs than 2021, some of which will be unveiled after the long-awaited personal meeting between Xi and Putin, due to take place in February.