James Jatras: About Ukraine Conflict and U.S. Elections

— Donald Trump’s rating in December exceeded Joe Biden’s for the first time, 47% versus 43%. More and more analysts believe that Trump will become the next US president. But how might the Colorado Supreme Court’s historic ruling based on the 14th Amendment (known as the insurrection clause) and multiple investigations against Trump affect his chances of running?

— In my opinion Trump is 90% likely to be the GOP nominee but less than 5% likely to win the November 2024 election. Keep in mind that the US doesn’t have a single national election but 50 state elections. So a national poll of Trump vs Biden is virtually meaningless. Only about a dozen swing states are up for grabs; the rest are reliably in either the Democratic or Republican camp. Thus, if Trump is kept off the ballot in only a few of those swing states, the election is over before it begins. In fact, just keeping him off the ballot in Pennsylvania, which has a very partisan Democrat governor and attorney general, as well as state Supreme Court, would almost certainly be enough to ensure his defeat. Colorado hasn’t been a swing state for decades, so in itself it doesn’t matter much, but other states will follow as Trump is convicted, as he will be, in one or more of the number of the cases proceeding against him. 

— Anyway if the Republican candidate wins should we expect changes in the US foreign policy towards Russia? How important is it for Moscow long-term who wins – Trump or another republican who hasn’t experienced communicating with Moscow?

Aside from what I see as the distinct unlikelihood of Trump’s election, the chances of significant change in US policy towards Moscow in the foreseeable future is (with one caveat; see next answer) virtually nil. Aside from Trump, and perhaps RFK Jr., the entire US political class is hostile to Russia, to a much greater degree than they were opposed to the USSR, which at least, in their minds, had a “progressive” ideology. They see Russia as having no such redeeming feature, as evidenced by their obsession with LGBT ideology. Even if by some miracle Trump were to win, his ability to effect any real shift is small. I have it on good authority that he has learned nothing from the failures of his 2017-2021 administration, caused in large part by his horrible personnel selections, drawn from the standard neoconservative pool of GOP “talent.” He would repeat the same mistake in 2025. Plus, while in 2016 the bipartisan establishment was blindsided by Trump’s unexpected win, now they are taking no chances. That’s why Congress has enacted legislation to prevent any future president from withdrawing from NATO without Senate approval.  

— The democrats have repeatedly stated that their key goal over Ukraine is to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia on the battlefield. Could this trend change if a Democratic candidate other than Biden wins? Though it’s a little chance because they will probably set up a common candidate.

— No. As noted above, the US bipartisan establishment’s hatred of post-communist Russia (patriotic, not internationalist; Pravoslavnaya, not atheist) is implacable and immutable. That is why, in the face of the unavoidable fact that Ukraine has lost, no reasonable negotiation to end the conflict can be expected from Washington. Instead, concerned about the crisis in Gaza and their longer-term focus on China, they will resort to the kind of deception we saw in the Minsk 2 agreement, hoping the Russians will fall for the same trick yet again by agreeing to a ceasefire, for empty assurances about Ukraine’s future, and so forth  The only thing that could change this dismal picture is a fundamental shakeup of the US that would replace the current morally and spiritually sick personnel with an entirely new cast of characters. That may in fact come in the next few years, not through the normal political or electoral process but via an internal crisis, comparable to what Russia experienced in the 1990s, resulting from the collapse of the unipolar Global American Empire (GAE) and the dollar-denominated world financial system. That outcome would be hastened by a decisive military defeat for the GAE in Ukraine. On the other hand, if Moscow falls for yet another deception, it would give the GAE a new and dangerous lease on life.  

— The Republican majority in the House voted to launch an impeachment investigation against Biden. How likely is such a scenario? Will Kamala Harris be able to rally the electorate ahead of the election if impeachment is announced?

— The House Republicans will talk about impeachment, the “Biden Crime Family,” but it’s not clear if they will impeach him, no matter what crimes their hearings and investigations might dig up. First, they know with near certainty that the Democrat-led Senate would not convict him. Second, they understand that like government shutdowns, an impeachment, especially a failed one, is bad politics for Republicans, given Democrat control of the major media. In the unlikely chance that something was turned up that was so horrible even the Senate would be pressured to remove Biden, he could always claim he was retiring for health reasons. Completely apart from impeachment, it’s still well within the realm of possibility, even probable in my opinion, that Biden will be replaced by someone more plausible, like California Governor Gavin Newsom.  It almost certainly would not be Harris, who is universally unpopular, even among Democrats. In any case, a Democrat win in 2024 is a very good bet: as explained, keeping Trump off of state ballots is Plan A; Plan B would be resorting to political technologies (mail-in and absentee ballots, ballot harvesting, etc.) that installed Biden in 2020.

— Democrats refuse direct dialogue with Russia and in general, at least officially do not support the idea of negotiations to resolve the conflict. If the Republicans win, can we expect the negotiations will start? Who can become the mediator? Could it be China or another country, or even an exact politician like Angela Merkel, according to the media? Which candidate do you see personally?

— As noted above, if Moscow puts any faith in the possibility of a negotiated solution to Ukraine, we are looking at a problem much more serious than wondering who might be able to mediate. I repeat with emphasis: any “deal” agreed to with Washington as currently composed could only be a “Minsk 3” deception, which even Merkel has admitted with respect to Minsk 2. No assurances or promises on the US side can be trusted. Such a deal would only be for the purpose of gaining a breathing space to prevent total, humiliating defeat on a par with the Afghanistan fiasco but with far more devastating consequences for the continued viability of NATO and of NATO’s concubine, the EU. Obviously, if such negotiations did take place, Merkel — a proven liar who abused Moscow’s trust — is unsuitable. Nor could China mediate, as that country is next on Washington’s target list. 

— Before leaving for the Christmas holidays, Congress did not agree on a bill providing $61 billion in funding for Ukraine. More and more doubts over supporting Ukraine are being raised in European states. How entrenched is this trend? Should we expect that support for Ukraine will actually decline in 2024?

— Yes. Ukraine funding is running into a number of problems: no plausible scenario for Ukrainian victory; depletion of US and European stocks of weapons to send to Ukraine; Ukraine’s depletion of its manpower even if they received equipment and ammunition in quantities greater than can be provided; increased awareness of Ukraine’s corruption and Zelensky’s ineffectiveness; and, most of all the competing demands of Israel and Taiwan, and for Republicans, the southern border. Americans don’t like losers, and Ukraine is a loser. While some politicians will still want to dump more money into military industries (who then fund their campaigns) and consider anything that kills Russians a “win,” they are running out of Ukrainians to sacrifice for that purpose.      

— The US and the EU have already imposed sanctions on almost all sectors of the Russian economy; experts argue that it’s getting more difficult to introduce further restrictions, since they hit the countries themselves. Will Washington introduce sanctions in 2024 that will be sensitive to the Russian economy?

— They will of course try, but they are running out of things to sanction. Even people of the low intellectual and moral caliber of those in charge of western capitals are aware the sanctions have hurt Europe’s economy much more than Russia’s. So they will go through the motions of announcing yet more sanctions on Russia but which don’t really do anything. It’s pure moral posturing. Meanwhile, as the pain deepens for European publics, we will see more leaders like Hungary’s Orban, Slovakia’s Fico, and Croatia’s Milanovic. It’s surprising that Scholz is still Chancellor after all he’s subjected his country to in his abject subservience to Washington. 

— Congress plans to limit the ability of the US President to withdraw from NATO unilaterally. Obviously, this legislation, as they say, is being adopted “for Trump.” Does Trump really intend to withdraw the US from the alliance, or is it just election rhetoric from the Democrats?

— It’s an insurance policy against something that is very, very unlikely to happen anyway. Not only is it improbable that Trump will get elected, even if he did there’s no indication this is anywhere on his mind. Remember, that when he was elected in 2016 the establishment was terrified that he would block the pending accession of Montenegro. They even tried to force approval for Montenegro through the (then) GOP-controlled Senate on Inauguration Day 2017 itself, so as not to give him a chance! But that effort was blocked by the heroic efforts of Senator Rand Paul. No matter. It soon became clear that the Trump administration — already staffed top to bottom by neoconservative GOP regulars, mostly Bush Jr. retreads — had no interest in stopping NATO expansion. Montenegro eventually was approved, as later was the ridiculously named “North Macedonia.” In my opinion the NATOphiles can sleep easy. They have nothing to worry about. 

— The media reported the US demanded that Israel complete the operation in the Gaza Strip by the end of 2023. Israel doesn’t seem to do it. What leverage does the US still have in regard to the situation in the Middle East? Could Washington reduce funding for Israel? How do you assess the US readiness to conduct an operation in the Red Sea to ensure free navigation?

— In my opinion any US calls for restraint are for show. Put bluntly, Bibi Netanyahu has more control over US policy than Joe Biden does — or at least the “Joe Biden” cardboard cutout in the White House. Thus, there is no question of leverage nor of reduced funding. With respect to the Red Sea, such a mission is possible but probably depends on how troublesome Washington considers the Houthis’ actions balanced against potential vulnerability of US ships if a regional conflict escalates.   

— Kim Jong-Un said the DPRK is ready to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike without hesitation. In general, the rhetoric surrounding the DPRK’s nuclear program has recently intensified. Could the US go for a radical escalation on the Korean Peninsula to deter the DPRK, i.e. use the missile defense system of Seoul and Tokyo against Pyongyang’s missiles or other military tools, or officially set up a military alliance with S. Korea and Japan (so called “Asian NATO”)?

— There is reason to think that in the face of looming defeat in Ukraine, Washington is looking in other theaters to stir up trouble for entities considered friendly to Moscow. This explains increasingly provocative moves by Albanian “authorities” against Serbs in northern Kosovo, increased pressure from the illegally installed “High Representative” on the Republika Srpska government of President Milorad Dodik, stepped up Israeli strikes on Syria, and what appears to have been the West’s unanswered theft, right under Moscow’s nose, of Armenia, thanks to the Sorosite regime of Nikol Pashinyan. Thus, provocative actions in other areas, such as the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula, are not surprising. Kim’s threats are aimed at offsetting such provocations. I don’t see how the US would use such missile defense systems unless North Korean missiles were actually fired at Japan or North Korea. Since we already have bilateral defense pacts with both Tokyo and Seoul, I’m not sure how a collective pact would make much difference. On the other hand, in 2021 the Biden Administration finalized the AUKUS agreement with the UK and Australia. So a “JAKOUS” (“J’Accuse…!”?) can’t be ruled out. As though the original NATO weren’t already one NATO too many…