No Plan C. The Road to Debacle.

Summary of Mercouris (Mercouris 11.27.2022)

Robust Russian Mood

The mood in Russia appears to have hardened, so that Russians are now ready for a long war, one which they believe they can endure, a war which they must win, and for which they have the resources. From Putin, Mercouris has never picked up the sense that he has any doubts of this. The only time when Putin seemed nervous and angry was back in March when he spoke in extremely scathing terms about the west, when he labelled the west an “empire of lies.” His nervousness was never about the military situation, but about the home front. He could not have been sure at that time about the extent to which the Russian economy would stabilize, or the extent to which the general Russian sentiment would turn out in full support of the war, or about the stability of Russia’s relations with other countries.

Better than Expected

These things have turned out much better than expected for Russia, despite the sanctions war. The ruble, at around 60-62 to the $, has been remarkably stable in recent months; industrial production seems to be rising; Russia had a good harvest in 2022 and will likely have a good harvest in 2023; consumer demand is now rising; inflation has been coming down. One of the reasons why Russia’s car industry is able to restart production is due to Moscow City’s takeover of the old Peugot factory; and in addition it has received help from China and help from another country (unnamed) that is providing Ruussia with spare parts for western vehicles. But it is first and foremost the Russian car manufacturers who are recovering, and localizing production. The same is true in aircraft production.

Battlefield Advances

On the battlefields, Russia is largely withstanding Ukrainian offensives, and is making good progess in Bakhmut, Marinka, Adiivka and the like. Meanwhile the intensity of Ukrainian artillery attacks on Donetsk City appears to be diminishing.

Degrading Western Weapons Support

Referencing Brian Berletic’s analysis at New Atlas, Mercouris talks about the degree to which western military supplies to Ukraine have never been up to the level that Ukraine may have expected. We have now had another gaggle of supplies from the Pentagon – additional munitions for Nasmas (?) (an anti-aircraft system), 150 heavy machine guns with thermal imagery sights for attacking drones (they havent had a very successful record at it) such as the Geranium 2, additional ammo for HIMARS, 200 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds (excaliber, but no ordinary rounds), 10,000+ mortar rounds, high speed HARMS (which have proven something of a failure and have not made a serious dent), 150 Humvees, 20m small arms ammo, 200 generators (nowhere close to what Ukraine needs), spare parts for 150mm M777 Howitzers (which are no longer been supplied by the USA). Very thin gruel.

European countries are also supplying weapon systems, including a few old Sea King helicopters from Britain (not the better MI8 variety) which are being phased out in Britain itself. American media have been talking about how Ukraine expends more artillery shells than NATO forces used in a month in Afghanistan. Yet Ukraine’s expenditure of artillery is only a fraction of Russia’s.

Western powers face immense difficulties in keeping supplies up to the necessary levels for Ukraine, and attempts to increase production are costly, expensive, take a long time and still will not come close to meeting Ukraine’s needs. There has been a frenetic hunt around the world for stocks of 150mm artillery shells (and not every country uses exactly the same variety) that would enable Ukraine to get its old Soviet style artillery working again. The risk is that even when available such shells may not be in good condition. Mercouris recalls Scott Ritter’s warning a few months ago that Howitzers are heavy in maintenance, unsuitable for heavy barrages, fragile, designed for lightness and mobility, and not what Ukraine needs. He has been proven comprehensively correct in this. The NYT reports that after a couple of hundred rounds these begin to reveal defects, which then forces Ukraine to rely on other Howitzers when the numbers of these are declining. The guns are not often fit for use, and have to be sent back for repair to Poland.

There are problems withn the German self-propelled 150mm guns, which seem to reveal comparable problems. When these were first supplied in June there were reports about how western artillery had longer range than Russian – which is true up to a point – but the reason that western artillery pieces have generally slightly longer range is because of the greater pressure of the gasses in the barrels. When the Russians want very long range artillery they tend to increase the caliber of the weapons because these can then withstand the higher pressures. Higher pressures in lower-caliber barrels are the cause of the more frequent breakdowns of western artillery, and this is becoming a major crisis.

By early August, Ukraine had run through the greater part of the tank fleet with which it started. Many of the tanks it now uses are from old Warsaw Pact arsenals and supplied by western powers in Eastern Europe (Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic etc) and now these supplies have also been severely depleted. Russia reports every day on Ukraine’s high losses of tanks. Ukraine has a fairly good system of retrieving and repairing tanks but there is a limit to how far this can go. In theory, Russian Soviet-era tanks can be replaced with superior western tanks, but Ukrainians would need a long, long time to be trained in their use, and the numbers of such tanks are limited. So NATO is scouring the Global South for supplies of older tank models (e.g. of the kind once used by the armies of Sadam Hussein, Ghadaffi and others). What kind of condition will these tanks be in, and even when they are refurbished are they really an adequate substitute for the kind of tanks that Ukraine once had?

One gets a general sense that Ukraine will increasingly have problems with its existing weapons systems. What about the supply of HIMARS and the weapons for such launchers? The US may have sent up to 34 launchers altogether, and there are endless arguments about how many of these have been destoyed by Russia. Stocks of HIMARS are being depleted in the USA itself. Russia meanwhile is now deploying weapons that have not been previously seen, including advanced anti-drone and anti-tank weapons which have been appearing in ever greater numbers, and Russia’s production of drones is being ramped up. There is a growing number of Tornados, the Russian equivalent of the HIMARS. The Tornado is a simple launch sytem that uses precision-guided missiles and some of these have longer range than the Ukrainian. The Tornados are being used in an increasingly effective way. Russia has the most advanced air defense system in the world, whereas Ukraine’s is under immense strain and is breaking down under Russia’s missile attacks, and was never as dense as the Russian system.

A Depressed NATO Mood

This imbalance adds to the imbalance, to Russia’s favor, in troop numbers, which, together with the decline of European economies, is affecting NATO’s mood, which is now much less confident than it was. The Economist carries a cover picture of an iced-over Europe, and warns of a very long recession. Even Simon Tisdall of the Guardian is growing increasingly despondent. Evans-Pritchard in the Daily Telegraph has finally admitted that Europe’s energy problems are only just beginning, and that the situation on the battlefields is not going as he previously believed, noting that gas reserves are down to a trickle, and that the result of all the increasing pressures on China to reflate the Chinese economy there will be increasing demand for LNG, and energy prices will increase accordingly in a context of less available Russian supplies in Europe. He acknowledges that Europe faces a real danger now of deindustrialization.

Dwindling Support for Ukraine

Support for Ukraine is beginning to dwindle. Tisdall now thinks there is a real possibility that Ukraine will be abandoned. There is a growing realization that the west’s Plan B has failed. Plan A was to crush the Russians by means of a sanctions war. This has not worked (despite the Yale Group’s insistence a few months ago that it had). Then came Plan B which was to send as many weapons systems to Ukraine as possible, push for Ukraine’s counteroffensives as in Kharkiv and Kherson, and that this would cause Russia to topple. But those “victories” were ephemeral, Russian society has absorbed them, Putin’s position is as strong as ever.

No Plan C

So the west now finds that it has no plan C, that Ukraine will likely lose, and that the west is headed for deindustrialization. There is no sign yet of a willingness to negotiate. We are likely going to see a repeat of the west’s mistakes in Vietnam and in Afghanistan namely, to keep trying things that have never worked in the hope that something might change. The west is plunging towards a debacle the likes of which we have never yet seen.

Additionally, the following provides food for thought:

NATO Realizes it is Not Ready to Take On Russia | Europe | Russia Ukraine War