On the New EurAsian Order

Sergey Karaganov, Alexander Mercouris and Glenn Diesen: From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia

The first question posed by Diesen concerns the origin of the current crisis, one which amounts, he says, to a failure of the possibility of a Greater Europe that had begun to emerge following the first Cold War. Karaganov says that he went on record as long ago as 1996 as saying that he thought the ultimate trajectory would be conflict, arising from the west’s decision on a “coup de Rus.” The worst mistake in Russian foreign policy was Russia’s signing of the founding act of the NATO-Russian treaty in 1997. NATO had already decided to expand, so why did Russia sign it? Clinton made it clear that NATO would be bound in no way whatsoever by this. But Russia at that time was too dependent on western funding to be more independent [of what perhaps we could describe less as NATO expansion and more as NATO imperialism,]. The first crack in the agreement came with NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 when it became absolutely clear that we were headed for an ultimate showdown between Russia and the West.

One London academic at the time referred to the treaty as “an unequal treaty” in the same sense that the Chinese used the term to describe the treaties imposed on China by the western powers in the nineteenth century. Russia was told that it had to accept the treaty since NATO was going to expand anyway. The trouble with unequal treaties is that they are unstable and cannot endure. Russia’s financial dependence that was at the roots of its going along with this, set off the alarm bells with the campaign in Chechnya in 1999 and, for the west, rang even more loudly when Russia began to take control of its energy wealth in the early 2000s in order to be less dependent on the west. This is when western anti-Russian propaganda in the modern period really began to take off. There was growing hostility.

Russia was dependent in the sense that it had a huge debt from Gorbachev’s time to the tune of some $120 billion which Russia had to serve or otherwise it would be cut off from other funds; this continued until Putin brought it to an end (refused to continue payment??) in the early 2000s, one of his aims from the beginning. The second dependency was Russia’s imposition of capitalism so that all monies earned had to be somehow defended by government or by crooks and which were siphoned overseas [I did not capture the logic of this statement, as best I have it, from Karaganov, but I get the drift: the version of capitalism adopted by Russia, which was pushed forward at neckbreak, reckless speed, brought about an era of government financial authoritarianism and the rise of criminal or at least undeserving oligarchs – are the rich ever deserving?]. Russia developed a huge comprador class and most of Russia’s elite was dependent on money siphoned off to the west [in other words, I think, whose continuing wealth depended on their investment of it in the west, not in Russia].

From 1999 Russia started to get rid of all of this. It was a hard process.

Karaganov, having talked about how Russia’s economic crisis was taken advantage of by the west in the 1990s, talks about how Russia looked to the west to partner in establishing a new security architecture that would embrace both Europe and Russia, an ambition that the west was not interested in pursuing. Hence, the west became less and less of a role model for Russia. Russia had been penetrated by western ideas, ones to which Russia’s intellectual elite were committed, and there was a notion that Russia was turning towards, even turning into Europe, which they naively saw as a land of affluence, culture, beauty etc. They had wanted to integrate with this delusion. People did not want to see the truth.

But Russia was already dissatisfied with the security position to which the west had assigned it. Russia came to see that the west was imposing unequal even dangerous schemes on it. When Europe rejected Christianity in constitutional debates, then for Karaganov that was the end of Europe [This was another section that was difficult to follow. I presume he was referring to a drift away from recognition in Europe of its Christian heritage, no doubt in part due to a growing awareness of its own developing ethnic diversity as well as acknowledgment of its own secularization. But I think Karaganov is usefully reminding his listeners that with Russia we are talking about a civilization in which Christianity is still regarded as a crucial component. This, of course, raises all kinds of problematic issues relating to Russia’s own spiritial diversity, in particular, of its vast Muslim populations]. The post-European or post-human values that were taking over many European elites was becoming more and more evident in the 2000s, leading to a stronger disassociation of Russian elites from Europe around 2010. Also around this time Russia began to develop stronger economic links with Asia. And now Russia and Europe have parted company in an altogether different way.

Mercouris suggests that most westerners today have very little knowledge about Russia. There is great understanding about the scale of the Russian economy leading to the miscalculations of the sanctions war against Russia. Also,Russians for a very long time have been idealizing Europe. Was this because travel was difficult in Soviet times. Were Russians unaware of the moral, cultural changes in the west that started in the 1960s onwards? Karakanov agrees that most Russians were misinformed about these changes [but there is a huge area that he is missing here, having to do with the popularity of western movies and western music and how these contributed to the feeding of positive sentiments among young Russians towards Europe and the USA. This is also a story of technology changes thatr provided Russians with ever easier access, if not always legal, to western cultural products] and besides, many people in Europe were also misunderstanding what was happening with their own systems and cultures.

Russians felt they were moving towards an ideal that they thought Europe represented but actually did not. In Soviet times, Russians were closed off from the west, intellectually. At the same time, Europe had very narrow access to Russian ideas, and this is now happening again; in fact it is worse than in Soviet times; it is getting more and more difficult for example for Russians to access western source[Likewise, for westerns to access Russian, as the hysterical censorship of RT illustrates). Now, Russians have a much more negative view of Europe. The picture of Europe is becoming distorted in Russia.

Diesen raises the question of the transition from Russian dependence on western technologies to Russia becoming more independent, and, therefore, of Europe having much less influence and authority in Russia. Karaganov agrees, but says it is a painful but necessary process. The Peter the Great period, which gave Russia a lot, has finished. He admires the legacy of Peter the Great, and he is sad about the parting from Europe, but sees this as necessary. He talks of the much more vibrant economies and cultures of Russia which to some extent came about as a result of its links with Europe, but now the Russian genius is returning. Apart from the terrible suffering in Ukraine, the process is otherwise going in the right direction, away from the power of the comprador class and the class of the “fifth columnists” (Russian liberals fascinated by the west) to become the freest country of Europe. He says that Russia’s levels and freedoms of discussion are improving and better than in most other countries of the world.

Diesen notes that few countries outside of NATO joined its sanctions war, and brushed off western pressures to conform with it, rejecting the west’s moral authority, while there are now more institutions developing outside of the western sphere, such as the BRICS and SCO. Karaganov considers that the west’s framework of knowledge across all disciplines is shaped by European identity, an identity whose foundation was one of colonial domination. Now, as the west loses its wars, Russia is resurgent alongisde the rise of new nations, and new cultures, that were neglected by Europe. For this reason Karaganov feels very positive about the future, provided we can solve (and it is solvable) the current catastrophic war in Ukraine by means of a common understanding of security needs, both in Europe/Russia but also in many other parts of the world (for example Pakistan/India), and by investment of our energies in real problems.

Mercouris notes that much of what Karaganov is talking about is not given any attention at all in western media and discourses. There have been long denials, for example, about the rise of China, about the alliance between China and Russia, a failure to see what is going on in Africa, that African states are now expressing opinions at odds with those of the European heartland. Western policymakers still see the world through the prism of a system of western hegemony even as this system is disappearing and as though all that is needed is a bit of pressure here and there to prop it up. There is no understanding of the process of transition on which. in reality. we are all engaged, at a time when problems are inceasingly transnational. Western elites, leaders for hundreds of years, cannot see today’s realities.

Diesen opines that unipolarity is already gone, but that the west seems to believe that it can reverse this trend if only it wins in Ukraine. Many countries have been taken aback by the west’s stubborness in this matter. Is there any appetite for diplomacy? When Russia proposed a ceasefire just recently it was rejected by the US, the EU, and Kiev, as though ceasefire is the same as capitulation, as though diplomacy was a dirty thing. Now we just have escalation after escalation. Karaganov sees a process of intellectual degradation among European elites because of 70 years of peace and quiet and these leaders cannot even imagine how to deal with a world in crisis; the conflict in Ukraine will do nothing to halt this process of intellectual degradation in Europe. Russia will win that war, leaving for Russia the challenge of its future relationship with Ukraine.

Diesen raises the question of Russia’s international relations with countries like China, India and Iran. Karaganov’s response amplifies the theme of western ignorance when he notes that Iran is one of the most educated countries in the world and that that applies to its women as well. At last ,Russia is building southern corridors to connect to Iran, China, Thailand and other Asian and Middle East clountries. That will constitute the Greater EurAsia. In 10 years, the SCO will be the major source of power in the world. All this has been developing slowly bvecause of neglect, but that is ending now with closer coordination between Beijing and Moscow. EurAsia is the best domain for intellectual and economic development, and Karaganov would like to see integration of South America in this process, in the movement towards this multi-colored, multi-polar world. The greatest Chinese poetry certainly competes with Dante.

Mercouris adds that Indian philosophy can certainly compete with Greek and notes that most Europeans have yet to make that kind of leap. He returns to the issue of the history of the relationship between Russia and China. Where is this relationship at the moment? Over the past two years the USA seems suddenly to have woken up to the reality and significance of this. Washington’s focus is on how to break up this relationship, in part by creating a war in Ukraine, defeating Russia there, and then redirecting anti-Russian US policies towards China.

Karaganov notes that his institution the HSE has seven or eight of the greatest foreign policy and China specialists. For the time being, the Russian-Chinese relationship is in a very safe place because of coincident interests, and economic ties are growing – Chinese cars are everywhere in Moscow, for example (at the expense of German). The Chinese are coming, but they are coming cautiously, and are respectful of Russia’s sovereign power. The relationship is now much healthier than in the past, no longer based as was once was the case, on ideological conformity. If Russia survives as a strong, sovereign nation the prospects for an even balance of power in EurAsia are strong. He would hope to see southern Siberia developed by Russia first and this will contribute to a relationship with China that is based on equality and mutual respect between different civilizations. China needs Russian fuel; Russia needs Chinese ingenuity and enterprise. The notion of EurAsia helps China sit comfortably not as a dominant power in this region but as an equal amongst equals. The world towards which we are moving is one that Karaganov likes, provided we can avoid the obvious pitfalls on the way.