Russia’s Revised Nuclear Doctrine and the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War

Much of the discussion around the ND revisions centers around Articles 9-12. They address the security problem posed to Russia by the NATO-Ukraine alliance and the war it sparked with Russia. Articles 9-10 note: “9. Nuclear deterrence is also carried out against States that provide their controlled territory, air and/or sea space and resources for the preparation and implementation of aggression against the Russian Federation. 10. Aggression of any state from the military coalition (bloc, union) against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies is considered as aggression of this coalition (bloc, union) as a whole” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, pp. 2-3). These new articles are a result of, and a response to NATO countries various forms of support for Ukraine, particularly its invasion into Kursk as well as drome and missile attacks on numerous Russian regions, aside from Crimea and the four Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia.

Several subsequent Articles in Russia’s revised ND reduce the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate just how close we are approaching said threshold, as far as the Kremlin is concerned. In many ways, these specific Articles constitute the core of the warning that Putin’s decision to revise the ND is; the revision of the ND is an exercise of nuclear deterrence in and of itself. 

Much attention has been focused on Article 11 and properly so. It stipulates: “Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear State with the participation or support of a nuclear State is considered as their joint attack” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, p. 3). This is indeed crucial because it attributes joint responsibility to NATO’s non-nuclear states and Ukraine along with NATO’s nuclear powers – the U.S., UK, and France. Thus, Ukraine is tied to the potential nuclear threat to Russia or Belarus posed by the three leading NATO states. Kiev is placed on the nuclear escalatory ladder and targeted for nuclear deterrence, given the implied nuclear threat it poses by putting Russia into conflict and ever greater conflict with NATO and its nuclear powers. The November 21^st Russian attack on Dnipro, Kiev using a new intermediate range ballistic conventional not nuclear missile among others, was an exercise in deterrence if implied, if you will. This attack was in accordance with Article 11’s attribution of joint responsibility for Ukraine and NATO and its nuclear powers. Article 12 states: “Nuclear deterrence is aimed at ensuring that a potential adversary understands the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, p. 3). The invocation of inevitable retaliation is particularly chilling in light of the Russian ND’s Article 11 and the November 21^st Russian attack on Dnipro—already a nuclear deterrence attack sans the nuclear warhead.

In response to the use of six ATACMs, the Russians deployed a new hypersonic, intermediate-range missile with a conventional but still unclear explosive charge, as noted above. In seeming proportion to the six ATACMs, the new Russian missile attacked in 6 waves each with 6 missiles, suggesting a multiple conventional warhead. There is speculation that there was no explosive, the attack having been a test, or detonation occurred deep underground (www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVrLEcxI7Wc&t=933s, at the 1:30 mark). Putin addressed the nation and the world after the Dnipro attack to explain Russia’s deterrence goal while again offering negotiations to end the war. He noted: 

“In response to the use of American and British long-range weapons, on November 21 of this year, the Russian Armed Forces launched a combined attack on one of the facilities of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine. In combat conditions, one of the newest Russian medium–range missile systems was tested, in this case with a ballistic missile in a nuclear-free hypersonic equipment. Our rocket scientists called it ‘Hazel.’ The tests were successful, and the launch goal was achieved. On the territory of Ukraine, in the city of Dnepropetrovsk, one of the largest and most famous industrial complexes ever since the Soviet Union was hit, which still produces rocket technology and other weapons. … (W)e are conducting combat tests of the Oreshnik missile system in response to the aggressive actions of NATO countries against Russia. The issue of further deployment of medium-range and shorter-range missiles will be decided by us, depending on the actions of the United States and its satellites. The targets for destruction during further tests of our newest missile systems will be determined by us based on threats to the security of the Russian Federation. We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against the military facilities of those countries that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities, and in the event of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond just as decisively and in a mirror (proportional) manner. I recommend that the ruling elites of those countries that have plans to use their military contingents against Russia seriously think about this” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75614).

The next to last sentence is the operative one per our discussion of nuclear deterrence and usage and echoes the revised ND’s Article 9. 

The most important overlooked article in the discussions of the new ND is the 19^th, in particular its fourth (‘g’) and fifth (‘d’) paragraphs indicated alphabetically in, of course, Russian (if in English they would be listed as ‘d’ and ‘e’). Art. 19 stipulates the conditions under which, the threats in response to which the Russian President may authorize the use of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Several of the stipulated conditions or threats appear to have been already realized or could arguably concluded to have been. For example, Art. 19’s paragraph ‘g’ states that a threat justifying the use of Russia’s nuclear forces is  “aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as members of the Union State with the use of conventional weapons, creating a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, p. 6).  The NATO-Ukraine Kursk incursion when it is as now backed up by massive missiles if not massive missile strikes could be construed as creating ‘a critical threat to (Russia’s) sovereignty and/or territorial integrity’. By some in Putin’s inner circle, if not by Putin himself. Surely, we are approaching a scenario that could reasonably be so construed.

Art. 19’s paragraph ‘d’ in Russian (what would be paragraph ‘e’, that is the 5^th, if in English) stipulates as cause to use nuclear weapons “the receipt of reliable information about the massive launch (take-off) of means of aerospace attack (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, p. 6). Although less applicable as of the first uses of ATACMs and Storm Shadows by NATO on Russian territory proper in Bryansk and Kursk), this paragraph could become salient in nuclear use decision-making, if NATO aircraft crossed into Russian airspace proper in order to fire NATO missiles such that they could reach Moscow. This a real option, misguided albeit, for NATO/Ukraine.

The upshot of all this, again, is that we are moving closer to scenarios in which Putin or a less cautious successor might choose to use a tactical nuclear weapon in order to end such threats as enumerated above or deter their further posing. I do not think that Putin, who is an extremely rational and cautious actor, will opt to use even a single tactical nuclear weapon, unless a situation, say, like the one in Kursk should drastically deteriorate from the Russian point of view: for example, if by some miracle Ukraine’s forces in Kursk were somehow to regroup and be approaching the Kursk nuclear power plant and/or nuclear weapons storage facility. But the actual situation on the ground is quite the reverse. Ukrainian forces are being or have been surrounded, depending on which one is talking about, and are likely to be fully destroyed or mostly destroyed during a hasty retreat. Thus, the ATACMs may be a way to ensure an open extraction corridor, and little more when it comes to Kursk. 

But the attack on Bryansk suggests a more expansive NATO-Ukraine agenda for the missiles. Since NATO has consistently escalated its involvement in terms of weapons deployments to Kiev, we can expect a similar escalation regarding the use of the ATACMs and other missiles. Putin will match them every step up the way. He may be forced to rise up the escalatory ladder more rapidly, given mounting public and elite pressure to get tough and fight a war instead of his ‘special military operation.’