The First Step Towards Peace in Ukraine

The post-talk press conferences at Riyadh suggested a point of contention between the two delegations. Lavrov spoke of ‘parallel’ tracks: a Ukrainian peace track and a U.S.-Russian relations track (www.youtube.com/watch?v=vuwcnOBkmGY). However, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated during the American delegation’s press conference that conclusion of a Ukrainian peace agreement would open the door to agreements on the U.S.-Russian track (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pi_KRvYPymw). Later, it as further clarified that no U.S. sanctions would not be lifted until a Ukrainian peace treaty was signed. It remains unclear whether other aspects of U.S. relations, such as coordination of policies in global hot spots like Syria, Palestine, and other issues would be delayed until a Ukrainian peace treaty is signed. News reports, citing multiple foreign diplomatic sources, suggest that the US and Russia have settled on a three-stage peace plan, according to multiple foreign diplomatic sources close to the talks in Saudi Arabia. The plan includes: (1) a ceasefire, (2) elections in Ukraine, and (3) signing of a final agreement. There are internal obstacles, contradictions, and risks in such a plan.

First problem: Russian officials, including Russian president Vladimir Putin, have repeated numerous times that they are opposed to a ceasefire, asserting that this opens the way to a frozen conflict that the West and/or Ukraine could heat up any time after the former rearms the latter. This means that the time frame that the Russian will tolerate will be short, and arms Western arms supplies will have to stopped during the ceasefire. The EU can scuttle the ceasefire by continuing, even increasing weapons supplies to Kiev, as the Istanbul agreement was scuttled three years ago.

Second, if the American timeline holds for both the Ukrainian peace process and U.S.-Russian track, then Ukraine and Europe can be expected to drag the war out and thereby prolong the U.S. sanctions and other aspects of U.S.-Russian cooperation. Putting aside Moscow’s previous opposition to any ceasefire, which Putin may have put aside, the delay of lifting sanctions and of an overall ‘détente`’ could quickly consternate Moscow sufficiently such that it choses to intensify its military offensives, putting the Ukrainian army, regime, and state under threat. At the current pace, Russian forces will arrive at the Dneiper River at some location in mid-summer and could be threatening Kiev by the end of the year. Former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko announced inside information that Zelenskiy would hold presidential elections on October 26^th. The Ukrainian army and regime may not hold out that long. 

Third, any Ukrainian presidential election will probably have to be paired with parliamentary elections, which are overdue. Presidential elections alone will be messy and unlikely to be free, fair, or peaceful. Indeed, they are likely to produce much political violence. Ukraine’s robust neofascist element will pose a particular danger, and a re-fashioned, stealth neo-fascist on the order of Syria’s ‘reformed’ jihadi terrorist-turned suit-wearing president could come out on top. Ukraine’s numerous criminalized oligarchs will pour fuel on the fire. 

Fourth, if the war ends because Kiev has collapsed or Moscow otherwise has taken control of all of eastern Ukraine, then Trump’s hope of receiving compensation for previous US aide in the form of US control over Ukrainian natural resources, transportation hubs, and other assets per the well-publicized agreement rejected by Zelenskiy at Munich will be dashed. The ‘collective West’ – however, disunified it may be – will be faced with the fait accompli of a Russian victory without any agreement. This will put Russia in an even better negotiating position should some in the West hope to conclude an agreement with Moscow on a European security architecture, as it appears Trump may want.  This perhaps explains why, according to some reports and Rubio’s words at the post-negotiation press conference regarding Trump’s impatience, Trump appears to be in a hurry. He is working according to a faster timeframe than the plan outlined above is likely to allow. 

Fifth, even in lieu of such a fait accompli, the schism emerging between Washington and Brussels weakens Washington’s efforts to secure agreements on both the Ukrainian and US-Russian track. A few years ago I proposed a peace process for Ukraine’s Donbas civil war and the overall conflict that included multiple and simultaneous negotiating tracks on Ukraine and European security architecture (https://gordonhahn.com/2017/11/27/a-un-peacekeeping-mission-for-ukraine/ and https://gordonhahn.com/2023/10/03/ending-the-nato-russia-ukrainian-war-untying-the-nato-russia-knot/). Any Western effort now to achieve success on the latter track is fraught with difficulty as a result of the Ukrainian war and lost time, during which Russia turned even farther east by developing a security focus on Eurasia by way of building with China a new Eurasian security architecture. Although, when Putin initiated this idea he held open participation to European countries. However, a Eurasian security system will be built on the Collective Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (https://gordonhahn.com/2024/06/28/war-or-peace-towards-a-ukrainian-peace-or-a-direct-nato-russian-war/). Given recent history, individual European countries could join, but NATO is unlikely partner in such a project. In this way, the Transatlantic community and alliance can be split; a development being facilitated by the Ukrainian War and Trump’s efforts to end it.