Trump’s Global Strategy and The Question Of

Hall GARDNER¹

Mr. Rastbeen, distinguished guests², it is an honor to speak before you today on the crucial issue of global security and the potential path to a sustainable global peace, on the third anniversary of the Ukraine-Russia war ― a horrific conflict that could and should have been prevented by concerted US and European policy. Now, after three years of an unnecessary war, the decisions made in the coming months will determine whether we move toward greater major power cooperation in a global concert or else deeper alliance polarization and potential NATO-Russia conflict.

Let me say at the outset that this is not an “official” presentation of US policy. I remain a critic of many of the Trump administration’s domestic and international policies. Nevertheless, I believe the Trump administration is correct to seek an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. The question, however, is not the goal, but the nature of the diplomatic process in which the Trump administration is taking to achieve a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire and whether that diplomacy will enhance the overall prospects for regional and global peace.

It is crucial that US and international diplomacy to achieve a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire that leads toward a sustainable peace can then serve as a stepping stone toward a new and more constructive US-European-Ukrainian-Russian relationship.

If correctly managed, a new relationship between the US, Europe and Russia can, in turn, work in concerted fashion with rising powers such as China and India, among other states in seeking to mitigate, if not eventually “resolve,” other major conflicts between China and Taiwan, North and South Korea, Israel, the Palestinians and Iran, for example, through diplomatic compromises.

That is the ideal…  but can it be achieved?

Trump’s second term global strategy represents a major shift from all previous US administrations since that of Bill Clinton’s second term and the fatal Clinton administration decision to expand NATO into eastern Europe. Contrary to Trump’s hardline first term strategy―that was largely extended by the Biden administration―Trump’s “Peace through Strength” and “maximum pressure” stratagems no longer seek to pressure and “contain” both Russia and China upon the threat of global war. Instead, Trump hopes to achieve a US-Russia rapprochement that will draw Moscow away from an increasingly powerful China. Trump also seeks to reduce, if possible, Moscow’s defense and political economic backing for Iran and North Korea.

It is crucial that the Trump administration not play games and choose the right strategies to achieve a truly long-term and sustainable regional and global peace―as opposed to a short term optical illusion of peace in quest for domestic American approval―in Trump’s egotistical quest to be considered by history as a great “peacemaker.”

Will Trump’s policy of “Peace through Strength” enhance the overall prospects for regional and global peace? Will the result be Peace through Strength or World War Trump?³

The Uncoordinated NATO-EU Double Enlargement

Mr. Rastbeen’s invitation to speak led me to look back at the articles I had written for the first two issues Geostrategics, dated February and March 2001.

In my first article, NATO and the European Union: The Risks of the Double Enlargement,⁴ in February 2001, I argued that the refusal of NATO and the EU to coordinate their enlargements, coupled with their  failure /refusal to work with Russia to establish a new system of Euro-Atlantic security, could not only lead Moscow to look toward a closer alliance with China and other states, but it could also provoke a Russian pan-nationalist backlash that could threaten Ukraine.⁵

Moreover, as the European Union “widened” its membership into eastern Europe, I also argued at the time that the EU needed to “deepen” its membership in terms of forging a more unified defense capability, starting with closer Franco-German defense cooperation―so that the EU would possess greater autonomy, but still working with the US and NATO―and Russia as well.⁶

A more unified and autonomous European defense capability could then serve to strengthen EU diplomacy in those “vital” areas where European states could agree to a unified policy―rather than be pressed to rely on NATO force capabilities and US diplomacy in a position of dependence. The Europeans could also better coordinate with Moscow and other states.

In my second article, I warned of the expansion of global conflict zones that could draw the major powers into conflict. Then, the so-called Global War on Terrorism since September 11, 2001―that has not entirely come to an end despite the hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021―has opened up new conflict zones throughout the wider Middle East after the US intervened militarily in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria at a cost of 8 trillion⁷, if not more, and after Israel in 2023 entered into a war with Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance”

The danger now is that wars in a number of these conflict zones have intensified―so that new/old “hot spots” are emerging or reemerging as the global system becomes increasingly polarized between rival alliances. The first alliance is led by the US and NATO, plus the EU, Japan, South Korea, and the new AUKUS pact between the US, UK and Australia, not to overlook US ally Israel and other Major Non-NATO allies. The second alliance represents states that are closely tied to Russia and China, that include Belarus, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and Cuba. Moscow and China also possess close political and economic relations with the BRICS¨+ states and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The global system is no longer characterized as being a bicentric rivalry between two “superpowers,” the US and Soviet Union. Instead it is a highly uneven polycentric global system, in which states, anti-state actor actors, and non-governmental actors, including transnational corporations, possess highly uneven power capabilities and socio-political economic influence. At the same time, major powers―the US, Russia and China―are seeking to coalesce these lesser powers and actors into their geostrategic orbits―at the risk of polarizing the global system into two rival alliances.

Preventing the polarization of the global system into two rival alliances can only be achieved by a new US rapprochement with both Russia and China ― but in working closely with US Allies in the effort to achieve regional and global peace.

Worst Case Scenarios

The first worst case scenario at the end of the Cold war was the possibility ― that has now become reality ― of a Russian revanchist backlash versus Ukraine in response to NATO enlargement, if not in opposition to European Union expansion to Ukraine in 2012-14 as well.

Not only did the founders of Containment, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, among others, such as the former US ambassador to Russia, Jack Matlock, oppose the decision of the Clinton administration to engage in the open-ended NATO enlargement into former Soviet spheres of influence and security, but so too did NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Goodpaster (1969-74); NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Galvin (1987-92); NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1992-93); and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993-97), General  Shalikashvili; as well as the Clinton administration’s  Secretary of Defense, Perry (1994-97).⁸

All of the above high-level US officials warned against a Russian backlash, the potentially rising costs of defense, and a break up of NATO consensus as a result of NATO enlargement. Most supported working with Moscow to establish a new European system of cooperative-collective security based upon a strengthened Partnership for Peace initiative and involving overlapping US/NATO, EU and Russian security guarantees as a viable alternative.

Instead, the Clinton administration chose to expand NATO, which was seen by Moscow as isolating Russian interests, rather than developing the Partnership for Peace which was seen by Moscow as including Russia. As NATO and the EU expanded step-by-step into post-Soviet spheres of influence, Moscow increasingly looked eastward toward China. For its part, China was concerned with perceived US backing for Taiwanese independence and looked back to Moscow for defense supports

While the US “pivot” or “rebalancing to Asia” did not officially begin until 2011, the rise of China as a more powerful military actor was raising US security concerns by the time of the 1995-96 “second Taiwan crisis.” At that time, Bill Clinton rushed 2 aircraft carriers to defend Taiwan and Pacific sea lines of communication. US concerns with the rise of China should have put Europe on warning―so that the EU should have begun to “deepen” its defense coordination then. The possibility of American political-military overextension and the potential US shift in strategic focus away from Europe and toward a more powerful China should have been foreseen in the mid-1990s if not sooner.  

In my first two books, Surviving the Millennium (1994) and Dangerous Crossroads (1997), and in first two articles that I wrote for Geostrategics, I argued that a neutral non-nuclear Ukraine was not only key to the sustain the post-Cold War European geopolitical equilibrium⁹ ―but also it was also key to sustaining the global geopolitical equilibrium.

The more the uncoordinated open-ended NATO and EU enlargements expanded into post-Soviet space toward the Baltic states and Ukraine, the more Russia would reach out to China, Iran, North Korea, etc.―in the formation of a so-called “multipolar world” as defined by Moscow and Beijing in 1997.

The possibility of a strong Sino-Russian “axis” was then indicated by the signing of the July 2001 Sino-Russian 20-year partnership, but downplayed by the US “hidden state” (in the terms of Hans Morgenthau.) That treaty was renewed in February 2022 as a “no limits” China-Russia strategic partnership just before Moscow’s so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine. 

America First and Russia, China and Iran

In a two-faced strategy, Trump has threatened sanctions, if not threats to use military force, against US rivals Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Hamas, in order to pressure these states and anti-state actors to agree to US demands―while concurrently offering the prospects of peace negotiations with presumed eventual benefits, which may or may not prove to be actualized.

Here, it should be noted that Trump’s tariff policy is in large part intended to sustain the US dollar as the hegemonic currency (whether it will be successful or not)―so that Trump has threatened any state and the BRICS+ countries in particular that try to trade oil and gas and other products in currencies besides the dollar with “100% tariffs.”¹⁰

The Trump administration has accordingly threatened maximalist “Peace through Strength” positions with respect to both US allies and US rivals alike in order to achieve something close to Trump’s nationalist and personal business goals through tough bargaining. By reaching out to Moscow, one of Trump’s goals is to draw Russia away from closer ties with China―if not away from Iran and North Korea as well. This approach raises question as to how countries now aligned with Moscow might change their respective geostrategies if the US and Russia do eventually move closer together and particularly if the US and Russia cannot implement new mutual accords with their respective allies. How will China, in particular, react? 

With respect to Moscow, Trump has warned that if there was not a ceasefire with respect to the Russia-Ukraine war soon, he would “have no other choice”¹¹ but to impose tariffs, taxes and sanctions on “anything being sold by Russia to the United States, and various other participating countries… We can do it the easy way, or the hard way — and the easy way is always better… It is time to ‘Make a deal.’ No more lives should be lost!” 

With respect to China, in addition to adding an extra 10% to already high tariffs on Chinese products, the Trump administration has removed the phrase « we do not support Taiwan independence » from its fact sheet on Taiwan relations. This implies that the US might support Taiwan to become independent in case of a Chinese effort to absorb the island by force or more likely blockade.

On the one hand, it was unclear if this change in wording represented a major shift in US policy intended to pressure China―in which the US fears that Beijing could control the sea lines of communication from the Pacific to the wider Middle East if it seizes Taiwan. On the other hand, Trump still claims to be a friend of China’s president Xi Jinping and that he can still make a “deal.” (See my proposal for an internationalized “confederal” solution to the China-Taiwan dispute.)¹²

With respect to Iran, at the same time that Trump signed an executive order to place “maximum pressure” on Tehran, Trump claimed that he wanted peace. Trump asserted, “I would like a deal done with Iran on non-nuclear. I would prefer that to bombing the hell out of it.” He also stated that Israel would not carry out a strike if there were such an agreement. Yet after the first Trump administration itself had dumped the JCPOA Iran nuclear deal that was negotiated with the UN and EU, what if there is no successful new Iran nuclear deal¹³―for whatever reason? Would the US and Israel risk an attack on Iran that could destabilize the entire region not only in terms of excessively high energy prices―but also at the risk of permanent confrontation with jihadist movements?

America First and US Allies

Trump has also pressured US allies, including EU countries, and Denmark, India, Canada, Mexico, Panama, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, with high tariffs, for example. With respect to NATO and other Major Non-NATO  Allies, Trump’s “America First” stance has concurrently raised questions as to the sincerity of American defense commitments and NATO article V security guarantees.

In addition, Trump has threatened military action against Mexican drug cartels, but without necessarily respecting Mexican sovereignty.  Another “new/old” flashpoint (at least since the seemingly forgotten 1962 Cuban missile crisis!) is indicated by Trump’s threats to take control the Panama Canal and eliminate alleged Chinese influence.¹⁴

It appears Trump wants to eliminate alleged Chinese political economic influence from the operations of the Panama Canal so that the US can control sealines of communication from the Pacific to the newly christened “Gulf of America”―which Trump’s new name for the Gulf of Mexico that symbolizes Trump’s “America First” policies. Here, the primary concern for Trump is burgeoning Chinese political economic influence in Venezuela and the rest of Latin America.

The Israeli Exception

By contrast, Israel, appears to be an “exception” to Trump’s America First doctrine as compared to other US allies―in reflecting Trump’s domestic alliance with rightwing American Christian-Zionists. In his effort to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Trump sees Israel as a major nodal point to build the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor that will run from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Greece, Italy, and then to the US, thereby “connecting (US) partners, roads, railways and undersea cables.”¹⁵ Trump’s problem: The Gaza War has jammed up the works.

While other major US allies are being threatened with cuts in US defense supports and with high tariffs, Tel Aviv has been given a carte blanche to violently expand its mini-imperium and to engage Palestinian “disposal” and democide regardless of the dangerous consequences to regional stability.

The Trump administration needs to do an about face, and press Israel to work with the Arab/Islamic world ― that includes Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Turkey ― in the effort to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state, with a new political leadership, in the formation of a confederal two state solution. This would represent an alternative to Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” ― that risks the destabilization of the entire wider Middle East region.¹⁶

Trump and NATO and the European Union

Despite Trump administration reassurances to the contrary, a number of European states, particularly those in closest proximity to Moscow, fear the possibility that a US-Russia condominium, or joint global management, will place the geostrategic and political economic interests of the US and Russia first and their interests second, if not last. These fears appear valid after Trump demanded that NATO allies spend up to 5% of GDP on defense ― with the threat that the US would not defend those Allies that do not significantly augment defenses.

The perceived Russian threat to seize even more than 20% of Ukraine, and fears that the conflict might expand to the Baltic region or elsewhere in eastern Europe, combined with the American threat not to provide Ukraine and the Europeans with sufficient defense support, have led the Europeans to find ways to rearm at a potential cost of $840bn. The European Commission subsequently proposed new joint EU borrowing of 150 billion euros to lend to EU governments to boost European defense capabilities.¹⁷

In a proposed new European defense order, Friedrich Merz, the new German Chancellor, has urged both Britain and France to extend their nuclear protection to Germany. France has accordingly offered to sell Germany nuclear capable fighter jets. In a significant speech on March 5, 2025, French President Macron said he would discuss with European allies the possibility of using France’s nuclear deterrent to protect the entire European continent.¹⁸

 Trump’s rapprochement with Russia, coupled with tough US sanctions on Europe, has raised accordingly questions about the potential impact of Trump’s policies on all US allies. To what extent will the Europeans be able to unify their defenses ― now that they feel abandoned by the US? How will other allies react?

While a European defense build-up would be aimed at creating a stronger and more integrated Europe, and preventing further European disaggregation after Brexit, Europe would probably also need to look to Ukraine, China and India to counterbalance both the US and Russia ― if Washington no longer gave Europe significant defense supports.

There is thus a risk that Europe, or at least the major states of Europe that could include the UK, could fail to further unify their defense capabilities ― thereby risking further break up after Brexit.¹⁹ From this standpoint, it is in the interests of the Europeans to support Trump’s peace initiative.  

America First, North and South Korea

North Korea has been boosting its nuclear weapons and hypersonic missile capabilities ever since Trump disastrously failed to “make a deal” in his first term.²⁰ Despite the North Korean build up, in negotiating with US Ally South Korea, Trump has threatened high tariffs and payments for US defense protection, coupled with demands that South Korea purchase US weapons.

On the one hand, Trump could permit South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons, which would theoretically permit the US to reduce defense commitments―but then the US would lose its power to oversee South Korean defenses. Another option is for Seoul to develop the technological capabilities to build nuclear bombs, but not deploy them, as is already the case for Japan. Or the US could redeploy tactical nuclear weapons, for which it would demand payment. The above are all bad options.

The fourth and best option is for South Korea to reopen diplomatic relations with the North and begin a process of risk reduction and deconfliction.²¹ South and North Korea should seek to restore the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement that was scrapped in 2023.²² North Korea could agree to freeze its nuclear weapons, with a promise to eliminate them in the future if the agreements hold. As there was no peace treaty, only a truce, after the 1950-53 Korean War, it is time for a peace treaty between North and South Korea. Yet such an approach needs US backing.

America First and the Near East

A third conflict zone not generally mentioned is what was once called the Near East. The possibility that Turkey could become completely alienated due to the Ukraine-Russia war, the Israeli-Hamas-Iran war and other regional conflicts as Turkey extends its regional hegemony, can not be totally excluded.

Ankara, for example, had backed Azerbaijan against CSTO member Armenia, which Moscow weakly defended as it was concentrating on its so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine.  Ankara has continued to threaten military intervention in Syria versus the Islamic State and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish, People’s Defense Units (YPG) ― which Ankara has seen as a “terrorist” organization linked to the Kurdish PKK, even if it fought the Islamic State. Concurrently, an unstoppable Israel has sought to carve out a defense buffer in southern Syria and destroy Syrian defenses that remained after the fall of the Al-Assad regime and the rise to power of the Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham government.

As Turkey controls the Dardanelles and Russian access to the eastern Mediterranean, sustaining Ankara in a pro-US, pro-European direction is crucial ― a policy which could prove difficult to sustain given President Erdogan’s strong condemnation of US and Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians in Gaza. Working to resolve Greek-European-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and Libya, as well as working with Turkey, among other states, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as well as the Israel-Iran conflict, is key to sustaining the regional and global peace. And as Ankara had hosted failed Ukraine-Russia negotiations in March 2022, it should continue to play a role in ending the war.²³

America First and Ukraine

From Clinton to Biden, by supporting NATO enlargement, at first secretly to Ukraine in late 1994, and then more overtly since 2008, the US, along with the EU, have been on a trajectory that risked major power war, not just with Russia, but with China, Iran and North Korea.

The first Trump administration had continued that trajectory. The second Trump administration now claims it can reach a general political entente with Moscow that could draw Russia closer to the US, in part by drawing Moscow into the G-7²⁴ and away from China and the BRICS+.

Washington and Moscow had their first bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia in mid-February 2025. This meeting raised European, Ukrainian, if not Chinese, Iranian and North Korean fears of a US-Russia condominium in which Washington and Moscow would seek to dominate global affairs. In effect, Trump seeks to reframe its relations with Moscow first before it brings in its allies into peace talks.

The so-called joke went: “if you are not sitting at the dinner table, you are part of the meal.” As Zelenskyy argued, Ukraine, Europe in a broad sense — and this includes the European Union, Turkey and the [United Kingdom] — should be involved in conversations and the development of the necessary security guarantees with America regarding the fate of our part of the world.”²⁵ If Kyiv does not obtain US security guarantees―as it appears dubious the Europeans could provide sufficient defense support in the near future ― the Zelenskyy leadership has feared that Kyiv would be forced to “capitulate” to Russia.

Yet the question remains: Is there really any other option than to accept defeat after Kyiv has lost roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory to Russia? On the one hand, continuing the war risks expanding it to new regions, at the risk of a global conflict. On the other, there is a risk that is neither side will be satisfied after a truce, and that the conflict could continue.

To put a definite end to the conflict, and crudely, to help pay the US costs of the war, Trump threatened to pause US support for Ukraine’s defense capabilities if Kyiv does not make a deal over “raw earth” and other resources, in addition to agreeing to a peace settlement with Moscow ― with whom Trump also hopes to make a deal.²⁶ (See penultimate section, “Prospects for Peace between Ukraine and Russia”)

In pressuring Ukraine, Trump has initially demanded US control over some 50% of Ukrainian rare earth deposits among other critical raw materials in return for US military, political economic and financial supports ― even if the majority of rare earths are in the Russian occupied regions of Ukraine. For its part, Kyiv claimed that it did not want to sell out its resource rich land to multinational corporate investors ― and it wants long term US security guarantees if it accepts a ceasefire.

From a larger geo-economic perspective, Trump hopes to obtain direct US access to Ukrainian, Russian and other rare earth reserves, in Australia, Canada, Greenland and the Arctic, for example. In doing so, Trump hopes to break the Chinese monopoly as a supplier of rare earth and other critical raw materials.

Kyiv’s initial refusal to sell Ukrainian resources without strong US security guarantees therefore angered Trump ― as Trump needs to show his supporters that he is ostensibly obtaining a financial return on US tax payer spending for supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia. This is true even if up to 90% is spent on the US military industrial complex and US corporations and US non-profits. Of aid overall, 60 percent is spent in the United States, about 25 percent is spent in Ukraine, and the final 15 percent is spent globally.²⁷

In Trump’s view, even if such international funding is truly beneficial for American “soft power” interests abroad, these finances can be better spent at home and by reducing mounting US debts ― in accord with his ideology “American First.”²⁸ At the same time, it is dubious such funds will ever return to taxpayer pockets.

Trump’ policies play a two-faced game. On the one hand, the Trump administration tries to reassure US allies that they will not be left out of future discussions. On the other, Trump continues to make demands on US allies and Ukraine for economic concessions ― ostensibly in exchange for security guarantees and defense supports.

Ukraine’s Threat to Develop Nuclear Weapons

Another major issue of contention is Kyiv’s threats to develop nuclear weaponry. In the bargaining process, Kyiv has threatened to develop nuclear weapons ― if it does not obtain ‘real’ US or NATO security guarantees in return under the assumption that the Europeans cannot step up defense support rapidly.

Yet contrary to his intent, Zelenskyy’s threat to develop and deploy nuclear weaponry, whether it is feasible or not, angers both Trump and Putin ― and brings the two to collaborate much as did Clinton and Yeltsin in the period 1991-94 ― when Russia and the US teamed up to press Ukraine to give up its significant nuclear weapon capability left over from the Cold War in 1991. At that time, Kyiv possessed 1,900 Soviet strategic nuclear warheads and between 2,650 and 4,200 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.²⁹

In the tense period 1991 to 1994 of the not-so-civilized Ukraine-Russia divorce, Clinton played “good cop” and promised aid and debt reduction measures if Kyiv would return back to Moscow the nuclear capabilities leftover from the Soviet Union. For his part, Yeltsin played “bad cop” by threatening conventional preemptive strikes. Kyiv finally gave in and signed the 1994 Budapest accords which gave it weak security assurances from the US, UK, France, China and Russia in exchange for giving up its nuclear capabilities and signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Yet instead of strengthening the Partnership for Peace and opting for the denuclearization of the entire region through the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone as proposed by Ukraine at the time, the Clinton administration focused on expanding NATO into central, and then eastern, Europe.  

Almost immediately after the signing of the 1994 Budapest accords, President Yeltsin in December 1994 was outraged to learn that the US was planning to expand NATO’s nuclear alliance ― a process that begin in 1997, but only after both Yeltsin and Clinton had been reelected in 1996! Ironically, Moscow thought it had eliminated the “menace” of a nuclear Ukraine in 1994, but subsequently, it feared after 1997 that it would be confronted with the “menace” of a “nuclear NATO” once Ukraine and other states eventually became NATO members.

And now, in contemporary circumstances, Kyiv has brandished the threat to deploy nuclear weaponry―an option that would prove costly, but possible to achieve.³⁰

Trump’s maximum pressure bargaining to gain economic concessions from Kyiv in exchange for possible US security guarantees appears to be at the roots of the “insecurity-security dialectic” for Ukraine as the latter continues to battle it out with Russia. The question remains as whether, and what kind of “security guarantees” will be provided from the US, NATO, the Europeans, or the UN, or in some combination, if any?… Or will Ukraine risk the nuclear option ― if Kyiv fears isolation?

America First and the EU

Trump policy appears aimed at weakening Germany and the European Union. This is to be achieved through high tariffs and demands for increased defense spending, up to 5% of GDP for NATO members, for example. These demands have been combined with the attempt of the US government ― that has perhaps been influenced by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, plus influential individuals, such as Elon Musk³¹ ― to support populist and far-right anti-immigration causes. Here, Vice President J.D. Vance met with the co-leader of the rightwing German party, the AfD, Alice Weidel. This was followed by President Trump praise for the anti-Federalist, anti-EURO, national-libertarian, sovereigntist AfD that rejects a formal Common European Foreign and Security Policy after the February 2025 German parliamentary elections.³²

These US pressures, coupled with the political economic impact of the Ukraine-Russia war, could weaken the essentially supranational and social democratic nature of European Union governance and its regulatory bureaucracy that limits corporate “freedom.” If the EU cannot strengthen its defense and political economic policy coordination―even if it is unable to achieve a formal Common European Foreign and Defense Policy that many right and leftwing political parties oppose ― these pressures could also lead to the further break up the EU after Brexit. Aweakened EU would then permit the US, Russia, as well as China, to more freely assert their political-economic and strategic interests in Europe.

While the Trump administration and populist/ rightwing European parties have emphasized the social and economic costs of uncontrolled immigration in their political campaigns, the real Trump geostrategic game is to eliminate government bureaucracy and regulations that restrain major corporations with respect to taxation, labor, and ecological regulations in the US and Europe and elsewhere ― at the risk of destabilizing the European Union ― if the latter cannot soon further democratize and reform itself.

America First and the Arctic

As the Arctic region has become a new potential conflict zone between the US, Russia and China, largely due to its large deposits of critical raw materials, oil and gas reserves, and rare earth resources, Trump has not only threatened military action versus Denmark with respect to either selling Greenland or else pressing Greenland to become independent.³³ Trump has also pressed Canada to become the 51^st state.³⁴

Ironically, much as the US supported Panamanian independence from Colombia in the effort to gain control over the Panama Canal in 1903 and thereby gain control over sea lines of communication from the Pacific ― to what Trump is now calling the “Gulf of America” ― the US is threatening to support Greenland’s independence. Senator Ted Cruz recently warned Denmark: If Greenland becomes independent, Denmark would get “nothing.” So, it is best to sell it now, Cruz counselled!

Trump’ s demands appear intended to pressure Denmark/ Greenland and Canada into providing some form of US geostrategic/ defense positioning, as well as political-economic access to energy resources, critical raw materials and rare earth metals, despite the ecological risks and dangers of extraction.³⁵ In addition to seeking to obtain rare earths for the US to compete with China’s vast reserves, Trump wants to defend the US from potential ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and drone attacks ― given the fact that the Arctic region represents the shortest trajectory for missile attack from potential American rivals.

In pursuing a boondoggle for the military industrial complex, Trump claims to want to deploy radar and “Iron Dome” missile systems and other defense system in the Arctic regions. Trump likewise hopes to sustain US control over Arctic, Canadian, and North Atlantic sealines of communication given the fact that the Arctic routes significantly reduce shipping time. Ironically, the Arctic has become a potential conflict zone as a result of global warming.

America First and National Defense

Trump has promised  “let’s cut our military budget in half. And we can do that.” Yet his policies do not appear to be moving in that direction ― at least thus far.

US steps toward a unilateral Peace through Strength “national missile defense”  under Trump’s Iron Dome plan appears to contradict Trump’s calls for nuclear arms and missile reductions with both Russia and China and could risk a new nuclear and hypersonic arms race.

The Trump administration plans to take $50 billion away from “woke Biden-era non-lethal programs and instead spend that money on President Trump’s America First, peace through strength priorities” as stated by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. The latter has affirmed that he wants to make “our military once again into the most lethal, badass force on the planet to keep our country safe.”

While some Pentagon programs would be cut, and government waste ostensibly eliminated, funds for border protection, fighting transnational criminal organizations, nuclear modernization, submarine programs, missile defense, drone technology, cybersecurity, core readiness and training and the defense industrial infrastructure would be sustained. But it is not clear if the overall US defense budget is to be cut or just redirected for new so-called “Peace through Strength” purposes. While it appears certain that the Trump administration wants the Europeans to defend Europe, it is not clear whether the US will defend the Indo-Pacific. Once again, US defense of Israel appears to be the only exception.

To counter Russian medium range nuclear capabilities deployed during the Ukraine war, the Biden administration and Berlin planned to deploy conventionally armed ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Germany on a rotational basis beginning in 2026.³⁶ These weapons could include the Tomahawk cruise, Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and hypersonic missiles that possess a significantly longer range than missiles used to strike Russia from Ukraine. These weapons are ostensibly to be replaced by Euromissiles sometime in the future.

Likewise, to counter Chinese and North Korean nuclear capabilities, the Biden administration also planned to deploy similar missiles at US military bases in Guam and Philippines. Biden has also agreed to deploy nuclear-armed submarines in South Korea, as previously discussed. The Pentagon sees Russia and China as cooperating versus Taiwan while Moscow and Beijing see Taiwan as trying to stir up a “Ukraine-style” crisis in Asia in order to attract outside US, Japanese and European support.

 If Trump decides to follow through with Biden’s decision to engage in intermediate range missile deployments, the return of such weaponry to Europe and now to the Indo-Pacific threatens both a new Euromissile crisis of the period 1978 to 1987 as well as a brand new “Asia-missile” crisis ― upon the threat of major power war.

Prospects for Peace between Ukraine and Russia

Assuming a ceasefire can be implemented, a formal establishment of Ukrainian non-nuclear neutrality, accompanied by deployments of “neutral”  European and international peacekeeping forces, from nationalities agreed to by both sides, under a general UN or OSCE mandate and initiation of European and global arms accords, can serve as incentives for Russia to end the war.³⁷

For its part, Kyiv would obtain strong security guarantees from the Europeans, if not by the Americans―if agreed by President Trump ― and other states in backing the deployment “neutral” international peacekeepers in key regions of contention. A peace settlement should eventually allow for future territorial compromises, and could eventually involve shared or international sovereignty over contested areas.

Despite the Ukrainian leadership’s initial reluctance to seek a peace accord with Moscow―and only after Trump halted US military aid to Ukraine and intelligence sharing in early March 2025 in decisions taken ostensibly without consulting its NATO allies ― Zelenskyy finally appeared to agree to a rare earth minerals deal. Zelenskyy also called for a “truce” with Russia, while emphasizing Ukraine’s intention to work under Trump’s “strong leadership” to secure a lasting peace.

Nevertheless, the question as to what extent the US would back up both Ukraine and the Europeans, and the nature of “security guarantees” to be provided Ukraine, still remains in limbo and depends largely on Trump’s negotiations with both Volodymyr Zylenskyy and with Vladimir Putin ― in the process of negotiating a peace deal.

If a ceasefire can be eventually achieved, international forces and some “neutral” European forces, once again agreed by both sides, can deployed in Ukraine, along with internationally verified oversight and future reductions of Russian forces. Washington and Moscow can then seek to reshape European and global security cooperation and begin to establish confidence and security building measures throughout all of eastern Europe, if not in other conflict zones.

Multilateral conflict-resolution negotiations should take place with respect to disputes between Russia and Baltic states, Russian Kaliningrad and Suwalki gap, Transnistria and Moldova, Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Serbia and Kosovo, for example. The goal would be to restore mutual trust and confidence between opposition factions and states ― with regard to Russophile regions in Estonia, for example, while sustaining Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian membershipin an increasingly Europeanized NATO. Working with Beijing as a mediator or participant with respect to disputes between the EU, Kaliningrad and the Suwalki corridor is essential due to Beijing’s political and economic influence on Moscow and due to the impact of China’s Eurasian and Polar Belt and Road Initiative on Russia and the Baltic region.

A UN or OSCE backed international consortium could be established with the support of the US, the Europeans, China, India, as well as Russia and other countries to develop Ukraine’s critical raw materials, rare earths, and energy wealth in the territories of Ukraine and those occupied by Russia, as well as the disputed Black Sea region. A portion of the funds raised could help support war reparations, peacekeeping and reconstruction.

While Europe can and should begin to better coordinate its defense spending, Washington and Moscow should begin serious discussions as to how future strategic arms deals could include all forms of U.S. and Russian weaponry, with an eye toward major reductions/ elimination of conventional arms in forging a new CFE treaty.  Washington and Moscow should also discuss a “transparency mechanism”³⁸ to meet Russian concerns with the deployment of U.S.-NATO missile defenses and other NATO military infrastructure. 

The possibility of joint U.S.-European-Russian controls over Missile Defense systems, as discussed by former President Obama, should eventually be reconsidered, as part of President Trump’s Iron Dome initiative. One of the goals should be reductions of ICBMs, as well as the elimination of medium, intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons (as had been urged by Mikhail Gorbachev) ― as the latter are war fighting weapons―in an effort to renew the 1987 INF Treaty ― followed by verification measurs. 

If a sustainable peace can be established with respect to Ukraine ― accompanied by a new more concerted NATO-European-Russian interrelationship that also involves US-European-Russian-Chinese arms reductions/ eliminations ― the task of reaching sustainable peace accords in other regional conflicts will prove much less difficult. New nuclear and conventional arms reduction/ elimination agreements would also reduce the expenses of a new more unified European defense capability.

Risks Ahead

The danger is that continuing to fight Moscow risks expanding the war to new regions and could provoke a direct NATO-Russia confrontation, or “World War III” in Trump’s words. NATO and the EU did absolutely nothing to press Ukraine and Russia into cooperation in the period from the signing of 1994 Budapest Accords that led Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons left on its territory after Soviet collapse until the war broke out in February 2022. Nor did the US and NATO seek to amend relations with Moscow once the decision to enlarge NATO was taken in the years 1994-97.³⁹

Now it is time to reach a general entente with Moscow with respect to NATO and EU enlargement. The US and Russia have apparently settled on a three-stage peace plan. The plan includes: (1) a ceasefire, (2) elections in Ukraine, and (3) signing of a final agreement. Yet the rough ahead will still be very rocky and full of potholes.⁴⁰

A major risk is that Trump’s erratic unilateralist “America First” tactics ― involving maximalist positions to force concessions, such as high tariffs on both US allies and US rivals alike; unnecessary cut backs in truly helpful US “soft power” tools in countries in need of development assistance ostensibly in an effort to reduce the monstrous US budget deficit and mounting debts; plus US public and private support for extreme political parties, in addition to Congressional threats to defund the UN ― not only tend to exacerbate ongoing conflicts, but also foster new ones. 

Whether rightly or wrongly, a number of European states, particularly those on the NATO front line with Moscow, have feared that Trump’s effort to prevent a direct NATO-Russia military confrontation will undermine the credibility of the US commitment to NATO’s Article V to Russia’s advantage. Critics also question whether Trump’s rapprochement with Moscow will be able to draw Russia away from China, Iran and North Korea, while reducing the chances of the conflicts spreading to new/old regions.

If Trump fails to establish a sustainable peace between Ukraine and Russia that results in a new US-European-Russian reconciliation, the chances of yet another global war will augment. Much as was the case before both World War I and World War II, homines geopolitici et oeconomici are definitely entering a moment that the Biden administration repeatedly referred to as an “inflection point” in history ― a moment that could either turn the world toward global peace or toward a devastating major power conflict.

Endnotes

1. Biography at the end. ↩︎
2. This article was the basis of Hall Gardner’s intervention on  « Peace and American Policy » during a symposium of the Paris Academy of Geopolitics about “International Peace” (Colloque international pour la Paix). Gardner Hall, « ‘Colloque international pour la Paix’ (6/11) Hall GARDNER » (vidéo de l’intervention du 24 février 2025), Paris, Académie de Géopolitique de Paris, publiée le 28 février 2025), 24 min. 10, lien : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zgURbmw9n1M (consulté le 6 mars 2025). ↩︎
3. Trump’s potential impact on global geopolitics ; Hall Gardner, World War Trump (Prometheus Books, 2018) ↩︎
4. L’OTAN et l’Union Européenne : Les risques du « double élargissement » – Académie de Géopolitique de Paris (January 2001, No 1) All these threats were current at the turn of the century, particularly after the 1999 air war over Kosovo that was fought more against Serbia, an ally of Russia and China, than it was for Albanian Kosovars who needed protection on the ground. That war in particular alienated both Russia and China and set the stage for their July 2001 strategic partnership. In opposition to NATO, Moscow could likewise boost its conventional and nuclear capabilities, deployed in Kaliningrad, for example, in addition to those deployed on the Kola peninsula ↩︎
5. The Ice Curtain: Modernization on the Kola Peninsula Moscow had hardly a voice, and certainly not a veto, in the strategic and political economic decisions that led both NATO and the EU to enlarge their memberships and that have impacted Moscow’s perceived “vital” security concerns. ↩︎
6. Hall Gardner, “History Suggests the US and Europe need a more Equal Partnership” (European Affairs, Summer 2002); https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0582-europe-as-a-power-european-sovereignty-strategic-autonomy-a-debate-that-is-moving-towards-an ; https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/779-european-support-to-the-defence-industry-mid-term-review-of-the-european-defence-fund  Until 2021, the European budget had no funds dedicated to defense! ↩︎
7. Economic Costs | Costs of War ↩︎
8. https://www.meer.com/en/85736-toward-a-us-russian-chinese-showdown ↩︎
9. In 2001, and in previous books with respect to Ukraine, I argued… “NATO Enlargement, combined with Russian pressures, has consequently threatened to splinter Ukraine… In many ways, maintaining Ukraine as a stable “buffer” between NATO and Russia is key to the new post-Cold War European equilibrium; yet both domestic and international factors seem to be working against the long term establishment of an independent, neutral and non-nuclear Ukraine.”Une Géostratégie pour la Paix mondiale – Académie de Géopolitique de Paris  (March 2001, No 2.) See also, Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads (Praeger, 1997) ; Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium (Praeger, 1994). Hall | Hall Gardner ↩︎
10. Former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis argues that there is logic to Trump’s apparent tariff madness https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2025/02/21/donald-trumps-economic-masterplan-unherd/ The risk, however, is that it might backfire and divide the world economy. https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/shortcutting-our-way-to-multipolarity-trump-tariffs-and-brics ↩︎
11. https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-threatens-russia-others-with-sanctions-if-ukraine-deal-not-reached-2025-01-22/ ↩︎
12. https://www.meer.com/en/73198-its-time-to-rethink-us-china-relations ↩︎
13. https://www.meer.com/en/88733-trumps-middle-east-strategy-negotiations-and-tensions ↩︎
14. https://www.passblue.com/2025/02/13/trumps-threat-to-retake-the-panama-canal-what-you-really-need-to-know/ On a historical note, US support for Panama independence from Colombia and annexation of the Canal is not entirely different than Russian support for Crimean independence from Ukraine. Or US efforts to support Greenland’s independence! ↩︎
15. Key takeaways from Donald Trump’s meeting with India’s Narendra Modi | Donald Trump News | Al Jazeera ↩︎
16. https://www.meer.com/en/88733-trumps-middle-east-strategy-negotiations-and-tensions Trump’s ‘Gaza Riviera’ Video: 6 Strange and Outrageous Details You Have to See to Believe ↩︎
17. $840 Billion Plan To ‘Rearm Europe’ Announced – Newsweek ↩︎
18. Macron will discuss extending French nuclear protection to Europe with allies ↩︎
19. This scenario is based on the late 19^th century  when France looked to Tsarist Russia to forge an alliance in the period 1890 to 1894 to counter Imperial Germany―after Great Britain sought, and failed, to achieve a rapprochement with Berlin. Like the period before World War I, the danger is the potential “encirclement” and isolation of Russia that could lead to renewed Russian militarism upon the fear of further disaggregation of the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  On the other, it is also possible for Europe to further break up after Brexit. ↩︎
20. https://www.meer.com/en/58097-the-insecurity-security-dialectic-and-the-indo-pacific
    ↩︎
21. Trump can’t denuclearize North Korea. South Korea’s next leader should pursue risk reduction instead – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ↩︎
22. What Was in the Now-Scrapped Inter-Korea Military Agreement? – The Diplomat ↩︎
23. The Lost Peace? | The Nation; The story behind 2022’s secret Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations | NPR Illinois ↩︎
24. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5143894-trump-russia-g7-reinstatement/ ↩︎
25. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250218-zelensky-slams-us-russia-talks-urges-fair-negotiations ↩︎
26. Trump pauses all U.S. military aid to Ukraine after angry clash with Zelenskiy | Reuters ↩︎
27. https://breakingdefense.com/2023/10/most-aid-to-ukraine-is-spent-in-the-us-a-total-shutdown-would-be-irresponsible/ ↩︎
28. Another maximum pressure strategy is Elon Musk’s threats to cut off Starlink satellite links used for Ukrainian civil and military communications. But this could lead to counter threats not to use Starlink by Ukraine and EU or else develop other options. US threatens to shut off Starlink if Ukraine won’t sign minerals deal, sources tell Reuters ↩︎
29. 176 Soviet ICBMs were located in Ukraine (130 SS-19 ICBMs and 46 SS-24 ICBMs), and 44 strategic bombers Nuclear Disarmament Ukraine ↩︎
30. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/02/are-nuclear-weapons-an-option-for-ukraine/ ↩︎
31. Elon Musk’s goals appear to weaken European social democracy in support of nationalist libertarianism. German election: Why Elon Musk promotes the far-right AfD – DW – 12/30/2024 ; How Elon Musk Is Helping Germany’s Far-Right AfD Party Go Mainstream – Business Insider. US Vice President Vance met with AfD co-leader on the sidelines of the Munich Security conference. Vice President JD Vance meets German far-right leader days before election in Germany. It is possible that support by the US government officials and by Musk for far right groups in Europe could backfire. In any case, the break up of the European Union may be in the interests of specific US transnational corporations, but it is not in the US geostrategic interest. The US still needs a strong counter-weight to Russia and a rising China. ↩︎
32. 2017-04-12_afd-grundsatzprogramm-englisch_web.pdf ↩︎
33. Senator Ted Cruz has argued that if the US “got into a military conflict with Russia or with China, ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] would come right over the Arctic and Greenland is ideally positioned to defend the United States of America. » He has also argued that « Greenland has abundant rare earth minerals and critical minerals that are essential for all of the technology, all of the weaponry” that the US needs. When Danish officials complained that “Greenland is not for sale”, Cruz replied, “You know what? Everything’s for sale.’ » He also warned that « the Greenland independence movement has been growing in momentum. And if Greenland declares itself independent of you, Denmark gets nothing. » And lastly, he claimed that American citizenship for citizens of Greenland would be “an incredibly valuable inducement. »  Ted Cruz Reveals Warning He Issued to NATO Ally – Newsweek ↩︎
34. https://www.ft.com/content/52404d80-4ae5-486a-b50c-ee2cb99f2978?accessToken=zwAAAZWug-8Rkc9SQE2ASuVIatO1DO4suZ8peAE.MEUCIHVnG0KN0vGP9aR9zuWHTxtzdinxPnRahP4GBxCBEuBEAiEApoZUt_86dF8LSAEbvuPKqQ7TBANFw6z1dYyk98IPbCY&segmentId=52404d80-4ae5-486a-b50c-ee2cb99f2978 ↩︎
35. https://breakingdefense.com/2023/10/most-aid-to-ukraine-is-spent-in-the-us-a-total-shutdown-would-be-irresponsible/ ↩︎
36. https://www.meer.com/en/85736-toward-a-us-russian-chinese-showdown ↩︎
37. https://breakingdefense.com/2023/10/most-aid-to-ukraine-is-spent-in-the-us-a-total-shutdown-would-be-irresponsible/ ↩︎
38. https://english.elpais.com/usa/2022-02-02/pentagon-says-documents-published-by-el-pais-show-us-is-willing-to-negotiate-with-russia.html#?rel=mas_sumario ↩︎
39. See Scott Horton, Provoked Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine (2024) ↩︎
40. THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS PEACE IN UKRAINE – Russian & Eurasian Politics ↩︎

Author biography

Hall GARDNER is an international relations theorist, editorialist, TV commentator, poet and novelist. His many books on global politics, including Toward an Alternative Transatlantic Strategy (2021) in French and English; IR Theory, Historical Analogy and Major Power War (2019); Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History (2015); NATO Expansion and the U.S. Strategy in Asia (2013); and American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism” (2005), blend a historical and theoretical approach with contemporary international affairs, and concentrate on questions involving NATO and European Union enlargement, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact upon China and Eurasia in general, as well as the global ramifications of the “war on terrorism.”

His book World War Trump (2018) forewarned of Trump’s January 6, 2021 coup attempt. His book, The Failure to Prevent World War I, explored the causes of the so-called “War to End all Wars.” His first books, Surviving the Millennium (1994) and Dangerous Crossroads (1997) both forewarned of a dangerous Russian backlash, war with Ukraine, and the possibility of major power war if the U.S., NATO, and the European Union could not implement a new system of European Security that incorporated Russian security concerns.

These works likewise warned that Russia and China would adopt a closer geostrategic strategic partnership going beyond a “marriage of convenience” in response to the revitalization of the US doctrine of “containment” while China, in turn, would continue to pursue its goal of unifying with Taiwan with tacit Russian backing. His later books, Averting Global War (2007) and NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia (2013), all outlined a strategy to prevent major power war, as have World War Trump and Toward an Alternative Transatlantic Strategy. There is a real danger that the wider Middle East—that represents the Balkans of today—could draw the major powers into direct conflict.

His editorials have appeared in the L.A. Times, The Hill, Other News, Open Democracy, among many others. He has been interviewed by Courthouse News, TNT, Japanese Public Television (NHK): Global Debate Wisdom; Associated Press (AP), FRANCE 24, Deutsche Welle, Al Jazeera, Reuters, Radio France International (RFI), Bloomberg News, RFO “Toutes les France,” Voice of Russia, Russia Today, VOA-China, VOA-Iran, C-NBC TV News, BBC World News (radio), MacClean’s (Canada), Izvestia, O Globo (Brazil), Agence France Press, and EuroNews, among others.

Gardner’s poems have been published in numerous anthologies, such as The Peace or Perish Crisis Anthology, Fire Readings, the Paris Atlantic, and on the MEER website. His poem Vincent’s Room, and its translation into French, was chosen for National Translation Month (September 2021). His book of poems, The Wake-Up Blast (2008), represents 30 years of poetic protest.

His first novel, Year of the Earth Serpent Changing Colors, was published in January 2023. Year of the Earth Serpent Changing Colors. A Novel. | Columbia University Press The sequel, Year of the Horseshoe Bat—in Exile was  published in 2024. Year of the Horseshoe Bat | Columbia University Press

His website is: Hall | Hall Gardner; Articles and poetry: https://www.meer.com/en/authors/701-hall-gardner; Books: https://www.amazon.com/stores/Hall-Gardner/author/B001HPAN6S?ref=ap_rdr&isDramIntegrated=true&shoppingPortalEnabled=true