Two years on, is Ukraine’s military faltering?

Russia’s capture of Avdiivka marks its first meaningful military victory in almost a year. The town has little military value in itself. But its loss is important for two reasons. One is the symbolism of a Russian advance in the run-up to the country’s (sham) election in March and around the anniversary of the war. The other is that Ukrainian defences around the town are not as good as they should be. “We have been suffering casualties because of poorly dug-in positions,” complained a Ukrainian intelligence source to my colleague Tim Judah in his recent vivid dispatch from eastern Ukraine. In recent days Russia has advanced further west from Avdiivka to Lastochkyne. Is there a risk that it continues doing so?

My sense, based on recent conversations with Western military, defence and intelligence officials, is that a collapse of Ukrainian lines is unlikely. “Russia’s domestic ammunition production capabilities are currently insufficient for meeting the needs of the Ukraine conflict,” is the assessment of one informed observer. In other words, Russia is consuming what it produces (or gets from North Korea) and has little in reserve to use for a breakthrough. Russia’s army also lacks the leadership and skilled troops to mount a fast-moving offensive. What they can do, however, is more Avdiivkas: surround a town, pound its defenders and creep forward.

Many of the sharpest observers of the war are concerned. Konrad Muzyka, a military analyst, publishes a regular update through his firm, Rochan Consulting. “The general expectation is that Russia still [has] capacity for large-scale offensive action,” he warns. And that is not just in the east. In the south, around the main thrust of Ukraine’s unsuccessful counter-offensive last year, Russian forces have been attacking the modest salient that Ukraine drove into Russian lines. Mr Muzyka tells me that while Russia might not have the capacity to capture the key village of Robotyne in the short term, the gap in capabilities and manpower on both sides will only get bigger, “leading to more Russian gains in the south”. Any Ukrainian losses in this area would be a particularly heavy blow, given the lives and ammunition expended in last year’s advances.

It would be unfair, however, to focus on Russian advances without mentioning a spectacular Ukrainian success. On February 23rd Ukraine said it had downed a Russian A-50 airborne early-warning and control aircraft, a sort of flying radar and command post that can spot other planes and targets on the ground. This was the second A-50 loss in a matter of weeks. These platforms are highly expensive and scarce, as are their crews. Ukraine reckons that Russia only has six operational A-50s left and that they cannot be replaced quickly. If more are lost, it might make it impossible for Russia to keep one in the air at all times. In short, Ukraine is steadily taking out the Russian air force’s eyes and ears.

What do I take from all this? Ukraine’s position is deteriorating. It needs more manpower, ammunition and better-prepared defences, much like the Russian ones which blunted Ukraine’s offensive. There is no point in sugarcoating this. Russia is likely to make further gains. But its advances are coming at an eye-watering and possibly unsustainable cost. “We do not believe Russia has a meaningful plan beyond continuing to fight in the expectation that Russian manpower and equipment numbers will eventually tell,” observes the same Western official. The conclusion, for me, is that it is worth keeping Ukraine in the fight, until such a time as it can mount another offensive. As my colleague Arkady Ostrovsky wrote recently: “The gap between Mr Putin’s militarism and people’s wish for life to get back to normal will only grow.”