ACURA Exclusive: Pietro A. Shakarian: The Russo-Persian Partnership Pact: Significance and Implications

Almost 200 years later, Russia and Iran have never been closer.  On January 17, 2025, Iran’s affable reform-minded president, Masoud Pezeshkian, arrived in Moscow to a red-carpet reception.  After a warm meeting and over three hours of talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the two leaders signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between their respective countries.  The signed pact envisions an intensification of ties between Moscow and Tehran to a degree unprecedented in the history of Russo-Iranian relations.  The document was the result of months of intensive diplomatic work by both the Russian and Iranian sides.  It also reflected a significant deepening of relations that had been occurring steadily over the past decade, augmented by Russo-Iranian cooperation within BRICS and coordination on several major flashpoints—Ukraine, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), Gaza/Palestine, and Lebanon.

Prior to this groundbreaking event, Western—especially British—media outlets made persistent attempts to dismiss the obvious deepening of ties between Moscow and Tehran. Publications such as The Guardian sought to play-up the supposed points of disagreement between the sides on issues such as the rising tensions over the southern Armenian province of Syunik (Zangezur).  Still others have speculated, without any understanding of the internal dynamics of the Iranian Islamic Republic, that Pezeshkian was on course to lead a rapprochement with the West, especially the US.  Yet, to any serious observer of Russo-Iranian relations, it was abundantly clear that such speculation was completely divorced from reality.  The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty between Putin and Pezeshkian ran this point home, amplified by the obvious warmth between the two leaders.

The preamble of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty defines relations between the Iranian and Russian peoples as being “deeply historical,” stressing the “closeness of cultures and spiritual-moral values.”  It emphasizes the need to elevate Russo-Iranian relations to a “new level” (“novy uroven’”) and to give them a “comprehensive, long-term, and strategic character.”  The treaty itself is valid for 20 years but is automatically extended every five years, ensuring that it remains more or less perpetually effective, unless one of the signatories withdraws from it.  In the run-up to the signing of this landmark accord, analysts in both the East and West widely speculated on its potential nature. Some believed that the treaty would only be of an economic or cooperative nature.  Others speculated that it would be purely focused on defense—to such a degree that the treaty itself could even be called a “defense pact.” In fact, the treaty, being comprehensive, includes elements of both.  Its 47 articles cover everything from cooperation in the defense and energy spheres, to mutual support against sanctions, to the promotion of Persian literature and language in Russia and Russian literature and language in Iran.

Defense Cooperation

As Iran’s top diplomat Abbas Araghchi stressed, the treaty itself does not represent a “military alliance.”  Nevertheless, mutual defensive cooperation stands front and center in the text, with the first several articles being devoted entirely to that issue. The centrality of defense is undoubtedly informed by the recent challenges faced by Moscow and Tehran in their common geographic neighborhood.  Iran’s area largely corresponds to the vast Iranian plateau of Eurasia, touching many areas of mutual concern with Russia.  Shaped like an elegant Persian ewer, the country stretches from the Caucasus in the north, to the Persian Gulf in the south, and to Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent in the east.  The fact that Iran sits adjacent to the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia makes it an ideal partner for Russia, as the Kremlin aims to bolster security along its Eurasian perimeter amid increased pressure from the West. Moscow and Tehran likewise share significant common interests in the Middle East and the Levant, enhanced by the recent fall of the embattled government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

These common areas of interest are reflected in the relevant articles on defense cooperation in the treaty.  Section 1 of Article 3 obliges the parties to strengthen relations on the basis of “sovereign equality, territorial integrity, independence,” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of both sides.”  Section 3—a cornerstone of the treaty—prohibits the parties from supporting potential aggressors who might attack one of the two signatories. This section is especially significant in light of recent Israeli threats against Iran. Section 4 of Article 3 further obliges the parties against supporting separatist movements on each of the other’s territory. Given that Russia and Iran are large, multiethnic “civilizational” states, this section is certainly applicable to both sides.  However, it is especially relevant for Iran, given post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s irredentist designs on Iranian Azerbaijan (the historical Atropatene of antiquity).  As an Iranian Azerbaijani himself, Pezeshkian is particularly sensitive to Baku’s efforts to stir up separatism in his native province.  In recent years, Ilham Aliyev’s Azerbaijan has been actively encouraged in these aggressive irredentist endeavors by the Israeli and American governments.  Supported by copious amounts of “caviar diplomacy,” dubious “academics” like the Atlantic Council’s Brenda Shaffer have been particularly vocal about the cause of “Southern Azerbaijan” (Baku’s official irredentist name for Iran’s northern provinces).

Section 4 of Article 3 thus represents a strong refutation of these efforts to “balkanize” Iran.  In Persian eyes, it is also perceived as a significant symbolic gesture on the part of Moscow, due to the historical legacy of Russian and Soviet interventions in Iran’s internal affairs. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the Iranian memory of Stalin’s support for the breakaway Azerbaijani and Kurdish republics in northern Iran after World War II.  The latter history still resonates among many Iranians and was even represented by Marjane Satrapi in her graphic novel (later film) Persepolis. Significantly, Pezeshkian’s hometown, Mahabad, once served as the center for the short-lived Kurdish Republic, backed by Stalin. Nevertheless, it must be stressed again that Section 4 is arguably just as relevant to Russia as it is to Iran, given recent calls by certain Western politicians and pundits for the dissolution or “breakup” of the Russian Federation.

Article 4 of the treaty focuses on deepening cooperation in the intelligence sphere, while Article 5 is entirely devoted to military cooperation.  The latter envisions a deep and all-encompassing collaboration between Tehran and Moscow in all military spheres, stopping just short of an outright military alliance.  It obliges both parties to conduct joint military exercises on their respective territories as well as “beyond their borders” in accordance with international law.  Section 4 calls for cooperation against common military and security threats, as well as larger threats to regional security.  In a similar vein, Section 2 of Article 6 envisions annual meetings on bilateral military-technical cooperation.  Article 7 focuses on joint cooperation in the fight against terrorism, human trafficking, illegal migration, and more, while Articles 10 and 11 focus on cooperation in the spheres of arms control and information security respectively.

Areas of Mutual Interest

Articles 12 and 13 of the treaty refer to the need for defense and security cooperation in specific areas of the Russian and Iranian geographic neighborhood.  In particular, one of Russia’s leading scholars of the Caucasus, Sergey Markedonov, has referred to Article 12 as being “of fundamental importance.”  This particular article obliges the two signatories to “promote the strengthening of peace and security in the Caspian region, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and the Middle East” and unequivocally calls on the sides to “cooperate with the objective of preventing the interference” and “destabilizing presence” of “third states.”  With regard to Transcaucasia, the unnamed “third states” undoubtedly include the US, the UK, Israel, the members of the EU, and almost certainly Turkey.  This article will likely be welcomed by Georgia’s Irakli Kobakhidze but will give pause to Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev.  Pashinyan’s flirtations with the US and the EU and Aliyev’s extensive cooperation with Israel and Turkey put Yerevan and Baku at odds with Tehran and Moscow by the terms of this specific article.

Article 13 focuses exclusively on the Caspian region, an area of particular relevance to both Russia and Iran not only in terms of security, but also energy and north-south economic and transport cooperation.  This article alone contains four sections, reflecting the great importance that Moscow and Tehran attach to the Caspian as a common zone of cooperation.  It also reflects Iran’s plans to transform itself into a regional and international gas hub, a vision that Russian elites once invoked in reference to Turkey, during a period when relations between Moscow and Ankara were warmer.  Foreign interference is no less relevant in the Caspian, given the significant interest of the American and British war parties and energy industries in the region.  BP, for example, holds a 30% interest in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  These forces also share the long-term interest in developing a Trans-Caspian pipeline, by expanding the BTC across the Caspian to access the energy riches of Central Asia, especially Turkmenistan, to “contain” Russia, Iran, and China.  Yet, despite the significance that the Caspian region is accorded in the treaty, it was not mentioned at all by Putin or Pezeshkian in their press conference.  By contrast, the Middle East was mentioned six times, while the Caucasus was mentioned three times.

Article 14 of the treaty is likewise relevant to recent developments in the Caucasus, obliging the parties to facilitate the expansion of trade between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).  Of particular significance in this regard is the common border between Iran and EAEU member Armenia, in the mountainous province of Syunik, a region of major historical, spiritual, and cultural importance for the Armenian people. Azerbaijan seeks to claim this vital link between Iran and the EAEU as the “Zangezur corridor,” a vision known by Iranians as “NATO’s Turan Corridor.”  The aim of the “Kuwait on the Caspian” would be to secure a direct link with its Nakhichevan exclave and, by extension, NATO member Turkey, granting NATO open access to the Caspian Sea. Empowered by his belief that he can get anything he wants through military aggression, Aliyev has constantly threatened to forcibly seize this territory from Armenia, thus making Syunik another major potential flashpoint in Eurasia. The issue has profound security implications for Iran and Russia and, as the seriousness of the treaty’s language attests, this point is certainly not lost on Moscow or Tehran.

From Sanctions Support to the Shahnameh

Subsequent articles call for deepening bilateral economic, trade, energy, and transportation ties.  Section 2 of Article 16 calls for establishing “direct ties” between Russian federal subjects and the provinces (ostân-hâ) of Iran.  Article 19, with four sections, details mutual cooperation against sanctions, including an obligation not to join any international sanctions against either signatory, as well as a guarantee against “unilateral coercive measures.”  Article 20 builds on these points by detailing options to bypass SWIFT.   In particular, Section 2 calls for creating a “modern payment system independent of third countries.”  Article 23 pledges mutual assistance in the development of the peaceful use of atomic energy, while Article 25 calls for simplifying customs procedures between the two countries. Several additional articles articulate extensive cooperation in the science, healthcare, and education spheres.  In terms of culture, Articles 32 and 34 call for the promotion of Russian and Persian literature and language in both countries. In the sphere of mass media, Article 33 calls for countering “disinformation and negative propaganda” aimed against the signatories.  The concluding articles call for additional cooperation in several spheres, from tourism to sports to water resource management.

On the whole, all of these articles reflect the fact that the Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty is indeed just that – an all-encompassing document providing the basis for even deeper ties between two giants of Eurasia.  Tellingly, as Markedonov also noted, the treaty itself reflects already much of what Russo-Iranian relations had become in recent years.  Now, however, everything is codified on paper.  The text is rich in significant points, but the most significant aspect of the document is what it represents and implies as a whole.  Much like the Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the Russo-Iranian treaty represents yet another major indication that today’s world is fundamentally multipolar.  Any serious student of history or international relations would do well to pay attention and study this document very closely.  It is of immense importance, not only for Russia and Iran, but also for the changing landscape of global affairs more generally.

Pietro A. Shakarian, PhD is a historian of Russia and the Soviet Union and a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Historical Research at the National Research University–Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, Russia.