Full Chinese logistical support for Russia could be the real game changer of the war – and that support is growing more important and less discreet.

Two years ago today Vladimir Putin explained why he went to war. He said he had no intention to control Ukraine and only wanted to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” it, after the U.S. had pushed Russia too far, wrote Joe Lauria.

As the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion nears, and the latest aid package for Ukraine stalls in Congress, we must be clear-eyed about the future.

US-Russia relations once seemed so promising after the collapse of the USSR. An honest look at how they soured can help us understand today’s conflicts.

After two years of war, an increasingly sombre mood has swept over Ukraine and its supporters in the West

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BC–65 AD) was a Stoic philosopher of ancient Rome and tutor to emperors. Known for his philosophic works and essays dealing with thorny moral and political issues, Seneca used philosophy as a compass to navigate the challenging terrain of life. Recently, as I was reading a new translation of Sentences from Seneca, it struck me that some of Seneca’s teachings may apply to the tragic conflict that is still unfolding in Ukraine. In the spirit of bringing the wisdom of the past to bear on the present, I offer four of Seneca’s sentences as ways of illuminating the problems of the war.

Most Washington firms are still doing work for free, pushing for more aid and shaping messaging on the war

As the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine draws near, the outlook appears bleak: both sides have sustained horrific losses, millions of Ukrainians remain displaced or in exile, and there is no plausible sign of an end to the violence. Western capitals are struggling to supply funds and ammunition to Kyiv, while the Kremlin seemingly draws on limitless supplies and political support from authoritarian allies and continues to pound Ukrainian cities to rubble. Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican presidential candidate, says he would “encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies that spend insufficiently on defense, while Russian President Vladimir Putin threatens Poland and the Baltics in an interview with Tucker Carlson.

Six Brookings scholars (Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Steven Pifer, Melanie W. Sisson, Angela Stent, and Tara Varma) debate the questions Ukraine and its supporters now face:

Is Russia winning its war against Ukraine? Should the United States and its allies push Ukraine to negotiate with Russia?
How can the United States and its allies best ensure security and stability in Ukraine and Europe? Should NATO take further steps toward Ukrainian membership at its 75th-anniversary summit in Washington in July?
What concrete steps should the United States and Europe take in 2024 to prevent a Ukrainian defeat? What would the consequences of a Russian victory be for the trans-Atlantic alliance?
These are hard questions, with no easy answers; the authors disagree with each other, and some of the disagreements remain unresolved. But the one thing we all agree on is: rarely in living memory has so much been at stake, not just for Ukraine, but for Europe and the Western alliance. And, arguably, for Russia too.

Russian-Ukrainian peace talks, February–March 2022.

Zelensky may soon be forced out on account of the bloody battle loss at Avdiivka