Trump vs. Zelensky, Part 2

In August of 2014, Professor John Mearsheimer wrote an essay for Foreign Affairs entitled “Why the West is to Blame for the Ukraine Crisis”. There he wrote that no Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance by a mortal enemy with Ukraine. Therefore, the USA should abandon its attempt to bring Ukraine into the Western alliance. If they did not, Russia would wreck Ukraine rather than let it go that far. On February 8, 2015, he wrote in the New York Times that America should not arm Ukraine, because it would risk escalation of the war in the Donbas. Ukraine should stay neutral for the sake of everyone involved.

He was not the only Cassandra issuing a warning about this. Many people inside and outside the government predicted that Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, the region of Georgia, was a trip wire for the Russians, and it did not matter who the leader in Moscow was. In fact, years ago, National Security Council Russian specialist Fiona Hill advised against bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the western alliance. She warned Vice President Dick Cheney against it. Why? Because so many of our allies in Europe opposed it and the Russians would regard it as a provocation. (Scott Horton, Provoked, p. 446)

Defense Secretary Robert Gates also opposed marching NATO east to Ukraine and Georgia. He specifically pointed out that the NATO agreement rotating troops through bases in Romania and Bulgaria was a taunting type of mistake. With that example, Ukraine and Georgia would be needlessly overreaching. Russian scholar Michael Mandelbaum wrote that this Ukraine policy was irrelevant and at worst counterproductive. He also labeled it political in nature. (Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995)

Another former Secretary of Defense, William Perry also complained about an unwise eastward policy. He said it would be provocative to the Russians. The reply Perry got on this is revealing of the arrogance motivating this movement: “Who cares what they think? They’re a third rate power.” As he then added, that message got through to Moscow. (Guardian, March 9, 2016, story by Julian Borger)

French president Jacques Chirac warned, “We have humiliated them too much. One day there will be a dangerous nationalist backlash.” (Meeting memo by Anthony Lake, 1/1/96) Veteran diplomat Dennis Ross said the same thing: this would be too humiliating for Russia, and the nationalists would have a field day in Moscow. (Horton, p. 130) Perhaps the wisest and most experienced Russian expert in America, former USSR diplomat George Kennan, was also formally against it. In the New York Times he called this movement east no less than “A Fateful Error”. (2/5/97) He told reporter Thomas Friedman, “I think NATO expansion is the beginning of a new Cold War.” (Friedman, NY Times, 5/2/98)

Kennan’s last comment accented the real problem. Combined with the sneering at what America thought was now a third rate power, marching NATO up to the Russian border was, in essence, igniting Cold War 2. Nixon/Reagan speechwriter Pat Buchanan—a former violent Cold Warrior—warned that it could cause the replacement of the compliant Boris Yeltsin with an anti-American nationalist. If that happened the blame “must rest squarely with a haughty US elite that has done its best to humiliate Russia.” He then pointedly asked: “Why are we doing this….the Soviet empire is dead….a friendly Russia is far more critical to US security than any alliance with Warsaw or Prague.” (Horton, p. 121)

In the face of all these warnings—and many more– what made this irresistible motion east so questionable was this: Russia asked to join NATO thrice. The first time was Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Secretary of State James Baker, the second was under Bill Clinton and the third was under Bush 2. All three offers were either ignored or sloughed off. (Ibid, p. 63, pp. 329-339) Would not this puzzling “everybody but us” action, make Moscow wonder–as Kennan and Buchanan suggested—that the motive for the march was to revive the Cold War? Except this time Moscow’s former allies in the Warsaw Pact would be arrayed against them. And this time the march would lead right up to the Russian border. Jack Matlock, former ambassador to the USSR, warned against precisely that. (Responsible Statecraft, 2/15/2022)

Giving all this a multiplier effect were the lies involved in the step by step encroachment eastward. It began with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. That milestone caused the neoconservative movement to puff itself up into Goliath type dimensions. As the late journalist and author Charles Krauthammer wrote, now with the USSR gone, it was America’s unipolar moment, the USA could remake the world as its leaders saw fit. (Foreign Affairs, 1/1/90) He was not alone. Journalist and publisher Bill Kristol and columnist Robert Kagan labeled it the moment of “benevolent global hegemony.” (Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996) Undersecretary of Defense for Obama, Michele Flournoy, talked about a military posture of Full Spectrum Dominance. (Horton, p. 40) In his book The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, said it was a moment of predominance.

Make no mistake, this attitude was prevalent in the halls of power under people working Russian affairs in the State Department. A prime example being diplomat Victoria Nuland, Kagan’s wife. (Horton, p. 443) And also in congress, with men like senators John McCain and Joe Biden. It was the time to stomp on Russia. (The Hill, 3//16/17, story by Daniel Depetris; NY Times, 3/30/98 story by Eric Schmitt)

All this is to show that America was not going into this dangerous march toward Ukraine with eyes shut. We were doing it with ample warnings. The neocons, and I am including Hillary Clinton under that rubric, won out in the end. But because of all these red flags, the US tried to hide its real motives. In some cases it outright lied.

The lies began with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Krauthammer saw this as a wedge to move the world: “I suggest we go all the way and stop at nothing short of universal domination.” (The National Interest, Winter 1989/90). The neocons thought German unification could mark the start of the American dominion of all Europe through NATO. But if that was to occur, Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev would have to get his troops out of eastern Europe and dissolve the Warsaw Pact. Margaret Thatcher of Britain was against German unification because she knew Gorbachev was hesitant to do it. (Irish Times, 12/28/19, story by Harry McGee)

President George H. W Bush and Secretary of State James Baker went around Thatcher. They cajoled Gorbachev into doing those things with the promise that once Germany was one, NATO would not move east at all. That this was agreed to was proven by notes posted at George Washington University in both 2017 and 2018. (Svetlana Savranskaya “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard”, National Security Archive, December 12, 2017). This pledge came from the president himself. (op. cit. Matlock). And in February of 1990, at a joint press conference, Baker and West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich stated that NATO had no intention of moving toward the East. (UPI story by Jim Anderson of 2/2/90). This pledge was made from Baker to Gorbachev no less than six times.(Horton, p. 50). When on November 26, 2009 the German magazine Der Spiegel reviewed the record, they concluded:

….there was no doubt that the West did everything it could to give the Soviets the impression that NATO membership was out of the question for countries like Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Gorbachev acted on these supposed pledges. Russian troops were moved out of eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in 1991. Turned out it was all a smoke screen. For in July of 1990 Baker alluded to the expansion of NATO for those who wanted out of the Warsaw pact. (Horton, p. 64) Just a few days after German unification was complete, in a private NATO memo in advance of a meeting, this statement appeared: “Should the United States and NATO now signal to the new democracies of Eastern Europe NATO’s readiness to contemplate their future membership?” (ibid, p. 66)

What makes this dual track even worse is that on August 1, 1991—the eve of Ukraine declaring independence– President Bush specifically said he would not participate in choosing between Gorbachev and independence leaders in order “to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism.” So quite naturally not only did Gorbachev buy into the overt promises, so did his successor Boris Yeltsin. To the point he thought Russia could join NATO down the line. (LA Times, 12/21/91, story by William Tuohy and Norman Kempster) But to be fair, its an open question whether or not Bush and Baker ever considered extending NATO as far east as Ukraine.

There is little question that the Clinton administration, especially under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, did consider it. Bill Clinton had an opportunity to snuff out the embers of any kind of Cold War 2. He did not. This despite Moscow pulling its troops out of Eastern Europe and downsizing its army by 70% during the Clinton years. (Congressional Research Staff report of 9/4/97) In fact it was under Clinton that NATO began moving dramatically east with the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joining in 1999. Clinton did this over strenuous objections by Yeltsin. In so doing Yeltsin reminded the new president of the previous promises made by the prior White House. (Yeltsin letter of 9/15/93) Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured Yeltsin Clinton would not expand the NATO alliance. (Horton, p. 102) Again, as with Bush I, this was a conscious ruse. For the decision to move eastward was made around the same time. (Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir, p. 167)

On January 12, 1994 the mask was dropped. In Prague, Clinton stated, “The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how.” Yeltsin was enraged, and when he saw Clinton two days later he told him, if such were the case, then Russia had to join first. Clinton ignored the request. (US Embassy cable to State, 1/14/94) Six months later, Clinton said the same thing in a speech in Warsaw. Again, Yeltsin said Russia was to join first. Again, this plea was ignored.

Question: Considering this repeated pattern—announcement, a request and then denial– how could Moscow not think that expansion was aimed at them?

In fact a State Department official admitted to the Poles that fooling Russia with feints was the intent. The falsity began with Germany and would now be extended to Eastern Europe. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake admitted the same: it was a charade designed to contain Russia. And it would lead up to a possible membership for Ukraine. (Horton, p. 108)

By 1995, Yeltsin finally understood Clinton was lying. He told him directly that he could not agree to expanding NATO to the borders of Russia. It would be a betrayal of the Russian people and it would constitute nothing but humiliation if it happened. It would be a new form of encirclement. He concluded with the most crucial question: Why do you want to do this? (Summary of meeting at Kremlin May 10, 1995)

The other problem was: how could anyone say that NATO was simply a defensive alliance? Not after the massive and continuous bombings of Kosovo and then Libya. And it was the Clintons—Bill and then Hillary—who were behind those two assaults. Just like it was Hillary Clinton who pushed NATO expansionist Madeleine Albright on her husband for Secretary of State.

As we know, first three new states joined NATO in 1999. Then seven in 2004; two more in 2009 and finally Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020. In other words, after the Cold War had ended, NATO doubled its membership. This, even though the ostensible reason for its existence–a communist threat from the USSR–did not exist anymore. Russia was not a communist country and the USSR had broken up. Russia was shrinking not expanding.

As early as 1997, Clinton began a process for considering Ukraine as a member of NATO. This was 4 months after Yeltsin had told him specifically not to do so. (Memorandum of Helsinki meeting 3/21/97)

Things got worse under Bush II. He withdrew from the ABM Treaty of 1972. He then announced that he would place defensive missiles in Romania and Poland, and radars in the Czech Republic. When asked what these were for, with a straight face, he said Iran. (Corey Flintoff, NPR News, 10/28/ 2007) What made this worse was that these defensive systems, the MK 41, are capable of being switched to offensive Tomahawk cruise missiles which can he armed with H bombs. (Posted at Foreign Policy web site, January 12, 2022, article by Jack Detsch) Then there was the planned stationing of F-16’s in the Baltics, now also part of NATO. (Steven Myers, NY Times, 4/3/2004)

What happened to empathy in diplomacy? When the time was ripe for a real détente, Clinton had abused Yeltsin and humiliated Russia. Now Bush 2 was arming an eastward NATO, a grouping his father promised would never exist. As the NY Times wrote, “To Russia, at least, the meaning is clear: the alliance still views it as a potential enemy rather than a partner.” (Thom Shanker, NY Times, 8/15/2004)

As Pat Buchanan predicted, this is what led to the rise of Vladimir Putin.